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Traditionally, the methods of public policy analysis have been
thought to be neutral and apolitical.

This dissertation demonstrates

that policy analysis can often be politically biased.

In Part I, it

is shown that the assumptions built into much of policy analysis (assump-

tions based largely on the presumed validity of the logical-positivist

approach to social science) tend to distort our perspective on public
policy issues and problems.

Furthermore, these distortions are found

to favor certain identifiable interests and ideological positions.

Ex-

amples from U.S. energy policy are used to illustrate these points.

Part

II of the dissertation attempts to construct a non-positivist approach to

policy analysis (based largely on the assumptions rooted in the inter-

pretive approach to social science) that not only avoids the kinds of
problems described in Part

I,

but also encourages a more imaginative and

democratic approach to our pressing policy problems.
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CHAPTER

I

THE NATURE OF POLICY ANALYSIS

The purpose of this study is to identify and explore the
political biases in public policy analysis

— an

ally thought to be politically neutral.

I

activity that is conventionwill investigate the source

and nature of these biases and explain why they are an inherent
part
of current analytical approaches.

I

will also advance some suggestions

for how these biases can be transcended.

The subject of biases in public policy analysis is not, of course,
an entirely original one.

For example, this study is similar in spirit

to some of the work done by Guy Benveniste in The Politics of Expertise

—a

book concerned with the political role of the expert planner in the

modern state.

^

I

share with Benveniste a concern for piercing the mask

of neutrality which obscures the political dimension of the work done

by professional policy analysts.

However, this study differs from his

in that it is less concerned with the biases resulting from the polit-

ical role the policy analyst is put into in the planning process and

more concerned with those political biases that are founded in the fundamental analytic assumptions and methods that inform the

analyst's

work.

Given these theoretical concerns, this study is much closer to
the work done by observers of policy analysis like Brian Fay and Laurence

Tribe.

2

Both of these scholars probe the basic philosophical and meth1

odological theories which help to constitute public policy analysis and
seek to demonstrate how these theories interconnect and support various

contemporary political ideologies.

Although my general approach is

similar, I hope to add a more substantive dimension to this kind of

theoretical analysis.

Throughout this work

I

shall focus on the area

of National Energy Policy and will be continually exploring how the

political biases in policy analysis have affected the way we in the
U.S. have approached our national energy problems.

The reader may also note some resemblance between this study
and some of the work done by Martin Rein in Social Science and Public

Policy

3

for we are both concerned with the problems caused by the

,

positivist underpinnings in policy analysis and are both aware of the
need to develop an approach to analysis which explicitly addresses the

nonnative and political dimensions of policy questions

— subjects

that

have been traditionally considered out-of-bounds in policy analysis.

Rein however fails to present a well worked out scheme for approaching
those questions and this is a gap
study.

I

I

will be filling with this present

shall set out a detailed and systematic alternative to the

positivist perspective

— an

alternative that is based on recent work

in the philosophy of social science and moral philosophy.

The Field of Public Policy Analysis

Let us stipulate what is meant by public policy analysis, who

practices it, and what the data-base will be for this investigation.
The question of what policy analysis actually is will be one of the

continuing themes of this work, but for now it can be defined most

simply as the systematic study of public policy
issues for the purpose
of producing recommendations which will affect
the decisions of policy-

makers.

Policy analysis is not only an intellectual endeavor,
it is

also a growing profession with a large number of
practitioners.

For

the purpose of description, these practitioners can
be divided into

three rough categories:
1.

Government Policy Analysts:

those who work for government

policy-makers in local, state and federal policy-making and
implementing institutions.

Alice Rivlin and her colleagues

at the Congressional Budget Office would be typical examples.
2.

Private Policy Analysts:

examples are those who work in pri-

vate think-tanks like the Rand Corporation, Brookings Institution, or the American Enterprise Institute, and who engage in

both independent and government sponsored policy studies.
3.

University-Based Policy Analysts: those analysts like Robert
Dorfman and James Coleman who are based in colleges and universities and engage in contract research and/or work occasionally in think-tanks or directly with the government.

Often

these university-based analysts also take part in the training
of new professional policy analysts.

Much of what now allows members of these three different groups
to fit into the category of policy analyst is the fact that they have

often gone through similar professional training and often use the
same basic analytic approaches.

This statement might not have been

true in the 1950 's and early sixties, when practically anyone dealing

with policy issues could call themselves policy analysts.

But in the

4

1970' s, public policy analysis began to emerge as a specific profession,

complete with its own professional organizations, professional journals,
and most importantly, its own professional schools of policy analysis

like the LBJ School at the University of Texas in Austin, The Public

Policy Program at the JFK School of Government at Harvard, and the Institute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan.

These

graduate programs of Policy Analysis, Public Management, Public Administration, Economics, etc. have provided a training ground for the anal-

ysts going into the three areas of employment described above,

In

these programs, part of learning to be a professional involves learning
the systematic methods that are characteristic of the profession: cost

benefit analysis, mathematical modeling, systems analysis, and so on.
In this sense, much of what now defines a policy analyst is the formal

approach he or she takes to understanding policy issues and choices.
In my investigation of public policy analysis I will be using

three basic kinds of literature as my data base.
1.

Policy Studies.

I

will rely extensively on the actual reports

produced by various professional policy analysts.

In order to

lend some consistency and focus to the investigation,

I

will be

concentrating primarily on policy studies done in the area of
National Energy Policy, although studies from other policy
areas will be used when they are particularly good illustrations of a point being made.
2.

Textbooks.

I

will also be relying on works intended to help

in the training of public policy analysts.

These works are

assumpparticularly helpful in investigating the fundamental

tions underlying policy analysis, for they tend
to address

those assumptions in a much more explicit way than
the policy studies themselves.

Works by Edith Stokey and Richard

Zeckhauser,^ Larry Wade,^ E.S.Quade,^ and Thomas Dye^ are
examples of books in this category.
3.

Overblew Books.

By overviews books I mean those scholarly

works which describe the state of the art and /or critically
discuss the field of public policy analysis.

Examples would

include books by Martin Rein,^ Alice Rivlin,^^ Richard
and others.

Nelson,"'""'"

Those works also tend to address the basic con-

cepts and presuppositions underlying policy analysis, and
they will be used to both express and support judgements and

conclusions that will be made about the field as a whole.

The Neutrality of Policy Analysis

A major defining characteristic of the practice of policy analysis is the conviction, frequently stressed, that such work is apolitical

.

The image of policy analysis as a neutral, technical activity

has been present ever since the early days of the profession.

For in-

stances, in the halcyon days of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting move-

ment (PPB) in the sixties, it was confidently declared that "The pro-

gram budget is a neutral too.

It has no politics."

12

And today it is

still often claimed that even though policy analysis are in the political system, they are not

of^

it

— they

are not partison political actors

Charles Schultz is one of those who acknowledges that analysts are

participants in the political process, but insists that they are par-

6

tisan only in the sense of being "partisan efficiency advocates.

At

each level of the decision process, these participants become parti-

cular champions of efficiency and effectiveness as criteria in deci-

sion-making.",13

It is of course very much in the interests of policy

analysts to reassure policymakers that they are not a political threat,
that they are simply there to help the policymaker better achieve his

or her goals

—a

beneficial, but essentially neutral role.

As Guy

Benveniste has observed, policy analysts often go out of their way
to point out that "experts will not alter the political process,

they will only enhance it."

lA

This apolitical image projected by many analysts is reinforced

by the political realities of their roles in the policymaking process.

Their role is not political in the sense that they wield any

direct or significant power in the political system.

Analysts do not

make policy; they are primarily advisors and their advice can be accepted or rejected.

It is widely understood

the policy analysis community

— that

— and

often resented by

policymakers will not hesitate to

reject a perfectly sound policy study if it is politically expedient
for them to do

so.'''^

In this sense, then, policy analysts could hard-

ly be thought of as significant or powerful political actors.

Finally, this neutral image of policy analysis is also preferred

by policymakers themselves.

Studies have shown that policymakers in-

sist that studies be objective, and that a lack of objectivity is one
of the primary reasons for the rejection of analytic findings.

1

Im-

portantly, this lack of objectivity is usually thought not to be the
analysts
fault of policy analysis itself, but the fault of particular

7

who introduce their own personal biases, or who fail to develop an

adequate study design.

It is also acknowledged that policy research

can be biases by the actions of policymakers themselves.

They might,

for instance, direct policy research away from certain kinds of so-

cial problems, or toward some political goals but not others.

James

Schlesinger has noted that political pressures can sometimes bias analyses in the following way:

The judgement of the decisionmaker regarding major objectives
and what is or is not important is likely to feed back and influence the analysis. .. Specif ic terms of reference may indicate
which scenarios are acceptable, which unacceptable, and which
contingencies should or should not be considered. It is perfectly appropriate, if not obligatory, for the analysts to point
out deficiencies in study assumptions or terms of reference.
Yet, many will lack the perception or the inclination while
others would regard such actions as personally imprudent. In
these cases the analysis will only play back to the decisionmaker a more sharply defined version of what was already implicit in his assumptions.
The role of analysis then becomes not
so much to sharpen the intuitions of the decisionmaker as to
confirm them. 17
But again,

in these cases, it is crucial to note that this bias is

caused by the abuse of policy analysis by particular individuals,
and is not caused by anything in the analytic techniques themselves,

which are thought to be politically neutral.

When used properly,

policy analysis remains apolitical.
However, it will be shown in this study that this conventional

view of policy analysis as apolitical is mistaken and misleading.
There are political biases in public policy analysis, and it can be

considered a political activity.

To be clear, the bias in policy

analysis is not the personal kind alluded to above.

My interest is

analyst
not in the well known fact that the personal biases of the

8

(and the policymaker) can sometimes make their way into policy
studies.

Rather,

I

am concerned about the political biases that exist in policy

analysis even in its most pure form.

The focus of this work will be

on the paradigmatic political biases in policy analysis

— biases

that

are embedded in the very nature of the analytic paradigms themselves
and would thus come into play no matter who used the paradigms.

These

biases originate in the epistemological and methodological assumptions

which infom policy analysis.

Several of

these assumptions distort

our perspective on policy issues in such a way that certain interests
and ideologies are systematically favored.
I

It is in this sense that

will argue that policy analysis is politically biased.

In order to

begin to percieve this bias it is helpful to consider more carefully
the terms in which we think about policy analysis itself.

Policy Analysis:

Tool or Perspective?

How we conceptualize and define public policy analysis has much
to do with whether we see it as neutral or biased.

Conventionally,

policy analysis is thought of as a set of tools like cost-benefit analysis, systems

analysis, decisions trees, computer simulations, and

so on, which can be applied to policy problems.

which are thought to be politically neutral

Tool are phenomena

— they

can be used by

Democrats as well as by Republicans and are considered to be "equally

applicable to a socialist, capitalist, or mixed enterprise society, to
a democracy or a dictatorship."^^

Since the analytical tools can be

goals,
used by all sorts of political actors for all kinds of political

not the
any political responsibility is thought to lie with the user,

9

not the tools themselves.

For example, a hammer and a saw can be used

to build a hospital or a torture chamber; but it would
hardly seem rea-

sonable to lay the praise or the blame for such structures on the
tools
that built them.

The logic of such a position begins to wear thin, however, when

we consider its expression in the campaign against gun control by the

National Rifle Association: "Guns don't kill people

— people

kill people."

The argument is basically the same as that above: blame people not
their neutral tools.

But is a gun a "neutral" tool?

are only good for certain kinds of activities

Perhaps not.

— like

violence.

Guns

And

one could certainly make the case that such "tools" do encourage
violence.

And while it would be fallacious to maintain that arms

create violent human tendencies, it does seem likely that their pro-

liferation would exacerbate those tendencies and make it easier to
fulfill them.

19

And this is, in fact,

quite similar to the argument

that I want to make about policy analysis, that it is a set of tools

which are only good for certain kinds of political activities and
they thus encourage those activities.

But while I feel this is a

valid line of argument, it is not the one which best illuminates the

political nature of policy analysis.

It continues to conceive of

policy analysis techniques as "tools," and

I

believe that the polit-

ical implications of policy analysis become much more apparent when

we transcend the narrow notion of policy analysis as a tool and

realize that it is better thought of as a perspective
looking at policy issues.

—a

way of

10

The notion that policy analysis is a perspective on
policy

problems is one that finds support from several of the
more thoughtful policy analysts.

For example, the eminent policy analyst, E.S.

Quade, shuns the notion that systems

analysis is merely a set of

techniques or tools, preferring instead to think of it as an "art,"
an "approach," a "perspective," and even a "philosophy "^°
.

In addi-

tion, two of the leading analysis at the prestigious Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard, Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, char-

acterize policy analysis, in general, as "a framework for thinking
about policy problems and making choices."
icy analysis is a mode of thought

—a

In a very real way, pol-

way of structuring how we think

of policy problems and how we go about solving them.

The extent to

which these Harvard analysts believe in policy analysis as an intellectual approach to the world is made clear by their instructions to

those who wish to become policy analysts.

Our perennial advice to students is " Practice !" Practice on
all kinds of situations, large and small, public and private.
Look regularly at the front page of the newspaper and think
hard about one of the policy problems featured... Practice on
your own problems and decisions, using models to get your
thinking straight or to illuminate commonplace events. For
example when you find yourself waiting in line, ask yourself
what could be accomplished with additional service capacity,
and what the benefits of such a move would be... Make up your
mind that at least once every day you will deliberately apply
the (policy analysis) outline to a problem you face. You'll
be amazed at what it will do for your reputation for perceptiveness and good judgement. 22

While a bit overstated, the point is clear enough: policy analysis
is best thought of as a mode of thought or an intellectual perspective

on policy questions.

This conception of analysis allows us to under-

stand better the manner in which analysis fits into the decision-making

11

process.

It is important to realize that analysis offers to policy-

makers more than information, a model, or even specific policy recommendation; it offers a certain perspective, a characteristic way of

defining and approaching policy issues.

This function of analysis is

at least partially confirmed in one of the few major studies done on

the uses of policy analysis research by policymakers.

Nathan Caplan^"^

found that, while hard, empirical information sometimes did directly

influence policymakers,

more often they cited the major contribution

of policy analyses as being "conceptual."

By conceptual it is meant

that the analysis primarily functioned to affect the "frame of refer-

ence" or "perspective" within which policymakers approached policies.

Evidence supporting the conceptual influence of policy analysis
of policymakers

and the political system can be found in the very na-

ture of the political language that is characterstic of the modern

industrial state.

Many of the concepts and terms used in public

policy analysis have become an integral part of our political vocabulary.

Terms like "costs and benefits," "zero-based budgeting," "policy

option," cost effectiveness," "externalities," "maximizing," "program-

matic planning," and so on have become a common part of political discourse in our legislatures and bureaucracies.

Since we think in terms

of language, this infusion of policy analysis inevitably brings with it
a corresponding infusion of the policy analysis perspective on policy

issues.

Thus it can be stressed that the effect of policy analysis

on the policy process is not solely dependent on the power of the par-

ticular analyst, but on the tendency of the terms and perspectives of

12

policy analysis to infiltrate our political culture and help
to structure the way we think about policy questions.

But let us get a bit

more specific, and begin to consider just what the exact nature of
this
policy analysis perspective is, its defining characteristics, its
assumptions, etc.

Policy Analysis as Scientific Rationality

One of the problems with identifying the perspective offered by

policy analysis is the fact that we have what first appears to be

many different perspectives.
techniques

There are a variety of policy analysis

— cost-effectiveness,

ysis, econometric modeling, etc.

proaches.

operations research, systems

—

anal-

all with apparently different ap-

This variety makes it easy to fall into a "forest for the

trees" problem where too much attention to differences makes it dif-

ficult to appreciate what these methods have in common.

We can, how-

ever, identify several common threads that run through most Of these

modes of analysis.

One of the most important commonalities is a com-

mitment to rationality.

Policy analysis in its essence is the attempt

to approach policy issues rationally.

Carol Weiss has pointed out

that for most policy analysts,
their commitment to social research is grounded in a belief in
They see the world as a complex place, and they
rationality.
seek guideposts and directional principles to find their way
In their view, social science provides both the theothrough.
retical directions and the empirical soundings to reach desired
To put these resources at the service of policymakers
goals.
will increase the chances that decisions that are reached will
be sound and wise. 24

As Weiss implies, the rationality sought by analysts is not just
any kind, it is scientific rationality— for rationality and clear

13

thinking in our culture are virtually synonomous with science and the

scientific method.

This understanding of the perspective of policy

analysis as a scientific one is evident in many of the common definitions of this activity.

For instance, the Policy Studies Organiza-

tion, a prominent professional group, has defined policy analysis as

the "application of political and social science to important policy

problems."

Thomas Dye, a noted analyst in academia, sees policy ana-

lysis as a "scientific approach to society's problems, ... an effort
to develop and test general propositions about the causes and conse-

quences of public policy and to accumulate reliable research findings
of general relevance."

25

One can also find indications of this scien-

tific perspective in the definition of specific forms of policy analysis.

For instance, "operations research is the application of scien-

tific method to the decisions problems of government, business, and

other social organizations;"

26

and Edward Suchman has defined pro-

gram evaluation research as "the specific use of the scientific method
for the purpose of making an evaluation."

27

And finally, the high

degree of commitment to this scientific image can be seen in the self-

descriptive language of analysts who insist on referring to themselves
as policy scientists and to their profession as the policy sciences

28
.

The effort to apply scientific rationality to policy questions

was probably inevitable given the great appreciation our culture has
for science.

As Americans, we have always been enamored with the

scientific method and its products, from the steam engine and the

telegraph to radio, television, lazers, and other such modern miracles,
to solve
Adn particularly impressive has been the ability of science

14

problems.

Scientific thought has been instrumental in allowing
us

to span rivers, cure disease, win wars, communicate
over vast distances,

and put a man on the moon.

Given this impressive track record, it

was probably only a matter of time before we turned to
the scientific

method in an attempt to solve the multiplying social and economic
problems of industrial society.

In this sense, policy analysis is

the embodiment of our belief that the most serious intellectual ap-

proach to any problem is a scientific one.
right

— do

it scientifically.

If you want something done

As Brian Fay has rightly pointed out,

much of the appeal of policy analysis is based on the "tacit presumption that science provides the paradigm example or proper thinking;

and as long as any enterprise is not treated in a scientific way, it
is being treated in an imperfect way."

29

It should be noted that the effort to integrate science with

politics did not begin with public policy analysis, but rather is an
old theme in American political thought.

Policy analysis is in many

ways simply the modern reincarnation of a political dream which can
be traced back to the Founding Fathers.

Federalists like James Madison

and Alexander Hamilton were fond of thinking of their newly drafted con-

stitution as an expression of the "new science of politics."

They were

children of the Enlightenment, impressed with the beauty and utility
of precise and regular laws.

They attempted to design a political sys-

tem that was grounded upon, in the words of John Schaar, the notion
that "the general laws of political motion are as precise and com-

prehencsive in the political realm as the general laws of motion are
in the physical realm."

These early attempts to scientize politics

15

are crude by todays standards of science and social science

.

The fulfill-

ment of the desire to wed politics to science has to await the development of sophisticated methods in the management and behavioral sciences
like systems analysis and econometric modeling.

But once these methods

came into use, commentators were quick to label policy analysis as
the "Space Age method for designing the future rationally and managing

the present scientifically." "

But this characterization of policy analysis as a science raises
an interesting question.

If policy analysis is simply an embodiment of

scientific rationality, where could the political bias be?
tific rationality neutral and value-free?

Isn't scien-

The answer to this last

question if no, and to begin to see why this is so we must remember that
all perspectives

— including

our perception of the world.

a scientific one

— are

ways of organizing

A perspective is biased in the sense that

it focuses our attention on certain phenomena and away from others.

It

divides up the world and directs our analytic efforts in some directions
but not in others.

In terms of policy analysis, a scientific perspec-

tive serves to emphasize certain dimenstions of policy questions and

de-emphasize others.

But not only does a scientific perspective struc-

ture our perception, it does so in ways that can be fault and misleading.

As we will see, many of the methodological assumptions that lie

at the leart of this scientific approach to policy are in fact flawed

— they

work to distort our understanding of policy issues.
My approach to the political biases in scientific rationality is

in some ways similar to the work of those who have exposed the ideolog-

ical dimensions of economic rationality.

Many of the techniques in

16

policy analysis, like cost-benefit analysis, are not only examples
of scientific rationality, but of economic rationality as well, and

several authors have shown that the assumptions of economic rationality are in fact biased toward certain kinds of values and political

positions.

For example, Aaron Wildavsky, in his 1966 critique of

cost-benefit analysis, demonstrated that it presumes the primacy of

individualistic values, the superiority of the market economy, and
the legitimacy of current distributions of income

cost-benefit analysis serves as

de_

— that,

in effect,

facto liberal-capitalist ideology.

Laurence Tribe has made a similar point in his provocative article,
"Policy Sciences: Analysis or Ideology?", in which he concludes that
a classical economic perspective on policy choices created identifi-

able normative and political biases.

33

In his words.

The policy sciences' intellectual and social heritage in the
classical economics of unfettered contract, consumer sovereignty,
and perfect markets. .. inclines them, within that paradigm, toward
the exaltation of utilitarian and self-interested individualism,
efficiency, and maximized production against distributive ends,
procedural and historical principles, and the values (often nonmonetizable, discontinuous, and of complex structure) associated
with personal rights, public goods, and communitarian and ecologiical goals. 34
In the same article, Tribe suggests that a promising direction
for researching the ideological dimensions of policy analysis "would

be to investigate.

.

.the underlying patterns that the policy sciences'

axioms and criteria reveal,

(and)

to study how these patterns

'

inter1.35

lock' with other contemporaneously developed areas of thought..."

This investigation procedes in that spirit, but instead of economic

rationality, the focus is scientific rationality.

17

Components of the Argument

Throughout the various chapters in Part
proceed on three interconnected levels.
level

I

I,

the argument will

First, on the theoretical

will show how the scientific rationality in policy analysis

is actually scientism

36

—a

faulty attempt to apply the techniques

of the natural sciences to social analysis.

The focus will include

a brief consideration of the nature of the logical-positivist phil-

osophy of social sciences to social analysis.

The focus will in-

clude a brief consideration of the nature of the logical-positivist

philosophy of social science which underlies and helps to constitute
the scientific approach of policy analysis.

In particular I will

be examining three of the fundamental philosophical assertions of

positivism which contribute to this scientific perspective:
1.

The assumption of methodological unity in the sciences.
This posits that the methods of analysis appropriate to
the physical sciences are appropriate for the scientific

study of social phenomena as well.

Thus it is necessary

and justifiable to approach the analysis of policy issues
in the same manner that a natural scientist would approach

the study of physics.
2.

The belief that the evaluation of values issues is beyond
the scope of national, scientific investigation.

Thus the

analysis of normative questions neither can nor should be a

central part of scientific policy analysis.
3.

The assumption that scientific public policy analysis can
and should be an apolitical activity.

Thus it is thought
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that there is no inherent political bias to this neutral form
of analysis.
It will be sho'wn that all of these notions are indefensible.

However, I do not intend for this work to be yet another full-scale

theoretical critique of positivism.

Rather the point will be that

the deficiencies of positivism and scientism are not merely matters of

theoretical concern, but that they have real political impacts.

Thus the

second level of my analysis will be a consideration of how the philo-

sophical problems of positivism are translated into political problems
in policy analysis.

I

will examine how the positivist assumption dis-

torts the persepctive that policy analysts have on policy issues and

how those distortions can have ideological implications.
in Chapter II,

I

For example,

shall show how the fact-value dichotomy in positiv-

ist thought can encourage an instrumental approach to policy issues

which unduly concentrates on questions of menas while neglecting more
important questions of ends.

I

shall make clear that this perspective

can be useful to those political and economic interests who want to dis-

courage the critical analysis of current public policy goals.

The spec-

ific policy example used in Chapter II will be continued growth in elec-

tricity production.

analysis

—

This kind of example constutes the third level of

the effect on these distorted analytic perspectives on ac-

tual energy policy decisions.

The area of energy policy was chosen

in part because it is one that has been characterized by continuing

policy failures.

It will be my contention that these failures are

in part due to the faulty understandings that are reinforced or

exacerbated by the distortions inherent in policy analysis.

While my approach to the problems in policy analysis is obviously
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a critical one,
I

it is also intended to be constructive.

In Part II,

will show that policy analysts can play a more useful and enlight-

ening role in the political process if they abandon the positivistic perspective, and adopt instead methodologies grounded in non-positivist

traditions of social analysis.

imprecise term.

Non-positivism, of course, is a very

There are many methodologies which could call them-

selves non-positivist, including Marxism, phenomenology, critical theory, and so on.

In this work, the alternative to positivism that will be

plored is Interpretive Theory

.

Interpretive Theory is a branch of Eng-

lish analytic philosophy which grew out of an attempt to critique and

move beyond the limitations of the logical-positivism that was dominant
in the earlier part of this century.

Many contemporary interpretive

social scientists trace their roots back to the later works of Ludwig

Wittgenstein, in which he developed his "ordinary language" approach to

philosophical analysis in an effort to transced his earlier positivistic writings.

Again, this work is not intended to be a full-scale

nor in-depth examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the inter-

pretive social sciences, I would refer them to the works of some of
its leading contemporary practitioners

— Peter

Winch,
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Alistair Mac-

Intyre,"^^ and especially Charles Taylor^^ and William Connolly.

In the interests of relevance and simplicity,

I

'^^

will be con-

centrating on three of the most fundamental insights derived from interpretive theory— and how they serve to illuminate the deficiencies
might
of positivism and indicate what an alterative approach to policy

look like.

The three insights are these:

(1)

that there is a qualit-

makes it
ative difference between natural and social realities which

inappropriate to approach them in the same mannter.

For example, it

is maintained in interpretive theory that human actions cannot be
ex-

plained in terms of causal laws, but must be interpreted in
the beliefs and reasons of the actors;

(2)

terras of

that there is at least some

rationality to the way people make value decisions, and that value
choices can thus be analyzed and discussed in a rational fashion; and
finally (3), that all forms of social analysis and explanation

cluding policy analysis

— are

— in-

inherently political in nature, and

have implications for the form that politics and political discourse
takes in a society.
II,

I

In the series of chapters that constitutes Part

will be extending these theoretical insights into the area of

policy analysis and consider what changes they would imply for how

policy analysis should be done and how analysts conceive of their
role in the policymaking system.

It will be argued that this alter-

native approach will encourage a more open, more relevant, more humanistic,

and more democratic approach to public policy analysis.

And

finally, extending the analysis to the level of substantive policy,
it will be shown, using the issue of energy growth, that this alter-

native perspective on policy can produce insights that traditional
policy analysis perspectives cannot.
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CHAPTER

II

POLICY ANALYSIS AS INSTRUMENTAL ISM

In this chapter,

will characterize

I

will set out the structure of the argument that

all' the

chapters in Part I.

I

will consider and

illustrate how the philosophical confusions contained in basic policy
analysis methodologies can work, to distort our understandings of various
policy problems.

In particular, this chapter will examine what is

probably the most typical analytic distortion present in public policy
analysis

— instrumentalism.

Instrumentalism is the tendency to narrowly

conceive of policy analysis as primarily an exercise in instrumental
rationality.

As will soon be evident, this concern for instrumental

rationality characterizes much of the policy analysis work done today,
and thus forms an appropriate place to begin this investigation.

My

contention is that this instrumental perspective fosters an inclination
on the part of policy analysis and policymakers to become so preoccupied

with questions of means in public policy debates as to neglect the more
important and basic task of critically reviewing the basic ends of the
policy being considered.
In this chapter,

analytic bias.

I

I

will explore the source and effects of this

will first examine the philosophical roots of this

instrumental perspective and briefly discuss the positivistic assumptions

which underlie and serve to justify this approach.
foundations of instrumentalism are established,
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I

Once the conceptual
will consider how this

analytic bias has effected our perception of a specific policy
issue— the

question of the growth of electricity production in the United States.
(This issue of growth, particularly in energy, will be a subject that

recurs throughout many of the chapters of the dissertation.)
to complete the argument in this chapter,

I

Finally,

will examine the political

implications of instrumentalism and consider how specific interest groups
can benefit from this kind of limited perspective on policy issues.

Fact /Value and Means Ends

Much of the source and justification for an instrumental approach
to policy analysis can be found in the positivist assumptions which under-

lie policy analysis.

dichotomy

— more

Among those basic assumptions is the fact-value

accurately known as the descriptive-evaluative dichotomy.

This descriptive-evaluative dichotomy posits that in social analysis we

must make a basic distinction between descriptive statements and evaluative (normative, value-laden) statements.

descriptive statements

— like

It is argued that while

"lowering inflation produces unemployment"

can be empirically tested to verify their truth or falsity, normative

statements
manner.
tive

— like

"unemployment is bad"

— cannot

be tested in the same

It is assumed that such value-laden statements are noncogni-

— that

is, cannot be proven true empirically.

This assumption of

noncognitivism is often accompanied by an emotivist theory of ethics

which asserts that value judgments are basically irrational or merely
a matter of subjective, personal preference.^

Thus, value statements

are not considered to be the legitimate subject of rational scientific
to
inquiry, and policy analysts who wish to maintain their commitment
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the scientific method and their identity as social
scientists must there-

fore restrict their investigations to empirical questions.
In policy analysis, this analytic commitment to the fact-value

dichotomy is translated into a commitment to a dichotomy between
questions of policy means and questions of policy ends.

As Brian Fay

explains, "policy analysts typically draw a distinction between means and
ends, the idea being the simple one that the choice of ends to be pursued
is

thought to be a choice requiring a value judgment, but that the

question as to the best means to a prescribed end is thought to be a
factual question that is therefore decidable scientifically."^

It is

thought that, once analysts leave the normative questions of policy ends
to policymakers,

they are "then able to consider the more technical

question of how we should pursue our objectives separately from the

problem of what we should value. "-^
Now it is true that some analysts insist on being able to question
the goals of the policymaker.
of clarification.

But usually this is only for the purpose

Often policymakers state their goals in ambiguous

and vague terms, and the analyst must seek to make them more clear and

precise

— to

"operationalize" them

and achieved.

grounds.

— so

that they can be better measured

This is much different than questioning goals on normative

Not only is direct challenging of policy goals considered bad

form for an objective scientist, it is also inhibited by several practical

considerations as well.

Any analyst who would consistently insist on

addressing questions of policy ends would not only be thought to be circumventing the democratic process but would also irritate his employers
by interfering with their prerogatives and authority in such matters.
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Such imprudent behavior would hardly increase the analyst's job
security, and thus it forms yet another reason for analysts to restrict
their investigations to matters of means.
In any case, it is clear that many of the most popular types of

public policy analysis, including cost-benefit analysis and cost-

effectiveness analysis, are forms of instrumental ism.
instrumental rationality

— the

They embody

notion that while we cannot be fully

rational about our choices of values and goals, we can devise ways of

determining the most rational means to achieve those assumed ends.
Questions of means are considered to be reducible in theory to questions
of what is the most efficient way to achieve an end, and such questions

are subject to value-neutral, empirical verification.^

For instance,

assuming a set of values, an analyst can empirically verify the various
costs and benefits associated with a set of policy options and determine

which is the most efficient option.^

Likewise, the typical cost-

effectiveness study is also an exercise in instrumental rationality.

The

question of how to achieve a given policy goal with the least amount of
expenditure is a factual one which, in principle at least, can be
determined by scientific analysis.

Having established the instrumental

focus of these typical forms of policy analysis, let us now turn to an

examination of the ramifications of instrumental perspective by considering an area in energy policy in which it has been used extensively.

Electricity Generation Policy

On the nations energy policy agenda, one of the issues that has
in
high priority is the question of how electricity is to be generated

29

the next half century.

The importance of this issue lies in the fact

that not only is the overall amount of electricity use projected to

increase over the next several decades, but also electricity is considered likely to represent an increasingly larger portion of our

national energy budget.
One of the most detailed and insightful studies done of electricity

production decision-making was carried out for the National Science
Foundation by a team of researchers headed by Kenneth Sayre.^

The team

sought to uncover the basic assumptions, reasons, and values that have

been informing these important policy decisions.

One of their most

interesting findings concerned the contents and emphasis present in the

utility policy reports.

They found that analysts tend to give only

cursory attention to the question of whether more electricity is needed,
and tend to spend much more time analyzing the question of how more

electricity can best be produced.^

This latter question is of course a

question of means, a question of efficiency, and is one ideally suited
to an empirical, cost-effectiveness approach.

The analysts typically

consider which source of power (coal, oil, nuclear), which site, and

which facility design would be the most cost-effective.

As the study

notes, options like solar energy are usually eliminated because of lack
of technological development, geo thermal and hydro are eliminated

because of lack of proper geographical locations, and oil and gas are
eliminated on the basis of resource depletion and the lack of reliable
foreign sources.^

The study team found that in the end, "the proposed

(policy choice) thus boils down to an economic and environmental cost
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comparison of the (utilities') proposed nuclear facility and a coal
plant of comparable capacity.

Thus the choice of generation facility

depended primarily on whether the empirical data indicated that the
lower construction costs of a coal plant or the (allegedly) lower fuel
costs of nuclear energy provided the most efficient path toward in-

creased electricity production.
This particular approach to the policy issue of electricity

generation can serve as a good example of how the instrumental approach
that is characteristic of much of policy analysis can help to distort

our understanding of policy issues.

Specifically, the means /ends

dichotomy can produce two important distortions, one of which points up
a flaw in the dichotomy itself,

the other of which affects the way we

actually define the problem being addressed.

The first concerns the

fact that, though we may consider the question of how to generate

electricity to be a question of means, it could hardly be thought to be
a value-free question,

as the philosophy of policy analysis would imply.

Indeed, the massive public controversy over nuclear power has shown that

such "instrumental" decisions are clearly full of many basic political
and moral implications.

Thus, while it is theoretically possible to

draw a distinction between neutral/ instrumental questions and normative/
goal questions, such a dichotomy breaks down in practice.

This is

because it fails to acknowledge that all policy decisions, whether they
be ostensibly about means or ends, inevitably affect people, their social

relations, and their way of life; and this fact makes all public decisions

necessarily normative in character.

As Brian Fay argues:
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All political decisions, even those which seem as means
to an end, are social policies, and as such they embody
a notion of what people ought to be required or permitted
to do to others.
No social policy's worth can be solely
instrumental because any such policy will require that
people interact with one another in certain definite ways,
and for this reason it must bear social value in itself
All political proposals, no matter how instrumental,
will alter and shape the personal relations of at least
some of the members of society, and will affect the relative
welfare of various classes of people; as such they embody
moral notions as to what is permissible, just, or right in
human affairs. They are a species of moral statement.

....

Given the essentially value-laden nature of all policy decisions,
the notion of value-free, instrumental policy studies and recommendations

can only be described as a convenient distortion.

When we begin to ask

who it is convenient for, then we have begun a political analysis of

policy analysis.

For example, we can certainly say that such a dis-

tortion is convenient for policy analysts themselves in that it serves
to circumscribe a neutral, nonpolitical area of expertise to which they

are uniquely qualified.

It justifies the role of the "scientist" in what

is normally considered the political process of policy deliberation.

Similarly, the illusion of a strict dichotomy between means and ends is

clearly helpful to those administrators who want to maintain the equally

questionable dichotomy between politics and administration.

Thus,

government and utility bureaucrats can claim not to be concerned with
"political" issues, but only in the best means to produce electricity.
And finally, the illusion of scientific value-free policy decision would
be convenient to any decision-maker who wanted to give the appearance

political
of rationality and objectivity to decisions made on purely
grounds.

These implications will be discussed in more detail in later
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chapters; but for now, let us turn our attention to the second

distorting effect that the means/ends dichotomy can have on our perspective on public policies.

The Politics of Issue Definition

One of the primary reasons that analytic frameworks tend to affect
the way we view issues is the natural tendency for most analysts to

define the problem they address in a way which makes their techniques
and expertise particularly relevant and applicable.

Part of what

this means in policy analysis is that policy issues have a natural

tendency to be seen as primarily questions of means

— because

it is pre-

cisely these questions which can be properly (scientifically) addressed
by the analyst.

Of course, this may cause difficulties when the issue

at hand is not primarily one of means.

In such cases we may find our-

selves in the situation of the proverbial drunkard who insists on looking
for his wallet under the streetlamp, not because he lost it there but

because that is the only place he can see clearly.

In other words,

limited analytic capacities may incline us to conveniently misdefine
social problems

—a

process which is well illustrated in the case of

electricity policy during the 1970s.
As the Sayre study indicated earlier, the issue of electricity

policy in the United States has been largely defined as how we are to

produce more electricity: and the public debate, often strenuous at times,
power.
has focused on whether our policy should emphasize coal or nuclear
and
But as a number of leading energy critics, like Amory Lovins-^^

Barry Commoner,

have pointed out, this perspective on the issue is a
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misleading one because it obscures what by all rights should be the

main issue in electricity policy
electricity.

whether we need to produce more

Both critics have observed that many of our problems in

energy policy in the last decade were related to the fact that much of
the energy debate was unduly hampered by a persistent tendency to ask

only instrumental "how to" questions and not the more basic "what" and
"why" questions.

Specifically, they argue that for various reasons the

desirability of energy growth has been merely assumed by policymakers
and the energy policy issue reduced to a matter of how to ensure

adequate supplies to meet that growth.

Policymakers, policy analysts,

and the public-at-large have all tended to accept, in Lovin's words, the

"basic tenet of high energy projections
use, the better off we are."-^^

.

.

.

that the more energy we

As a result, we have locked ourselves

into a policy of building more and more centralized generating facilities
to meet projected increases in electricity demand, without stopping to

seriously consider the mounting costs of such a plan, or the viability
of alternatives.

Among the social, economic, and environmental costs of increased

electrification are:

(1)

the introduction of major health risks from

coal mining, coal burning, uranium mining, reactor accidents (like

Three Mile Island), radioactive fuel storage leaks (as in Hanford,

Washington), and so on; (2) acceleration of environmental damages brought
by subsurface and strip-mining, including pollution and depletion of

water resources which are at already dangerously low levels in areas like
the Southwest;

(3)

inequitable distribution of environmental costs to
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rural areas, while affluent urban areas reap the benefits of the
electricity, as has been the case in the Four Corners power complex
in Arizona which feeds power to Las Vegas and Southern California;
(4)

the encouragement of the centralization and "Los Angelization" of

settlement patterns;

(5)

time of capital shortage;

the use of enormous amounts of capital in a
(6)

the resulting introduction of major

economic risks (again as in the case of Three Mile Island);

(7)

the

further concentration of economic and political power in the hands of
energy companies and utilities; and

(8)

the increased vulnerability of

the energy system to terrorism and sabotage, with the resultant possi-

bility of increased "paramilitarization of civilian

life.""'-^

As critics like Lovins have shown, many of these problems could

be avoided if we begin our analysis with a critical look at the values
and goals taken for granted in energy policy.

For instance, if we

ceased to assume steady growth in electrical consumption and began to

emphasize conservation, and if we ceased to assume that electricity is
good for all tasks and restricted its use to those things for which it
is appropriate, and if we emphasized development of nonelectric alterna-

tive forms of energy, like solar heating, then we could reduce our use
of electricity by one-third to one-half.

This would effectively

eliminate the necessity of building any new centralized generating
facilities in the near future and thus avoid most of the disadvantages
and risks listed above.

Obviously, however, this has not been the

course of our energy or electrical policy in the 70s and 80s.

35

Clearly, there are a number of reasons that the assumption
of

increased growth was not questioned in our energy policy (and we
will
be examining some of them in more detail in later chapters)

,

but it is

fair to say that the instrumental orientation in policy analysis did
play
a part in fostering this limited perspective.

A framework of analysis

that concentrates on means and assumes ends does not lend itself to the

questioning of basic goals.

One finds volumes of government studies

which compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of coal vs.
nuclear power, but one searches in vain for a government report during
the 70 's which seriously questioned the growth of centralized electricity

production.

Reports done by the U.S. Bureau of Mines,

the Atomic

Energy Commission,-'-^ The Department of the Interior j-*-^ and the Federal
20
Power Commissions^
all simply assumed sustained growth in electricity

consumption and production.

The typical perspective of most analysts

was summed up neatly by one study which was entitled, "Energy Strategy:

Not What But How.''^!

Even those studies which explicitly set out to be critical and
questioning, often did so in only an instrumental manner.

A good

example of this was an analysis done by Alice Rivlin's Congressional

Budget Office on President Carter's Energy Proposals.

22

While talking a

strong conservation line. Carter's plan actually called for continued

energy growth, especially in the area of electricity.

But the question

of whether increased electricity production was desirable was not raised

at all in the C.B.O. report, and the question of whether Carter's

conservation policies were adequate or desirable merited only two brief
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paragraphs in the 150-page study.

The bulk of the report concentrated

on the question of whether Carter's proposals were the best way to

achieve his goal— a typical example of instrumental near-sightedness.

The Growth Assumption

It is crucial to point out that my argument is not that the

instrumental bias in public policy analysis is responsible for the faults
in our energy policy.

As I mentioned in the first chapter, the biases

in policy analysis are problematic, not because they can by themselves

dominate policy decisions, but because they can exacerbate tendencies

already in the policy process.

electricity policy.

This is clearly evident in the area of

The prime reason that electricity growth has gone

unquestioned is not some fault in policy analysis, but the fact that
continuous growth is simply one of the most sacred goals in American
society.

The presumption that energy and electricity consumption must

continually increase is inviolable largely because it is seen to be
rooted in the more basic assumption of the necessity of continuous
economic growth.

One cannot question the need for more power without

questioning the need for an ever-increasing G.N. P., and it is difficult
to raise that question in America without appearing to be irrational.

It

is because this perceived need for continuous growth is considered so

basic to the American way of life that our policy discussions are usually
limited to debate over how this growth is best stimulated.

The instru-

mental perspective in policy analysis does not cause this generally
uncritical attitude towards the question of growth, but it certainly
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dovetails quite neatly with it.

(The basic assumption of growth

which underlies much of American public policy and counter-arguments
to it

will be a topic that will be explored in more depth as the

dissertation proceeds.)
It also should be mentioned at this point that this instrumental

perspective is not simply a characteristic of public policy analysis,
but part of our national political character as well.

Americans are

"practical" people who are not particularly inclined to question basic

values and ways of life like growth.

Kenneth Keniston, one of the most

perceptive observers of American culture, has pointed out that we
Americans have a cognitive predisposition to think of our problems in
instrumental terms

— as

problems of instrumental rationality rather than

problems of values or ends.
Ours is a how- to-do-it society, and not a what- to-do society.
For every discussion of the ethics of love, we have a dozen
manuals in every drugstore on the "techniques" of love. For
every discussion of the purposes of life, industry, and society,
a thousand hours are spent in discovering how to sell soap, how
to peddle the image of politicians, how to propagate the "American
way of life."
Thus our society characteristically dismisses
"final questions" as either philosophically "meaningless" or
more commonly as "irrelevant" to the pressing problems at hand.
The man who insists on asking such questions is usually considered an obstructionist. Discussions of "why" and "what"
are relegated to Sunday Church-going, to neurotic adolescents,
and to a few artists and dissidents whose views are occasionally
reported, well behind the business news in our national weeklies.
.

.

.

—

Keniston is attempting to describe an American habit of mind, but he also
succeeds in describing in a remarkably accurate fashion the guiding
spirit behind the activity of the policy analyst

ask "what" or "why," but only "how to."

—whose

job it is not to

This raises the interesting
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possibility that what we have in public policy analysis is the formalization, the institutionalization of an American intellectual character-

istic

—a

tendency to become mesmerized by the instrumental dimensions

of our problems.

(The notion of policy analysis as an institutionalization

of American thought is another of the themes that will be explored in

more detail in later chapters.)
At some point, however, we must begin to question the rationality
of instrumental rationality.

When we define rationality purely in

instrumental terms, we run the risk of actually obscuring the fact that
our policy path may be fundamentally an irrational one.

mistakenly assume that

a

We tend to

policy is rational if it achieves its goal

efficiently, and neglect to question the rationality of the goal itself.

An irrational goal pursued rationally is still irrational.

A focus on

instrumental rationality may only encourage, in the words of Yehezkel
Dror, "doing more efficiently the incorrect thing, and therefore both

causing damage more effectively and making the wrong policy more difficult
to change. "^^

In this sense, unless we want to risk merely compounding

our policy problems, we need a kind of policy analysis which can also

question the rationality of policy goals, which can put the basic value
questions at the center of its analysis.

But this of course is im-

possible within a positivist set of assumptions.

However, as Kenneth

Dolbeare suggests, failure to transcend this current paradigm of analysis
could prove very costly: "Uncritical extensions of current research

premises and approaches in policy analysis seems likely to further rigidify
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available policy alternatives and institutionalize the very value
premises and assumptions which have led to or now sustain existing

problems "^^
.

The Political Role of Instrumentalism

This tendency to not question basic ends like energy and economic

growth is, however, not merely a matter of cultural propensity.

This

instrumental focus is also a function of the fact that certain specific
political and economic interests benefit quite directly from this

uncritical attitude towards policy.
has a definite political function.

In other words, instrumentalism

A tendency to support current

dominant societal goals is also a tendency to support the interests of
those who benefit from those goals.

As Marx pointed out many years ago,

the dominant values in a society are often a reflection of the most

powerful and dominant groups in society.

Thus a perspective on policy

which does not question basic values can provide tacit support for those
groups.

In terms of energy policy, for instance, it is evident that

certain financial interests stand to benefit greatly from a tendency to
not question the desirability of continued growth in electricity production.

Manufacturers of electrical equipment suppliers of coal and

nuclear fuel, and

utility companies and their investors, all profit

handsomely from growth in electricity generation.

If one were to allocate

responsibility for creating and sustain the emphasis on energy growth,
most of it would not go to the intellectual biases contained in policy
analysis, but to the influence of these powerful interests in the
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policymaking process.

As Leon Lindberg concluded in his study of

the failure of energy policies in the United States:

The present dominant criteria and political coalitions
responsible for them are too narrow and undimensional
to provide the basis for a desirable or politically
viable long-term policy towards energy
supplyside criteria and definitions of the energy problem have
so far dominated agenda setting and the substance of
policy.
This situation reflects, among other things, the
political power of a relatively small number of corporations
and agencies sharing an immediate financial interest in or
intellectually committed to maintaining or expanding energy
consumption.

....

Thus, while policy analysis may not determine how policy issues
are defined, it can play a supporting role to those political interests

which do influence the process of issue definition to their own advantage.

It is in this sense that the analytical biases inherent in

policy analysis can have important political functions and ramifications.

To reiterate, we are not dealing here with a simple process

of the intentional political biases of analysts creeping into analysis,

but with a complex chain of conceptual convergences beginning with a

certain distorted perspective on policy issues dictated by analystic

assumptions and ending with a biased view of specific policy issues that
can directly benefit some political interests.
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CHAPTER

III

POLICY ANALYSIS AS FACT FETISHISM

McNamara's mind was mathematical, analytical, bringing
order and reason out of chaos. Always reason. And reason supported by facts, by statistics he could prove his rationality
with facts, intimidating others. He was marvelous with charts
Once, sitting at CINCPAC for eight hours watchand statistics.
ing hundreds and hundreds of slides flashed across the screen
showing what was in the pipeline to Vietnam and what was already
there, he finally said, after seven hours, "Stop the projector.
This slide, number 869, contradicts slide 11." Slide 11 was
flashed back and he was right, they did contradict each other.
Everyone was impressed, and many a little frightened.
David Halberstam
The Best and the Brightest

—

This chapter deals with several of the problems surrounding the

tendency toward fact-fetishism in public policy analysis

— the

tendency

to over-emphasize the importance and relevance of fact-gathering to the

resolution of public policy problems.

This problem has been commented

upon by other observers of policy analysis who have noted a tendency
for modern policy problems to be defined as data-collection problems.

With the help of these commentators, it will be shown that many of our
current, serious policy issues are in reality problems of conflicting
empirical
values and interests which are not easily resolvable on purely

grounds.

Indeed, it will be seen that the "facts" in a given policy

interpretations and
area often actually support a number of competing

positions in a given policy issue.
fact-fetishism lends
In addition, this chapter will explore how
policy analysis, and how this
a scientific facade to the activity of
43

44

facade may serve a number of different political purposes.

For example,

this facade can lend an air of scientific legitimacy to
decisions al-

ready made on other grounds.

Further, this emphasis on scientific

techniques and fact-gathering may also serve to structure the very
nature
of policy discussions in a way which indirectly supports the
interests
of particular sides in these policy disputes.

In many places through-

out the chapter, the issue of nuclear power will be used to illustrate
the points being made about fact-fetishism.

This persistent and con-

troversial issue will demonstrate how this analytic tendency can result
in a number of distortions in the way policy problems are understood

and policy decisions are made.

Science and Facts

According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the primary requirement of the scientific method is "fidelity to empirical evidence""'as it is known in popular parlance, "sticking to the facts."

— or

In the

same manner, a scientific decision, a rational decision, is often thought
to be one based solely on the facts, not emotions.

It is unsurprising

then that a scientific perspective on policy decisions puts special

emphasis on facts, and that many policy analysts spend much of their
time and energy gathering and processing information about policy

problems and options.

This emphasis on fact-gathering is not only a

function of the scientific perspective, but also a product of the realities of a large, centralized political system.

One of the great dis-

advantages of political centralization is that it is very difficult
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for policymakers to actually know what is happening in their
society.

They sit isolated in the capital and rarely have the opportunity
or
time to actually see and experience social problems first-hand.

They

are forced to rely on their aides and analysts for descriptions of the

nature and extent of these problems.
live?

How poor are they?

Who are the poor?

Where do they

In a sense, analysts become the eyes and ears

of the policymakers, collecting the vital information needed for rational

policy decisions.

Fortunately, this task of fact-gathering and pro-

cessing has been made immensely easier by advances in electronic

information storage and processing systems.

New sophisticated computer

technologies have made it possible to accumulate and analyze enormous
amounts of social data.

Many see this as an unmitigated good.

Herbert

Simon, for instance, has enthusiastically observed that, "With the rapid

development of information-processing technology, the corporate and
public decision-making processes are becoming immensely more sophisticated and rational than they were in past eras."

In the midst of this

kind of enthusiasm, very little thought has been given to the possibility
of political bias.

politically neutral

Indeed, it would seem difficult to find a more

— and

innocuous

— activity

than data-gathering.

But

in fact, even this simple activity can have hidden political impli-

cations, and can distort our understanding of policy problems in subtle,

but important ways.

Let us see how this can be so.

The Effects of Fact-Fetishism in Analysis
One unfortunate by-product of the development of sophisticated

information systems is that they have fueled some analysts' tendency to
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become fascinated with the very process and technology of data-gathering
itself.

The enormous capacity of these systems had made it possible for

data-gathering and processing to become an essentially endless activity,
and for the analyst to become so immersed in it that he or she loses

tract of the ultimate end involved.

policy analysis, Ida Hoos

,

One long-time student of public

has described this phenomenon in this way:

Dear to the hearts of technically oriented analysts is the
information gathering and processing state. In fact» so
gemutlich is the occupation with data that many systems designs, purported to deal with pressing social problems, never
progress beyond that point. Displaying the ingestive propensities of a snake, the information system swallows up all
the resources allocated to a given project and diverts attention
from its larger purposes.-^
As a typical example of this problem, Hoos cites a study done for
the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission.''^

Using techniques ranging

from origin-and-destination home interview surveys to aerial photography,

analysts enthusiastically gathered over 10 million pieces of information,

stored on 1100 reels of magnetic tape, at a cost of almost $3,000,000.

Unfortunately, despite all of this effort and expense, "interpretation
of the three-million-dollar agglomeration has never been achieved; the

raw data remains undigested and transportation remains the same hit-or-

miss affair in the area studies as elsewhere."^

These kinds of incidents were most typical in the earlier days of

information technology,^ when the enthusiasm of the data-collectors was
information was
unbounded, and when it was routinely assumed that more
always better than less.

But while such fiascos are more rare today, it

with this kind of focus on
is important to see that the main problem
it sometimes produces, but the
facts is not the excesses or waste that
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slanted perspective on policy issues it can encourage.

For example, an

emphasis on "facts" in analysis can begin to affect the way we define
and try to solve policy problems.

The understandable inclination is to

believe that data-gathering can actually be the key to solving our
social problems.

Myra Breitbart, in her study of the basic assumptions

informing the practice of urban planning, noted that "while most traditional planners acknowledge the complexity of urban problems, they maintain a basic faith in science and the power of hard facts to provide

solutions to these problems."^

A typical example of this tendency to

define policy problems as data-collection problems can be found in one

government report on urban planning and metropolitan development:

Information is the usual common denominator in metropolitan
problem solution; it is the core of any metropolitan growthmanagement scheme, guidance mechanism, booster campaign, or
research effort, both private and public. A tremendous range
of metropolitan-oriented undertakings, private and public,
operation and research-development oriented, founder for lack
of data.

This kind of perspective on policy problems can have a detrimental

effect on our attempts to understand and solve those problems.
for a moment,

Consider

the effect this perspective has had on the way we approach

and debate environmental issues.

Data-gathering has become such a

central focus in this area, that it has begun to distort the nature of
policy discourse concerning environmental issues.

Increasingly the

political struggles between business developers and environmentalists in
the courts and the legislatures consists of arguments between and about

rival environmental impact statements

—huge

volumes, full of thousands

of bits of data, virtually incomprehensible to lay people.

One of our
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leading environmental policy analysts, Robert Socolow, sees this develop-

ment as a matter of great concern.

He questions the wisdom of having

these debates center around such reports, and points out that these

analyses often "fail to assist in the resolution of environmental con-

troversies."^

These empirically-oriented technical reports are sometimes

irrelevant, he argues, because "they are not about what people care
about. "'^

What people care about are the basic values and interests that

are at stake in these environmental controversies: roughly speaking,
those values and interes.ts favored by industrial and commercial developers

versus those values and interests fostered by a more clean and healthy
environment.
a

Often the core of the dispute is not the exact impact of

particular project, but the clash of competing values

—a

subject that

usually gets little direct attention in the fact-oriented policy reports.
The controversy over the Tocks Island Dam is a typical example of
this problem.

Between 1962 and 1975, numerous environmental studies

were done of this project

— the

total came to over 50.

The last study

alone weighed sixteen pounds, came in six volumes, and was 3,600 pages
long.

As might be expected, much of the formal debate over Tocks Island

was taken up by argument over the accuracy, reliability, scope, and

methodology of these various studies.
of

And yet observers agree that none

these reports were a crucial factor in the final decision.

In the

end it was policymakers values and commitments to regional interests

which finally moved them to decide against the dam—factors that were
rarely explicitly

addressed in these statistic-filled studies
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Knowledge without Understanding
All of this is not to say that facts are not relevant to policy
decisions

— of

course they are.

But they may not be as centrally relevant

as policy analysts tend to think.

As Martin Rein explains, the research

approach used by most policy analysts is guided by philosophical assumptions that typically overestimate the role of factual findings in resolv-

ing the normative and political controversies that are at the center of

all policy issues.

Most social scientists take for granted the view that
social science can reduce conflict by expanding the areas
of agreement on what are the facts of the situation and how
If one assumes that there is a link between
they came about.
what is truthful (factual) and what is right (desirable) factual
analysis must also improve the quality of policy decisions.
Governments therefore should invest in policy-oriented research
I disagree with this interpretation of how policy and
analysis interact .... The crucial issues in a policy debate
are not so much matters of fact as questions of interpretation.
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

In other words, the relevance of facts to policy decisions may

have been oversold by policy analysts.

Rein reminds us that "social

policy is above all concerned with choice among competing values,"
and that while there is some connection between facts and values, facts

by themselves can rarely serve as even a general indicator of the correct

value or policy path to pursue.

Mere possession of information and facts

on a particular policy issue does not ensure that we know what information is relevant, or how to use it effectively.
rich, but perceptually poor

—we

We can be information

can lack an appreciation of the broader

social and economic context which gives meaning to this information.
other words, empirically-oriented policy analysis can easily produce

knowledge without understanding.

In
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This problem in policy analysis is similar to a more general
prob-

lem afflicting empirical research as a whole that has been
described by

interpretive social scientists like Charles Taylor.
isolated facts tell us very little by themselves.

They argue that
They have little real

meaning for us until we can interpret them, until we can put them into
some theoretical framework which explains their existence and significance.

Moreover, facts can often be interpreted in different ways; they

can often lend support to several different frameworks and perspectives.
This is, in part, why discovering "the facts" will often fail to settle
the issue in a policy controversy.

An illustration of this is the cur-

rent dispute over the meaning of the series of near-disastrous accidents
in our nuclear power program.

facts of the matter
etc.

— but

— the

There is essential agreement over the

nature of the accidents, how they occurred,

there are tremendous differences in interpretation.

Nuclear

opponents cite these accidents as indications of the inherent dangers

involved in nuclear power, while proponents argue that the near-miss

nature of the accidents demonstrates that safety procedures and equip-

ment can keep these power plants safe.
"Facts" are not only ambiguous in this way, but often in a complex
issue like nuclear power, there are enough contradictory facts to reasonably support several positions.

This seems to be confirmed by a survey

study done by John Reed and John Wilkes on the relationship between

knowledge and support for nuclear power. '^

They sought to discover

whether those citizens most "knowledgeable" about nuclear power tended
to support or oppose it.

Some supporters and opponents have long claimed
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that if only the public knew the "facts" of the situation,
they would

be on their side.

In order to test this hypothesis, Wilkes and Reed

first constructed an information test so that they could measure the

extent of nuclear knowledge of those in their study group.

They then

compared the level of knowledge to how the respondents felt about the

nuclear power issues.

The results are reproduced in the table

TABLE

below."*"'

1

ATTITUDES TOWARD BUILDING MORE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS IN THE U.S. BY NUCLEAR KNOWLEDGE
(in percents)

Attitude Toward Nuclear Power

Level of
Nuclear
Knowledge

Strongly
Oppose

Mildly
Oppose

Mildly
Oppose

Strongly
Oppose

FourFive

39

14

10

37

Three

26

10

19

45

Two

27

15

14

44

One

26

11

26

37

None

24

29

24

32
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As the table indicates, instead of finding a linear relationship between the two variables of knowledge and attitude on nuclear

power

— that

more knowledge was associated with either strong support or

strong opposition to nuclear power, what Wilkes and Reed found was a

curvilinear relationship, which indicated a higher percentage of knowledgables among the "strongly favor" and the "strongly oppose" groups. •'^

And the higher percentages of the least knowledgeable tended to be in
the mildly favor and mildly oppose categories.

In other words, the

increase in knowledge about nuclear power was associated with the strength
of opinion, but not one particular opinion.

To Wilkes and Reed this suggests that in policy areas where there

are a number of competing facts which support both the pro and con

positions, citizens probably select out those particular facts which tend
to fit best into their preconceived notions about the issue.

1

8

In any

case, it is clear that factual knowledge about the nuclear power contro-

versy, instead of settling the issue, seems to polarize the various sides

even more.

Or in the words of Wilkes, "This isn't really a debate about

the facts at all, its a debate about what nuclear power means to people."

The Cultural Dimensions of the Problem

The problem we have here can be seen as another variation of one

we discussed in the first chapter

— the

tendency of a scientistic policy

analysis to obscure the true, political nature of public policy decisions,
and thus to inhibit the recognition (and resolution) of the conflicts

over basic values and interests that lie at the heart of all serious

policy disputes.
phenomenon.

As Socolow observes, this is part of a larger cultural
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The failure of technical studies to assist in the resolution
of environmental controversies is part of a larger pattern
of failures of discourse in problems that put major societal
values at stake. Discussion of goals, of visions of the future,
are enormously inhibited. Privately, goals will be talked about
readily, as one discovers in even the most casual encounter with
any of the participants. But the public debate is cloaked in a
formality that excludes a large part of what people most care
about. Analyses are part of formal debate. We should not be
surprised to learn therefore, that the disciplined analyses
brought to bear on a current societal dispute hardly ever do
justice to the values at stake. -^^
As Socolow suggests, this reluctance to debate values in public
is related to how we think of "formality" in our culture.

of what a "formal"

— i.e.,

serious and rational

— debate

strongly informed by the scientific perspective.

Our notion

consists of is

Science has become

synonomous with a serious and rational appraach to the world.

Thus we

tend to think of a formal and serious debate as one which focuses on the

"facts," not on values; for values are thought to be purely subjective
and emotional and thus not the proper subject of rational debate.

This

scientific bent, with its emotivist theory of ethics, has worked to limit
our view of what acceptable and serious policy discourse consists of.

This helps to explain why even those opposed to environmentally destructive projects on moral or aesthetic grounds end up focusing their pre-

sentations in a hearing on the more technical and empirical questions
involved.

People who object to projects purely on normative grounds

can be made to feel that their arguments are, at best, subjective opinions,
or at worst, irrelevant, emotional outbursts.

To be taken seriously,

one must "stick to the facts"~even if they are not the issue.

seven

I

In chapter

will outline one way to avoid this kind of problem—an approach

to evaluate
to policy analysis that focuses on value issues and attempts
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them rationally

—but

for now let us continue our exploration of this

problem, and in particular, its political implications.

The Political Functions of Empiricism

We are faced with the following paradox: empirical policy analyses
rarely get to the heart of policy questions, yet we seem to be inundated
by them.

Or as Socolow has put it, although policy makers often "con-

clude that their time is not well spent pondering the available analyses
.

.

.

they may commission still more of them.'

irrational behavior be explained?

How can this seemingly

The explanation can only partly lie

in the scientistic bent of the policy analysts, another part must lie in

an understanding of the political purposes and interests that are served
by this data-oriented approach.

For example, one of the most plausible

explanations is that these reports are sometimes not intended to serve
as a guide to policy at all, but merely as ways of confirming and sup-

porting policy decisions already made on other grounds.

Empirical policy

studies can be employed as a scientific facade to enhance the apparent

desirability of pre-ordained policy choices.
In fact, the profession of policy analysis has long been aware that
its work can serve a "legitimization function"

Weiss clearly demonstrates.

22

— as

the work of Carol

But it is important to note that this

function could become increasingly important as modern policjonakers find
legitimacy an increasingly scarce political resource.

Political com-

mentators on both the left^"^ and the right^^ have noted the existence of
against this
a "legitimation crisis" in western democracies, and it is

background that much of policy analysis must be understood.

Harris polls
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have indicated that between 1966 and 1977 the number of people having a
"great deal" of confidence in the executive branch dropped from 41% to
23%;

the Supreme Court has fallen from 50% to 29%; and Congress has

dropped from 42% to 17%. 9 S

In 1979,

the nation heard President Carter

devote a major portion of one of his television addresses to this very
problem.

He pointed to the "crises of confidence" in government and

called it "a problem more serious than inflation or energy."

The causes

of this growing disillusionment are many, and it is not my purpose here
to enter into the current debate about them.

Rather,

I

would simply note

that this crisis does exist and has put policymakers in a tenuous posi-

tion

—a

position which may be reinforced by invoking the powerful symbol-

ism inherent in scientistic policy analysis studies.
It is well understood by politicians that legitimacy is at least
as much a matter of appearance as it is a matter of substance.
is in the realm of appearances that policy studies

tic ones

— can

— especially

And it
scientis-

serve a useful political function to the policymaker.

In

an era when few sources of authority go unquestioned, science remains a

respected form of authority in our culture.

And so policy makers who can

give the appearance of scientific procedures to their decisions are in-

voking a powerful legitimizing force.

It is this legitimizing force which

helps to explain why policy analyses are commissioned but not really used;
and also why policymakers have readily adopted the language of policy

analysis if not the specific recommendations of the analysts.

The use of

scientistic terms and statistics gives an air of rationality and precision
that is unavailable elsewhere.

It matters little of course,

if the actual
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terms or statistics are fully understood by the public, for it is the

appearance they give which is the point.

The Nuclear Power Issue
The legitimization function of policy analysis can be clearly seen
at work in the area of nuclear energy policy.

By the beginning of the

1970s the United States Federal government not only had a large amount of

financial capital invested in the development of nuclear power, but a
great deal of political capital as well.

The nuclear power program has

been a government sponsored program from its very beginnings in the Atoms
for Peace program of the Eisenhower Administration.

The Atomic Energy

Commission and later the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were prime movers
and supporters of this form of energy.

Much of this capital and prestige

began to be directly threatened by the advent of the anti-nuclear movement
in the late sixties.

In the face of continuing criticism and increasing

public concern over the safety of nuclear power, it was only natural for
the government to turn to the scietific establishment in 1972 to confirm
the inherent legitimacy of this program by getting at the "real facts"

about safety.

The product was the famous Rasmussen report on the probability of

nuclear accidents.

when it was released in 1975, it was heralded by

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the definitive study demonstrating

the safety of nuclear power.

Government spokesmen were careful to point

of 60 ex^
out that Professor Rasmussen was from M.I.T. and had the help

perts

;

full
that the report cost $3.000.000 , and amounted to 14 volumes

the chance of a reactor
of scientific calculations that demonstrated that

year, per reactor).
accident killing 70 people was a million to one (per
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and an accident causing 2,300 deaths had a
one-in-a-billion chance of
occuring.

Altogether an impressive display of scientific expertise,
and

no doubt it contributed to the efforts to allay public
fears.

It probably

matters little that the report suffered from so many oversimplifications
and gross methodological problems that after many years it was
even

questioned by the Department of Energy; for it is probable that much of
its purpose at the time was simply symbolic

— an

effort to invoke the

authority of science to calm the public and legitimize the long standing

government support for nuclear power. ? 7
Of course, whether or not the Rasmussen study was intentionally

conceived of and used by policymakers in such a cynical way is difficult,
if not impossible,

to prove conclisively

.

But there is some additional

evidence that policy studies in the area of nuclear energy have been purposely used for these purely legitimizing purposes.

This stronger evi-

dence comes from investigative work done by David Burnham, a reporter for
the New York Times.

In 1974, Burnham discovered that between 1963 and

1973 the Atomic Energy Commission engaged in a deliberate policy of sup-

pressing research studies "that found reactors more dangerous than

officially acknowledged.'

28

A typical incident involved a study done by

the agencies own scientists on the proper location of reactors in relation
to population centers.

This reactor siting study revealed among other

things that an accident at a nuclear site could potentially kill over

45,000 people and devastate an area the size of the state of Pennsylvania.
In a meeting to consider this report, that was attended by representatives

from six major private utility companies, it was decided to not make the
report public because of "potentially adverse reaction on the part of the
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public." 29

This pattern of suppression was continued in the recent
case

of Dr. Thomas F. Mancuso, whose work exposing the
dangers of low-level

radiation on nuclear plant workers led to his government
research contract being cancelled.

30

In these cases, it is clear that nuclear power policy studies were

not simply seen as ways of gathering relevant knowledge about the problems surrounding nuclear power; but rather, they were seen by at least

some policy makers as a way of manufacturing support for this contro-

versial program.

As Burnham concluded, "Over and over again, the internal

memos of the AEC officials indicate that they were apparently more concerned about the possible public relations impact of safety studies than
the actual safety of reactors.""^"'-

How Fact-Fetishism Can Support Special /Interests
The suppression of factual evidence discussed above is best under-

stood as an abuse of public policy analysis.

But it is important to note

that even where no such abuses occur, the tendency toward fact-fetishism

can still lead to distorted understandings of policy issues, understandings which can aid various special interests.

I

want to suggest that the

very form of political debate encouraged by fact-oriented policy studies
can work to the advantages of particular sides in policy disputes.

As

I

pointed out earlier, the tendency in this style of analysis is to see
policy problems as technical problems which can be resolved by adequate

empirical knowledge

— and

it is this kind of perspective which can work to

advantage of special interests.

In the debate over nuclear power, for

instance, this kind of perspective has created a "home court advantage"
for its supporters.

For until relatively recently, the major questions
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surrounding nuclear power were seen as ones that could be answered by
empirical studies: What is the probability of an accident? Can safety

mechanisms contain such accidents?
low-level radiation?

Are there real dangers posed by

How can we safely store nuclear wastes?

This

view was to the advantage of supporters in one sense because they were
in a much better position to fund research that would support their

position.

Research is an expensive proposition, and the government and

the nuclear industry clearly had more funds available than those who

oppose nuclear power.

And further, most of the "experts", in the area

of nuclear power are either directly or indirectly dependent on the

federal government or the nuclear industry for their livelihood.
But secondly, and more importantly, the emphasis on empirical
issues meant that many of the most powerful arguments raised by anti-

nuclear forces were relegated to a secondary status.

The debate focused

on studies like the Rasmussen report, with disputes over the accuracy of
the methodology, and so forth.

But many of the basic points of the anti-

nuclear position were not technical points at all, but moral and political
points.

Take, for example, the apparently technical issue of risks.

Many opponents argued that the central questions concerning risks were not
simply a matter of how safe nuclear power is, but how safe is safe enough—

what is an acceptable or desirable level of safety.
moral, value-laden questions.

These are clearly

Amory Lovins has long argued that "whether

nuclear power should be rejected is a question not of facts but of values.
Facts (to the limited extent that they can be disentangled from values)
are relevant but not dispositive."^^

Opponents also emphasized that there

in
are serious political questions at the heart of the risk issue—
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particular, the issue of who has the right to determine what an accept-

able level of risk actually was.

They questioned whether private utili-

ties, who stood to profit handsomely from building nuclear plans had the

right to accept risks for the public.

They also questioned whether

government institutions like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, whose

existence and growth were directly dependent on the continuation of the
nuclear power program, could be trusted to make these decisions in an

unbiased fashion.
However, advocates of nuclear power have been able to take the

high (scientific) ground in this debate, and convince policymakers that
these kinds of moral and political issues were spurious and irrelevant
the product of "political zealots" and "ecology freaks"

— and

only inter-

fered with a serious and rational approach to the technical problems of
As Dr. Ralph Lapp, a nuclear consultant, testified before

nuclear power.
Congress,"

.

.

.

opponents of nuclear power have converted a straight-

forward technical problem into a politicized and emotional issue. "^-^

The

end result of this tactic was, as I.C. Bupp has pointed out, that "by the

early seventies the general tendency among the Western world's business
and government establishments was to accept the judgment of nuclear

advocates that doubts about nuclear safety were confined to a comparative

handful of noisy and misguided people."

A Technocratic Ethos

Thus a scientific approach to policy issues is not always as

politically neutral as might first appear.

Ironically, the effort to

serve
remain "objective" by simply focusing on "the facts" may actually

certain political purposes and interests.

Leon Lindberg identifies

this kind of approach to policy analysis as part of a "technocratic

ethos: which has come to play a large role in contemporary American

politics.

His description of this ethos serves as a good summary of

the points made in this chapter:

The technocratic "ethos" assumes the desirability of separating
scientific questions from political and social value questions,
and assumes further that the scientific and technical questions
are more decisive and that they can be resolved on scientific
grounds apart from ethical considerations, and finally by perpetuating the notion that scientific expertise is the main
requirement for making reasoned choices among technological
alternatives, restricts participation in such decisions and frustrates democratic control of technology. Established interests
and long-standing alliances among government bureaucrats,
industry technocrats and managers, and their legislative patrons
are the usual beneficiaries -^5
.
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CHAPTER

IV

POLICY ANALYSIS: THE USES OF COMPLEXITY

The basic Issues in energy strategy, far from being too complex
and technical for ordinary people to understand, are on the
contrary too simple and political for experts to understand.
Amory Lovins
Soft Energy Paths

This chapter deals with another major variation of the depolitici-

zation theme introduced in the last chapter.

Here, I will examine the

tendency to see public policy problems as primarily problems of social

complexity

—a

function of the increasingly intricate and complicated

industrial world we live in.

Again the emphasis shifts toward technical

solutions, in this case the construction of better policy analysis

models which can untangle the complexity which seems to be frustrating
our attempts to solve our social problems.

As before, I will argue that

this analytical tendency in policy analysis can have a dysfunctional

effect on our understanding of the nature of our persistent socio-econo-

mic problems; in particular, it inhibits us from appreciating the

political nature of these difficulties and the political obstacles that

often prevent effective policy action.

Policy Failures and Modeling

Throughout the 1970' s and 80' s, the federal government has been
frustrated in its attempt to solve many of our most important policy
problems, including poverty, energy, inflation, and others.
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The

66

persistence of such problems has led some to despair
over the ability
of governments to actually solve problems in
advanced industrial societies.

President Carter stated in his 1978 State of the Union
Address

that "government cannot solve all our problems, set
our goals, or define
our vision.

Government cannot eliminate poverty, provide a bountiful

economy, reduce inflation, save our cities, cure illiteracy,
provide
energy, or mandate goodness .

Some, including many policy analysts,

have attributed the government's inability to solve our pressing social

problems to the sheer, confusing complexity of modern society.

Indus-

trial societies have simply grown to large and complex to be managed in
a straightforward manner.

But far from being discouraged about this

state of affairs, many policy analysts are optimistic; they see their

expertise and analytic techniques as the way out of this problem.

One

of our more prominent policy analysts, Jay W. Forrester summarizes this

view in the following way:
Whether viewed from Capital Hill, Wall Street, or Middle America,
the list of serious national problems is lengthening.
Such
problems include inflation, unemployment, recession, resource
scarcity, environmental damage, instability of governments, decay
in American cities, increasing food prices, and the shifting balance of international power from resource-consuming nations to
resource-producing nations. The persistence of serious national
problems has engendered widespread public dissatisfaction with the
nations 's ability to find and apply effective solutions to major
difficulties. As the nation increases in complexity beyond the
capacity of conventional social management, new tools are needed
to aid in understanding socio-economic behavior and designing more
enduring public policies
.

This perspective on our policy problems is common of many analysts
today, especially those who specialize in one of the most sophisticated

forms of public policy analysis, advanced computer modeling.
ways,

In many

this is the most prestigious form of policy analysis, and those
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analysts who are at the top of this field— Forrester of MIT, Lawrence

Klein of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Michael Evans
formerly of Chase Econometrics

— are

often consulted by government agen-

cies and private business, and appear as star witnesses before congres-

sional committees.

The rising importance of this computer simulation

school of policy analysis is based in large part on the assumption that
in advanced industrial societies, many policy failures flow directly

from our inability to understand how such a complex organization actually works.

As one analyst observed, one of the inherent problems in

our society is that "as the public policy decision-maker begins his

investigation,

...

he confronts an extremely complex society, the

complexity of which is intensified by the recognition that multiple
causes and effects tie many branches together in complex social rela-

tionships."

Thus, without a proper model of how the various parts of

our vast and intricate socio-economic system interact with one another
the policymaker is lost.

He or she is unable to accurately diagnose

the causes of our social problems, or to successfully predict the

intended (and unintended) effects of his or her policy actions.

Ana-

lysts like Forrester suggest that it is this inability to accurately

predict policy outcomes which accounts for many of our policy failures,
and produces "the pervasive sense of frustration and failure"

many policymakers.

felt by

In effect, our policy problems are seen as modelling

problems.

Obviously, this view of policy serves to justify the increased
policymaking
role of analysts and their computer simulations in the
process.

must
Forrester goes as far as to argue that these new tools
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replace our common modes of political thought which
cannot hope to deal

with the complexity we face in modern societies.

Politicians have

always had social, economic, and political theories
to explain society
and guide their policy decisions, but to the analyst
these are only

"intuitive" theories— and intuition, like spontaneity, is not a
characteristic that is looked upon with favor by rational analysts.

It is

thought that the kind of intuitive theories bandied about by
politicians,
the press, and the public are simply to crude to be of much use, and
can

actually do more harm than good.

They have the disadvantage of being

based upon "personal experience," the kind of experience that has little

utility in a complex social system which exhibits what Forrester calls
"devious," "diabolic," and "counter-intuitive" behavior.

As he explains:

The intuitive process will select the wrong policy solution much
more often than not. A complex system behaves in many ways quite
the opposite of the simple systems from which we have gained our
experience
Intuition and judgment, generated by a lifetime of experience with the simple systems that surround one's
everyday actions create a network of expectations and perceptions
that could hardly be better designed to mislead the unwary when
Complex systems
he moves into the realm of complex systems
are counter-intuitive. That is, they give indications that suggest
corrective action which will often be ineffective or even adverse
in its results. Very often one finds that the policies that have
been adopted for correcting a difficulty are actually intensifying
it rather than producing a solution.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

As an example of this problem, Forrester points out that while

"humanitarian interests and short term political pressures" may promote
an urban renewal policy which includes new, low-income housing to re-

place the burnt out slums in central city areas, such an "intuitively

sensible policy can affect adversely the very problems it is designed
to alleviate."

His analysis of such a policy, using a sophisticated

computer simulation, indicated that increases in low-income housing
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would only have the effect of attracting more low-income people
to
urban areas, which would in turn decrease the already weaken
tax-base,
and take up valuable land that could be used for new industry.^

Such

arguments serve as good analytical ammunition against "bleeding-heart
liberals," whose programs may be well intentioned, but only create more

problems than they solve.
To replace this faulty "intuitive" approach to policy, policy

analysts offer formal mathematical models.

And it would not be an

exaggeration to say that the construction and use of these kinds of
models occupy a large part of many analysts' time.
dizzying variety

— ranging

They come in a

from simple supply and demand graphs and

basic queing models to more sophisticated Markov models and computer
simulations.

Analysts are quite willing to admit that good policy

models do not have to be mathematical, they can be conceptual as well;
but in practice, few analysts use conceptual models

extensively.

As

Stokey and Zeckhauser have pointed out, "in fact, what many analysts

mean when they speak of models are the formal mathematical models that
describe implicitly the quantitative changes in a particular variable
or system in response to various stimuli."^

Given the analysts' attrac-

tion to scientific rationality, the preference for this kind of model
is not difficult to understand.

Mathematics allows the analyst to

transcend the sloppy and imprecise conceptiial thinking that is typical
of ordinary political discourse.

Numbers offer the most precise way to

measure the variables being considered, and more importantly, equations
are the best way to represent the "cause and effect relationships essenQ

tial to the problem being studied."

These law-like, causal relationships
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are crucial, because once we are able to discover and
model the socioeconomic laws of behavior that govern the policy area we
are interested
in,

then we are able to successfully identify the key variables
to mani-

pulate and to predict the exact outcome of various policy options.
In many ways, modeling is the epitome of the notion of scientific

rationality that animates public policy analysis.

It focuses on ideas

of "cause and effect" and "prediction"~the very stuff of the natural

sciences.

And computer models even allow the analyst to conduct complex

"experiments" by allowing various policy options to be first tested in
these simulation to see what their effect on the socio-economic system

would be.

It is in modeling that policy analysis comes the closest to

being a real social science
sciences.

—a

science cast in the image of the natural

And as Brian Fay has pointed out, much of the optimism that

accompanies policy analysis is rooted in the belief that once it achieves
the level of a science, it will become a major factor in our attempt to

overcome our many social problems.
(I)t is claimed, that just as the natural sciences have provided

men with a certain kind of knowledge by which they can control
their natural environment, thereby making it more hospitable and
productive, so also the knowledge gained from social science will
enable men to control their social environment, thereby making it
more harmonious and congrument with the needs and wants of its
members
.

Policy Failures; Complexity or Politics?

There are many problems in this modeling vision of policy analysis,

both in theory and practice, and we will be considering several of them
in the following chapters.

For now, let us concentrate on the over-

complexity argument which underlies this approach, and seek to ascertain
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its accuracy and political implications.

complex one?

Is our society a highly

In some sense this is obviously true.

But the key

question is not whether our society is a highly complex one, but
whether, as Forrester and others suggest, that it is this complexity
that accounts for much of our inability to solve our social problems.

Or are there other factors which better explain the persistence of
these problems.

To begin to answer these questions, let us consider

several problematic areas in our national energy policy.
Energy is surely one of the most complex policy areas facing us
today, and virtually all observers of this area agree that in the 1970s,
the U.S. failed to develop an effective and comprehensive policy pro-

gram to deal with these problems.

Some of the policy analysis in this

area has assumed that these two facts are closely related; that one
can put the blame for our energy policy failures in large part on our

inability to develop a coherent and comprehensive analysis of our
complex energy supply and demand system.

One massive (800 page) study

done by Resources for the Future for the federal government expressed
this view in a typical fashion, frequently attributing policy problems
to "knowledge gaps" and "disabling limitations in our data.""*"^

Particu-

lar emphasis was put on the importance of developing more adequate

models of the national and international energy system.

National energy policies and governmental energy programs
have always been dependent upon, either explicitly or implicitly, models of the energy system and projections or
forcasts of future events. Historically, the energy models
employed have frequently been judgmental or non-quantitative
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....

in form
Despite the large and expanding effort and
the availability of more data and increasingly sophisticated
hardware to manipulate it, we still continue to fall short of
achieving a satisfactory capability to analyze consequences
or impacts of alternative policies on the various parts of
the energy system or to project with an acceptable degree of
reliability what will happen in the future under various assumed conditions. 11

We find a similar argument made by Herbert Simon:
The number of important variables involved in the energy
picture is so large, and the interconnections among variables
so intricate, that common sense and everyday reasoning no
longer provide adequate guides to energy policies if, indeed,
they ever did
Hence, the most important organizational
requirement for handling energy policy in an intelligent way is
the creation of one or more models either of an optimizing or
simulation type to provide coherence to the decision-making
process

—

....

—

—

But while we can always use more data and better models, the

question is to what extent the lack of such things has prevented the

generation of an effective energy policy.

Clearly it has not prevented

the formulation of a comprehensive energy plan

—many

individuals and

groups, left, right and middle, have produced well-researched national

energy plans.

And many of these groups have pointed out that our in-

ability to deal with our energy problems is not so much an analytic
failure, but a political failure
an effective policy.

— the

inability to pass and implement

Indeed, in a rare instance of agreement between

the left and the right, both Barry Commoner and Mobil Oil Company have

asserted that much of our energy problem is political in nature.
diverge, of course, on the specifics.

They

Commoner and other environ-

rational
mentalist have argued that the main political obstacle to a
the oil
energy policy has been the power of special interests like
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companies who have been able to block or gut energy legislation
which
has not been in their interests.

On the other hand, Mobil Oil Company

has argued that "the energy crisis is in large measure a
political
crisis"^'^ due to over-regulation by the government and unrealistic

environmental standards.

Despite these differences, the point here is

clear: the explanation for the persistence of our energy problems lies

not so much in the areas of models, but in the area of some old and

intuitive concepts like "interests" and "power."

This is an important

point, so let us consider an even more specific example from this

problematic policy area

— the

deregulation of natural gas.

The Gas Deregulation Controversy

Natural gas was one of the most difficult and frustrating areas
of energy policy during the 1970 's.

The primary issue in the prolonged

and intense debate was the desirability of deregulating the well-head

price of natural gas.

Specifically, there was disagreement over whether

low gas prices would cause a shortage of natural gas, and whether allowing the price to rise would produce more gas for the market
the debate was over the elasticity of gas production.

— in

short,

On one side were

organizations like the American Gas Association which argued that the

artificially low prices set for interstate gas by the Federal Power

Commission had distorted the market for natural

gas."'"^

It was contended

that the regulated prices had not only made gas appear cheaper than it

really was, thus stimulating an artifically high demand, but that those

74

low prices also made it unprofitable to drill for more
natural

gas-

gas that is located in increasingly remote and more expensive
areas.

Thus regulation was directly blamed for the natural gas shortages
that

affected the country during the late 1970

's.

In support of this argu-

ment, some gas policy analysts produced models which showed that higher
gas prices would make more gas available.

For example, one study in-

dicated that an increase in the price of natural gas from $1.75 to
$2.50 per million cubic feet Oncf) would increase U.S. recoverable

reserves by approximately 20%.^^

On the other side of this debate were public interest groups and
certain government agencies which maintained that deregulation would
only produce higher prices and higher industry profits and not signifi-

cantly more natural gas.

The General Accounting Office, for instance,

produced an analysis which indicated that few additional reserves would
likely be discovered at prices above $1.75 per
gas supply was not very responsive to price.

mcf.-'-^

They argued that

It is evident then,

that

it could be argued that this deregulation problem was actually a model-

— that

ing problem

if we could only ascertain which model of elasticity

was most accurate, then the issue could be resolved in a rational
fashion.

For example, one of the main differences in these elasticity

models concerns different assumptions about the extent of natural gas
reserves and the accessibility of those reserves.

Relatively scarce

reserves that are not readily accessible means higher development and
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production costs for the gas companies and that means that higher
prices

would be required to produce higher production.

Thus it would be very

helpful to be able to establish the exact extent and nature of domestic
gas reserves.

Unfortunately, however, because of many uncertainties,

the exact nature of natural gas reserves is very difficult to ascertain

precisely.

Reputable geologists have been known to make estimates of

natural gas reserves which differ by an order of magnitude of

five.-*-^

Thus, depending on whether one uses reputable optimistic numbers or

reputable pessimistic numbers, one can produce a reputable analysis supporting either side of this debate.
Perhaps more accurate estimates of gas reserves can be developed
perhaps not.
is

But what all of this focus on modeling questions obscures

the great possibility that all of this disagreement over models was

simply a surrogate for a much more basic political conflict between the
parties involved.

The real issue may not have been the accuracy of the

competing models, but a matter of justice and equality.

As one com-

mentator concluded, the main problem with passing natural gas legislation
in the 1970 's was that it was an "overwhelmingly difficult political

issue, involving an objective conflict of interest among several groups
and several regions, very high financial stakes

— perhaps

"^O
$400 billion—and correspondingly high passions.

as high as

xhe heart of the

issue was the enormous amount of wealth that would be transferred to
gas producing companies by virtue of deregulation.

Many consumers saw

this as a massive "rip-off," while gas producers simply saw it as good

business practice.

In the light of this economic and political conflict,
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the issue of the exact degree of price elasticity was
actually a

secondary concern for many.

As I.C. Bupp and Frank Schuller observed

in the Harvard Business School Energy Study," as far as independent
(gas producers) are concerned, alternative estimates of price
and

supply are beside the point.

big rewards.

The point is that big risks should mean

So any public policy that tries to moderate such rewards

in the interests of other objectives is unjust. "21

xhe issue was finally

resolved (at least temporarily) in October of 1978 with the passage of
the Natural Gas Policy Act which provides for the increased deregula-

tion of the price of gas

—a

testimony more to the power of the natural

gas lobby than to the accuracy of their models, for deregulation has

yet to produce any of the substantial increases in supply that were

predicted.

Now all of this is not to say that insufficient models are not
sometimes a problem in policymaking.

There are many obstacles to

effective policies, and poor models is one of them.

But this explana-

tion of our policy failures only distracts from an understanding of the

primary reason why problems like energy, urban decay, environmental
decay, poverty continue to persist

politics

.

These problems persist

not because they are beyond our intellectual capacities, but because

most real solutions involve some redistribution of wealth, income, and
services in society, and many of the groups that would be hurt are

powerful enough to block or sidetrack those policy measures which would

harm their interests.

Entrenched political interests

— not

complexity
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is at the heart of the policy paralysis which is typical
in so many

policy areas.

In his study of our failed economic policies, MIT econo-

mist Lester C. Thurow has reached a conclusion very similar to this:
"Our
economic problems are solvable.
several solutions.

For most of our problems, there are

But all of these solutions have the characteristic

that someone must suffere large economic losses.

No one wants to volun-

teer for this role, and we have a political process incapable of forcing

anyone to shoulder this burden. "^^

Failure to appreciate this truth

that politics may be the central cause of our policy failures

— can

only

make it more difficult to solve these problems.

Depoliticizing Policy
As Richard Nelson has noted, this tendency to underplay the politi-

cal dimensions of policy problems is part of the intellectual tradition
of policy analysis:

All the traditions (of policy analysis) possess an enormous
amount of confidence that it is possible to find technically
correct answers to important policy problems; they play down
or ignore that many problems may be largely political, involving real conflicts of interests that cannot be dissolved
by sweet rationalism.'^-'

Policy analysts are certainly not unaware of the existence of these
kinds of political obstacles.

If quizzed,

few would seriously maintain

that all one needs to create an effective public policy is an accurate

model.

But there seems to be a discrepency between the analyst's personal

level of political awareness and the awareness embodied in their analytical

frameworks and policy studies themselves.

On one level, analysts are

aware of the centrality of political obstacles, but there seems to little
place for this awareness in their work.

A study done on national energy

policy by MIT made this schizophrenia clear when it stated that
"Behind
every energy bottleneck and every future decision stand serious
societal
issues: nuclear power safety, environmental protection and many
others.

Such issues, though both appropriate and important to the debate now
in

progress throughout the nation, are beyond the scope of this report. "^^
It seems that though policy analysts themselves are not politically naive,

many of their studies are.
The inclination to see the persistence of our social problems as
a function of complexity and insufficient analytic techniques is part

of the general tendency to depoliticize policy problems that is charac-

teristic of policy analysis.

As we saw earlier, this tendency is

partially self-serving in that it makes activities like modelling appear
to be

more relevant and central to policymaking.

But it is also im-

portant to see that this tendency is also strongly rooted in the con-

ception of politics that underlies much of policy analysis.

For many

analysts, politics as it is usually practiced is seen as irrational
and corrupt.

Policy decisions are often made on the basis of petty

personality conflicts, or on the undue influence of selfish special
interest groups.

The idea of the most rational policy seems to get

lost among all of the influence-peddling, back-stabbing, pork-barreling,
and log-rolling that is typical in government.

In this sense, most

analysts tend to implicitly adopt a reason/politics split; a belief
that rational analysis is a separate and superior way to approach

political decisions.

Sometimes this belief becomes the hope that
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rational analysis will eventually replace politics as the
guiding
force in policy making, a hope that was best expressed
by John Maynard

Deynes when he said, "The ideas of economists and political
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are
more

...

powerful than commonly understood

I

am sure that the power of

vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. "^^
Importantly, there is little conception of a legitimate clash
of interests, of valid political conflict, in this view of politics.

There is little sense that these conflicts can be rational, or that
these conflicts may be the inevitable result of the pursuit of freedom
and justice in a given society.

Instead, conflicts are seen as

basically irrational; it is believed that "conflict is a corrolary of
ignorance, therefore the application of knowledge will reduce conflict. "^^

For example, it is sometimes asserted that the better pre-

dictions produced by mathematical models will lead to the resolution
of most political disagreements.

As Stokey and Zeckhauser have argued,

"policy disagreements would lessen

— and

perhaps vanish

— if

we could

predict with certainty the safety consequences of the breeder reactor,
or the costs of annual upkeep of clay courts, or whether a special

shuttle bus for the elderly would be heavily used. "27

of course, the

problem with such an optimistic view is that most policy disagreements
are not merely a function of differing predictions, but a matter of

diverging values and interests.

Indeed, differences in predictions are
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often a function of differing value orientations.

As we saw earlier,

in the conflict of natural gas pricing, differences in
models pre-

dictions sometimes only function as a surrogate battleground for

political groups divided by more basic political and philosophical
differences.

In these situations, predictive models do not transcend

politics, but tend to become a part of politics.

In most controversies,

models function less as objective arbitrators and more as ventriloquists' dummies which spout out the predictions desired by the group

using the model.

This need not imply any corruption on the part of

the model managers, but simply reflects the fact that there is often a

very wide range of reasonable assumptions that a model manager can

choose from in constructing his or her model.

And it is unsurprising

that analysts for a consumer lobby that is opposed to deregulation of
gas would build a model incorporating the more pessimistic assumptions

relating to price elasticity, while the models produced by gas company
analysis would favor the more optimistic assumptions.

Complexity as a Political Issue

In one sense, the question of whether the persistence of policy

problems is more a function of complexity or political factors is a

very misleading one; it implicitly accepts a distinction between
political issues and issues of complexity.

But this distinction is an

artificial one which only obscures the fact that complexity itself can
be thought of as a political issue.

Thus even if we grant that the
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over-complexity of

modem societies

is a major contribution to

policy failures, we need not accept the depoliticizing connotations
that accompany this assertion.

It can be argued, for instance,

that

the very fact that analysts tend to accept this complexity and only

strive to work within it is itself a political position.

For there

are those who oppose accepting the complexities of modern industrial

society and would argue for a more simple and rational form of socio-

economic organization.

For example, many of those in the back-to-the

land movement, and other counter-cultural movements of the last decades

have argued that large-scale, complex industrial societies are in-

herently alienating and prone to a whole host of social and environmental problems.

In a sense, they agree with policy analysts about

the reasons for the persistence of many policy problems, but they dis-

agree about the solutions.

Instead of creating a corps of policy

analysts to "manage" that complexity, they would seek a simpler society

where analysts were not needed.
Marxists economists have also argued that the over-complexity
of capitalist economies is primarily a political issue.

28

They argue

that many of the complex dysfunctions afflicting the U.S. economy

like the recurring cycles of inflation and unemployment

— are

due to

the anarchistic and irrational structure built into a capitalist

economic system.

In their view, our failure to solve our persistent

economic problems is due to our political commitment to maintaining a

capitalist economy.

This commitment prevents the government from

attacking these structural problems directly, and forces the
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government to turn to a series of indirect and complex "fine tuning"
policies which at best can only minimize these economic dysfunctions.
For a Marxist economist then, the role of the analyst in a capitalist

society is a very political one; their job is to manage and thus

legitimize a basically irrational economic system.
sider the problem of inflation.

For example, con-

This has surely been one of the most

frustrating and complex policy issues to face policy analysts, and
much effort has been applied to producing explanations and models of

inflation that would allow us to bring it under control.

Many

elaborate and complicated policies have been devised and employed, including efforts to raise interest rates, slow deficit spending,

encourage saving by consumers, and so on.

As many of these policies

have failed, analysts have gone back, to the analytic drawing board
to devise even

more intricate ways to exert some control over prices.

Radical economists are fond of pointing out that many socialist economies have not been afflicted with the same kind of spiraling inflation
that has plagued capitalist economies

and controlled by the government.

— in

part because prices are set

In keeping with this, some have

suggested that there is one obvious policy that would stop inflation
dead in its tracks in the United States

—wage

and price controls.
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But they point out that this relatively straight forward approach to
the problem is impeded by its political implications.

It is a dis-

concerting move away from the capitalist tradition of letting
corporations and the market set prices.

Wage and price controls,
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if utilized over any long period of time, would inevitably
disrupt

some of the price signals which govern economic production; and so
if production shortages and other dislocations were to be avoided,

it might require the government to step in and direct production

activities
many fear.

— and

this would be a giant step toward the socialism that

The point here is not so much the desirability or un-

desirability of wage and price controls, but the fact that if analysts
are committed to maintaining control over pricing in the private sector,
and to limiting government policy to complex and indirect maneuverings
this is a commitment with political implications.

One need not be a Marxist to see that, for political reasons,

we often make public policies and policy problems much more complicated than need be.

For instance, even Herman Daly, who is hardly a

Marxist, has found in his work on population control that while many

policy analysts and policymakers have begun to agree on the importance
of slowing down population growth,

there is a very strong tendency

on their part to shy away from any simple and direct policy program

— like

Kenneth Boulding's birth license

to limit

population growth

scheme.

Because of the negative moral and political connotations that

surround the notion of population control, policymakers prefer to
indulge in a variety of complex and indirect strategies to discourage

population growth, including modifying the tax laws, restricting
public housing to small families, encouraging celibacy and late

marriage, encouraging tolerance of homosexuality, convincing people
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to spend their money on consumer durables rather than having children,

making it popular to have children only between ages of twenty and
thirty, and so forth.

Daly explains nicely how this kind of awkward,

complicated, and indirect approach to public policy can be understood
as a function of the political concerns of the policymaker combined

with the scientistic perspective of the policy analyst.
Whence this enormous preference for indirectness? It results partly from our unwillingness to really face the
issue. Limiting reproduction is still a taboo subject that
must be approached in contorted and roundabout ways rather
than directly.
Furthermore, roundaboutness and indirectness are the bread and butter of empirical social scientists,
who get grants and make their reputations by measuring the
responsiveness of the birth rate to all sorts of remote
"policy variables." The direct approach makes estimation of
all these social parameters governing tenuous chains of cause
and effect quite unnessary.^^

The Political Uses of Complexity

Daly's remarks suggest an important point: that the use of

elaborate modeling is popular not so much because it is effective in
taming the complexity of the modern world, but because it is effective
in depoliticizing policy issues

— and

this turning of political issues

into technical issues can actually benefit certain interests.

As

Daly implies, one of the most obvious examples of this concerns the
policy analysts themselves who have a vested interest in promoting
their
complex and roundabout policy approaches which will ensure that

modeling expertise is indispensable.

Depoliticizatlon can also

easily serve the interests of policymakers.

For instance, when im-

for
portant policy measures fail, it is much more convenient
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policymakers to blame this on the sheer complexity of the social
problems and the difficulties involved in analysis, than to admit to
their own political mis judgments or administrative incompetence.

Moreover, the depoliticizing effect of this complexity argument
has also been known to work to the advantage of various special interests.

As David Noble has observed, analytic techniques can often be

used to create or accentuate the complexities surrounding a policy
issue.

Tobacco companies are fond of asserting that establishing the

exact causes of cancer is a difficult and complex endeavor

— so

com-

plex that one cannot indisputably say that smoking causes cancer.

Noble points out that a common tactic

used by corporations charged

with harming the environment is to bring a group of analysts to demonstrate that establishing undeniable connections between industrial
activities and detrimental environmental effects is an extremely complex and debatable task.

The intended effect of this is to confuse

and mitigate any responsibility that any particular company might
have.

In Noble's view, much of the corporate funded policy research

in the environmental area is "devoted to hiding the real issues of

power and control in a verbal haze of obscurantist prose, driving

home the industries message: Things are much more complicated than we
thought.

Thus the spirit of policy analysis fits quite well into

a standard political strategy, one used by corporations and their

environmental opponents as well: if one wants the government to not
that
act on a certain issue, this can be best assured by demonstrating

86

the issue is much too complex and confusing to act on immediately, and

by insisting that more studies be done

—which

will hopefully take

several years and end up being inconclusive.

A Depoliticized Culture

Finally, part of the appeal of the complexity argument can be
traced to the peculiar nature of American political culture.

The

notion that social problems are matters of complexity that can be
solved by applying the proper "intellectual technology" has an in-

herent appeal to Americans; for as Kenneth Keniston has pointed out,

we like to believe that most of our difficulties are "problems" which
are inherently cognitive in nature.

In his words,

Indeed, the very notion that most difficulties in life are
"problems" is one of the central assumptions of the (American)
outlook. We normally assume that the pitfalls along life's
path can best be dealt with by treating them as cognitive
difficulties whose solution involves the application of "knowhow. "^2
In other words, the very fact that we tend to think of our policy

difficulties as "problems" (as opposed to conflicts) implies that like

math problems, these difficulties have an intellectual solution.

Thus

public policy analysis can be seen as the formal embodiment of the

American preference to see ourselves as
quite clever in solving problems.

a

practical people who are

Instead of seeing politics as the

arena of clashing interests and ideologies, we would rather have it

reduced to a matter of "problem-solving."

vision of politics.

This is a more convenient

For to see politics as conflict would logically
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imply that citizens should actively participate, should take sides,
and should passionately struggle over the policy issues of the day.
But if politics is "problem-solving," then political activity can be

reduced to hiring the best "problem-solvers."

Unlike many Europeans,

Americans do not seem to thrive on intense political participation.
For us, the "pursuit of happiness" has traditionally been a private

endeavor; and political activity is often thought of as a burden or an

inconvenience to be avoided if at all possible.

(In keeping with this,

policy analysts tend to emphasize the high "costs" of political participation.)

Thus the predominant, middleclass ideal of politics is simply

to hire a government that will solve the problems that are getting in

the way of their individual pursuits, and then leave them alone.

In

such a context, the appeal of a perspective which view political issues
as problems due to complexity or lack of information is obvious.

An Old and Continuing Tradition

The zenith of this depoliticized view of politics was probably

during the optimistic years of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

During this period the "End of Ideology" rhetoric was quite popular
in both political and academic circles.

America was thought to no

longer have political or ideological problems, only technical ones.
As Kennedy himself argued in 1962:

What is at stake in our economic decisions today is not
some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the
country to passion, but the practical management of a modern
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economy. What we need are not labels and cliches,
but
more basic discussions of the sophisticated and technical
questions involved in keeping a great economic machinery
moving ahead.-'-'
In keeping with his views, Kennedy surrounded himself with
what David

Halberstam called "the best and the brightest."

Men like Robert

MacNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Hostow; "the new breed of thinkerdoers, half of academe, half of the nation's think tanks and of policy

planning;

.

.

.

men of applied intelligence who would not land us in

trouble by passion and emotion. "^^

In many ways, policy analysis is

the institutionalized legacy of these intellectuals, particularly

McNamara who was the first high level champion of systems analysis
and cost-effectiveness in government.

The naive kind of optimism that accompanied policy analysis in
its early days has long since waned.

In part this was due to the

disturbing role that policy analysis and systems analysis had in the

Vietnam War.

In many ways, it was the first systems analysis war.

The war was seen by some as being primarily an exercise in technical
expertise, and volumes and volumes of statistics were gathered to

measure its progress and effectiveness.

This view reinforced the

belief that Vietnam was primarily a military struggle; one that could
be won with more troops and more bombs.
counts

— always

And the data

— the

seemed to indicate that we were winning.

body

But all of

this only obscured the fact that Vietnam was primarily a political

struggle.

Unable to see this, the United States continually under-

estimated the determination and strength of the Vietcong and
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and North Vietnamese.

There were, of course, those in the govern-

ment who suspected this kind of mistake, but often it was only expressed
as a kind of intuition, a notion that is rarely taken very seriously by

some in the analytic community.

As Halberstam pointed out:

When the doubters about Vietnam began to express themselves,
they at first tended to be people who did not talk (McNamara's)
language
They did not think in terms of statistics or
rationalizing systems, and they did not support their judgments with facts as he knew them, but rather by saying that it
did not smell right, or that it just did not feel right; he
would trust his facts and statistics and instincts against
theirs just as he had before at Ford when confronted by the
businessmen who had doubted his facts and charts. 35
.

.

.

The mixed successes and alleged failures of urban renewal and

other "Great Society" policy programs of the 1960s also added to the

disillusionment about the effectiveness of policy analysis, and our
ability to solve our social problems through "intellectual technology.""^^

This disillusionment, however, has not signaled the dis-

appearance of this kind of technocratic approach from policy analysis
or the political sphere.

In part, this is because the purpose of

this technocratic approach has not simply been to solve social problems,

but also to give the impression that these problems are merely tech-

nical ones and not basic political divisions which reflect deep-seated
conflicts of interest in our society.
failed only in one sense

— not

Thus technocratic analysis has

ridding society of its pressing problems

but has been relatively more successful in fulfilling its political
purposes.

As we have seen, policy analysis can be helpful in depoliti-

cizing policy issues.

And this kind of depolitization not only serves
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various interests, it also fits in well with the subcurrent of
de-

politicization that runs throughout our political culture.

For these

reasons, despite the fact that many analysts and policymakers are

now more "realistic" about the effectiveness of public policy analysis,
this does not necessarily mean that the tendency to see policy problems
as problems of complexity is likely to disappear.

Furthermore, if there is a persistent failure to recognize that
policy problems are in many cases essentially political in nature, then

policy analysts may find themselves in undesirable political positions.
At best it means that policy analysts and their studies will often wind
up being largely irrelevant to the resolution of these problems, and
at worst it means that analysts could simply become unwitting partici-

pants in the political struggles surrounding public policies, with
their studies being used for unforeseen political purposes.

It is

worth our while then to seek a way out of this technocratic perspective.
At a minimum, this would require a conceptual move beyond the rational-

ity/politics dichotomy that lies at the heart of this perspective.

It

requires, for instance, that analysts become more sensitive to the

political implications of their supposedly neutral scientific rationality.

In part, these first chapters are a step in that direction.

But analysts must also begin to make a more serious attempt to address
the normative and political issues involved in policy decisions.

how that can be done will be the subject of Chapter IX.

Just
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CHAPTER

V

POLICY ANALYSIS AS PREDICTION

The success of mathematical physics led to the social
scientists to be jealous of its power without quite understanding the intellectual attitudes that had contributed to
this power.
The use of mathematical formulae had accompanied
the development of the natural sciences and become the mode
in the social sciences.
Just as primitive peoples adopt the
Western modes of denationalized clothing and of parliamentarism
out of a vague feeling that these magic rites and vestments will
at once put them abreast of modern culture and technique, so
the economists have developed the habit of dressing up their
rather imprecise ideas in the language of the infinitesimal
calculus ... To assign what purports to be precise values
to such essentially vague quantities is neither useful nor
honest, and any pretense of applying precise formulae to these
loosely defined quantities is a sham and a waste of time.
Norbert Wiener
in God and Golem

Econometric models have been helpful, indeed necessary, tools in
the design of macro-economic policy in the United States for many years

now.

The interrelated problems of inflation, money supply, growth,

recession, etc., are simply too vast and complicated to deal with without models to help us predict the consequences

unintended

— of

— both

various economic policy options.

intended and

As Jay W. Forrester

argues, if models can be developed to dependably represent and predict
the cause and effect relationships that characterize our socio-economic

policyworld, they would be tremendous aids in almost every area of

making

^
.

Nevertheless, there is one important question that must be
sophisticated
examined in detail: just how reliable are these
94
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mathematical models?

In this chapter we shall examine not how

modelling can be a depoliticisizing distraction, but some of the
internal limitations that affect these modelling efforts.

While analysts

and policymakers have come to rely increasingly on such models to guide

crucial policy decisions, there are real questions emerging as to their

accuracy and reliability.

On the one hand, there are some modellers

who are typically quite enthusiastic about the relevance and reliability
2

of these models.

But there are also those who have begun to seriously

question dependence on these elaborate constructs.

Nowhere is the

disillusionment about the reliability of these complex models more
evident than in the area of econometric modelling.

These models were

once thought to be the prototype for all policy models, but in the 1970 'i
there had been increasing concern over their adequacy.

Fully 75% of the

college economics professors polled in a recent survey said that they
have "increasing doubts about the accuracy of macro-economic models."-^

These doubts have been founded on the very real failures of these models
for example, the failure of econometric models to predict or to even

explain the kinds of inflation and stagflation that have afflicted the
One economist summed up the situation

economy during the last decade.
in this way:

The influence of economists has never been greater
yet the public esteem of economists has never been
Economic forecasting has become a multilower
Yet the economy is widely
million dollar business
perceived as out of control with the economists having
mathematical models
little of value to contribute
models have
econometric
analogue
empirical
their
and
Econoof
tools
economics
standard
the
now become
task.
the
to
up
not
proved
models
metric
.
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Another policy area in which the adequacy of current models
has come into question is that of energy policy.

In a recent study

of leading energy system models done by Sergio Koreisha and Robert

Stobaugh, it is not only concluded that "a models prediction may be
quite imprecise and therefore not particularly useful for policymakers,"
but it was also found that many energy models actually helped to distort
our view of our energy problems.^

As a specific example, they point out

that many of these models only fed the illusion that our energy problems

were not serious.
The major studies since 1973 have given us predictions about
the U. S. energy situation that have been consistently more
optimistic than the reality proved to be, especially in regard
to energy supplies.
Some of these models were published without receiving much notice and had virtually no lasting impact.
Nevertheless, it seems abundantly clear that some of the
optimistic forecasts issued did influence and mislead both
the energy policymakers and the informed public about the
causes and possible solutions for the energy problem.^

—

—

These generally recognized failures in the area of policy modelling

have raised the question of whether and how these models can be improved
and made a more reliable guide for policymaking.

But this potential for

improvement depends greatly, of course, on the nature and source of these
current failures.

Are these failures due to unique technical problems

located in particular models, or are these failures caused by a more basic

philosophical shortcoming in the nature of these models which limits their
predictive abilities?

Let us consider each of these explanations in turn,

for each gives us a quite different understanding of the possibilities

inherent in these models.
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Modelling Failures: A Technical Explanation

Technical explanations of model failures are those which focus
primarily on the technical aspects of the models themselves, and in
general attempt to lay the blame for predictive failures on the fact
that current models are too simple to adequately predict the complex

workings of our energy system or economic system.

In order to construct

a workable model, all 'model builders must make a number of simplifying

assumptions which can lead to some inaccuracies.

For example. The

Kennedy-Houthakker World Oil Model incorporated the assumption that
rising oil prices would lead Industry and utilities to switch to coal.^
They based this assumption of the fact in the past price differences
had led these institutions to switch from coal to oil.

However, it

turned out that while it is easy to convert coal handling equipment into
oil burners, it is much more difficult to convert equipment originally

designed to be fueled by oil into coal burners.

One problem is that oil

burners typically have much smaller fire-boxes than coal burners, and
thus can only be converted to coal at the lost of substantial capacity.

As the result of such oversights, the models prediction of the conversion

rate was much too optimistic.
In the area of econometric modelling, there have been many attempts
to explain the Inadequacy of these models in terms of their failure to

incorporate some important characteristics of the economic system.

One

common argument has been that models have been based on Keyneslan
and focused
assumptions which have ignored the supply side of the economy,
of demand.
too much on controlling the economy through regulation

Q
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Others have argued that an equilibrivim model of the economy is over-

simplified and inaccurate; that models must begin to assume that

disequilibrium is the prevailing condition of a capitalist economic
system.

9

The details of these arguments are not as important as their

general thrust: that problems with, current models are primarily technical
in nature and can be overcome by making them more complex and more

accurate representations of the system under consideration.
There is certainly some truth in this perspective
for the technical improvement of policy models.

— there

is room

But some critics of

policy analysis have argued that these models will always suffer from
problems of oversimplification.

As Martin Rein has observed:

While simplified models of economic and social reality can
be developed, based upon stylized facts and heroic assumptions,
none of the insights derived from these exercises provides
There are
secure basis for the design of social policies
isolate
a few
variables
and
we
seem
to
be
unable
to
too many
crucial imputs. Moreover, there is an inherent paucity of
reliable information about these variables.-'-^
.

.

.

This point is reiterated by Ida Hoos:

complete models [may be possible] in designing missiles
and rockets but not in the realm of social affairs where the
multiplicity of unqualif iable, if not unidentifiable, variables
This often
make prediction at best a statistical exercise
leads to oversimplications neglect of vital facts, and inappropriate or unwarrented recommendations and conclusions
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

These critics and others contend that social systems are simply
too vast and "essentially complex" to be captured accurately in models.

12

Accurate predictions are possible in the physical sciences because we
can reduce the number of important variables to a manageable few.

But

variables, too
this is not possible in society, where there are too many

produce accurate
many bits of information that we would need to collect to
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social predictions.

One critic, Amory Lovins, takes this point to its

logical extreme by arguing that even if we were able to somehow

reproduce the essential complexity of socio-economic phenomena in a
model, it would probably do us little good.

As he explains it:

One makes a model, presumably, because some system is too
complex for its behavior to be apprehended intuitively. The
same, unfortunately, is then bound to be true of the model,
and one will never know whether to believe it or not, nor
how far it can be used for guidance, since one does not understand it and has no way to validate it.-'--^
But most of these kinds of criticism of modelling have had little

effect on that activity.

Indeed, there is little reason to believe that

this kind of over-complexity argument would discourage modellers.
as we saw in the last chapter, it is exactly this argument

— that

For
it is

the complexity of social reality that makes prediction so difficult

that modelling advocates use to justify their work.

that models tend to be incomplete.
the cure is all too obvious

— one

Critics may charge

But incompleteness is not a fatal flaw;

simply makes the models more complete.

Science is not easily intimidated by mere complexity, especially with the

advent of sophisticated computer technologies.

And so it seems that the

primary effect of this line of criticism has been to simply spur on

analysts

— like

J.W. Forrester and others

— into

collecting more and more

data, devising more ways to quantify previously ignored variables, and

creating more complex computer simulations of our economic and energy
systems.

In this sense, the efforts of some critics to undermine the basic

faith and optimism underlying modelling have backfired.
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Modelling Failures: The Philosophical Explanati
on
There is, however, an explanation for the predictive
faili
Lures
of descriptive mathematical models which goes
beyond these technical

kinds of criticisms.

It is at its core a philosophical or epistemo-

logical explanation that applies not just to econometric and energy
models, but to all social science models which are based on positivist

assumptions.

This explanation begins by pointing out that policy

analysis shares its predictive problems with all of the social sciences.
It is argued that the predictive ability of the social sciences has

always been poor because of their inability to develop a basic set of

rigorous casual laws as the natural sciences have

done."'"^

Laws which

express casual relationships which are constant over time are the

crucial ingredient in effective predictive models.

The positivist

explanation for this failure is essentially the same as the one discussed
above: social reality is so much more complicated than natural reality
that social laws are necessarily more rough and probabilistic than

physical ones.

However, during recent years there has evolved a

different explanation for this problem of insufficient laws in the social
sciences

— one

which explicitly rejects the positivist argument.

One of

the first formulations of this counter-argument is found in the work of

Peter Winch.

Winch can be considered a founding member of the Inter-

pretive School of Social Science, a post-positive approach to social
analysis having its conceptual roots in English analytic philosophy and
the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.-'-^

In 1958, Winch produced his
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now famous short monograph, The Idea of a Social Science

,

in which

he put forth a provocative philosophical critique of the positivist

conception of knowledge and social inquiry."*"^

For our purposes, one of

his most important arguments concerns the inability of the social sciences
to

produce reliable laws and predictions as the physical sciences have

done.

Rejecting the positivist explanation, he argued instead that

this failure to produce reliable socio-economic laws is not due simply
to

the sheer complexity of social phenomena, but to the basic qualities

of social phenomena which separate them from natural phenomena.

Winch

rejected John Stuart Mill's classic argument that social phenomena are
"just very much more complicated" than natural phenomena, and insisted
that the difference between them is not so much "a difference in degree,

but a difference in kind."-'-^

In other words,

there is a basic qualita-

tive difference between natural and social reality which makes scientific

prediction of social phenomena problematic.

Let us consider for a moment

just what this difference is.

According to Winch, the essential difference between social and
natural phenomena is that the behavior of the latter is dictated by the
laws of physics, while the behavior of human beings is governed by the

beliefs that are held by them.-^^

Or to put it another way, social

phenomena are constituted in part by human beliefs, but natural phenomena
are not.

Thus while the behavior of natural objects proceeds according

beliefs about
to constant natural laws which operate independent of human
can exist and
them, social practices and institutions (like the economy)

participants
proceed only if certain beliefs and rules are held by the
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in those institutions.

A natural process like water evaporating on

the ocean will occur quite independent of our beliefs about
it, but a

social institution like the economy could literally not exist without

certain beliefs about what exchange is, what a price is, what money is
worth, and so on. It is in this sense that social institutions and

practices are constituted in part by human beliefs.
It is this fact that human actions are governed by beliefs and

not laws which makes social prediction so difficult.

inherently more variable than laws.

For beliefs are

Accurate prediction requires a

vision of social life as determined by laws of behavior.

Thus the

predictive ability of policy models rests on the positivist presumption
that there is an essential similarity between natural and social

phenomena, and thus a similarity between the methods of understanding

appropriate to both.

(This is the assumption of the methodological unity

of the science cited in the introduction.)

But if human activity is

actually constituted by beliefs then the constancy needed for accurate
forecasting is undermined.
can be consciously changed.

Beliefs are not necessarily constant, they
In other words, as human beings our actions

are not determined by constant laws, we have the capacity of choice,
the ability to choose between the beliefs that inform our actions.

It

is this ability that frustrates the deterministic vision that would

make prediction easy, and helps account for why mathematical, law-like
policy models are subject to failure.

A consideration of some of the elements frustrating energy policy
predictions provides some support for Winch's arguments.

For example,

most policy analysts have been consistently overly-optimistic in their
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predictions about the price and availability of foreign oil resources.

During much of the 1970s, various administrations expressed the belief
that the OPEC cartel could not maintain its strangle hold on oil prices;

and one administration official, referring to one large computer model,

confidently asserted in 1975 that "We expect oil prices to level out

between $4 and $6 a barrel.

Clearly part of the problem here is the

analyst's inability to anticipate the changing views and beliefs of
those who make decisions for the member countries of OPEC.
In addition, the work of several young economists like Robert

Lucas 21 and Robert Barro also lends support to some of Winch's arguThey argue that the failure of traditional econometric models

ments.

can be traced to the fact that these models do not incorporate the

ability of economic actors to change their beliefs and therefore their
actions.

They point out that these models assume that people will react

the same way to similar economic situations.

true.

But this is not always

People can learn from their experience, change their beliefs,

and react differently.

For example, the government may increase the

money stock in order to stimulate the economy.

People find themselves

with more money and so go out and spend it on more goods, and so on.
But eventually, as the inflation caused by increased money stocks makes

itself felt, people realize that they have overspent and overborrowed
that their increased wealth was just an illusion, and they become more

wary.

So when the government tries the same tactic again,

is far different.

the response

As Lucas explains, "When expansionary monetary policy

is used repeatedly over time,

it no longer accomplishes its purposes.

lOA

There is no stimulating effect on spending and output.
expansions come out as inflation and nothing else."22

Expected
Thomas Sargent

adds that "People recognize the truth and stop making the same
mistakes.

When they do, they eliminate the planned effects of the policy. "^-^
Despite such problems, these economists remain enthusiastic about
the use of models, insisting that we should be able to predict these

changes in beliefs and behavior,

and incorporate them into our models.

They argue that we need only assume that "people tend to act rationally
and intelligently in their own interest, "^'^ and that this kind of

behavior can be predicted with accuracy.

It is thought that if there

is any "law" of human behavior it is that people will always try to act

in their own self-interest.

If this "rational expectations" theory is

true, then reliable models and predictions along the lines of the natu-

ral sciences might still be a real possibility.

course some problems with this theory.

But there are of

For instance, there is the

questionable assumption that people do act rationally
not an uncommon human characteristic.

— Irrationality

is

Economists like Lucas dismiss

this problem by arguing that to dwell on it would get in the way of

making good models.

"Irrational behavior can't be predicted.

can't model it, just because it l£ irrational.
."^^
to assume that people act rationally

You

But good models have

This is a classic example of

how the requirements of their models, not the characteristics of human
social reality tend to inform the perspectives of policy analysts.

But

even if, for the sake of argument, we were to grant the assumption that

all people act rationally, non-positlvist critics like Winch
would

still maintain that prediction can be problematic.

Interpretation and Fallibility

Winch argues that even if people act rationally, even if we
know the beliefs and rules that inform their actions, we may not be
able to predict their behavior.

This is because social action, in

contrast to natural events, require interpretations by the actor.

To

follow a rule, to act on a belief requires that the actor interpret

how that rule applies in a given situation.

For example, what it

means to act rationally may not always be entirely clear, especially

when the actor faces a situation that is new to him or her.
be a number of possible interpretations.

There may

For instance, consider a

group of workers confronted with a new Presidential request to keep

wage increases below 7% in order to slow down inflation.

Some workers

might interpret acting rationally in their self-interest as meaning
that they should support this measure, and thus encourage others to do
so, eventually curbing the inflation which is eating away at their

standard of living.

Other workers may think that it is rational to

oppose the wage cap, and strive for wage increases that will keep up

with inflation.

We have a situation of conflicting interpretations,

in which both groups are attempting to act rationally in their own

interests, and in which neither interpretation is obviously wrong.

Thus because the concept of "rationality" is subject to various
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interpretations and definitions, an analyst can assume that all

people act rationally, and still mis-predict the public's reaction
to public policies.

This understanding of the inherent problems surrounding the

prediction of "rational" action is supported by the work of Phillip
Green.

His book, the now classic Deadly Logic , is a critique of the

models and predictions used to justify our policies toward nuclear

confrontation and wars.^'^

Much of our strategic policy is based on

the analytic framework of game theory

—which

attempts to predict the

behavior of various rational "players" in confrontation situations.

In

a critique very similar to Winch's, Green points out that much of our

strategic thinking mistakenly assumes that what "rational action" is
in these situations will always be clear.

Green argues that in

situations of nuclear confrontation, the crucial attempt to predict the
enemy's rational actions and reactions depends directly upon our ability
to accurately determine the values that enemy policymakers are seeking
to

maximize through those actions.

However, at best, game theory can

give us only a static representation of those values.

Even assuming

that this initial representation is correct, it is quite likely that

these "values will undergo change during the drawn-out decision-making

process" that one would find in such a situation.

Green points out

that to assume, as game theory does, that "we (can have) in hand some

kind of quantified and unvarying national value estimate, a sort of

operational version of the Preamble of the Constitution
simply anti-empirical."^^

.

.

.

(is)

Given these sorts of problems. Green
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concludes that game theory models can foster overconf idence
in our

ability to correctly predict the rationality and acts of enemy
planners,
and that this can lend a false air of precision and accuracy
to the

deterrence model that was relied on so heavily in our defense planning
at the time.

For Winch, there is also another unique characteristic of human

behavior that makes social prediction problematic

— human

fallibility.

The argument here is that even if we had perfect knowledge of the

beliefs and motives of the public and even if through some miracle
everyone had the same interpretation of those beliefs, we still might
be unable to accurately predict the behavior of citizens

might make mistakes.

— because

they

Beliefs and rules, unlike natural laws, can be

followed either correctly or incorrectly, and so there is always the

possibility that someone will make a mistake while trying to follow a
rule.

A citizen, for example, may very well intend to support or follow

a certain government policy, but makes a mistake and actually undermines

it with his or her actions.

At first glance, a factor like fallibility

may seem to be an insignificant problem in policy analysis, but in fact,
one of the most controversial policies of the last decade was so largely

because of the failure of policy analysts to fully take into account
the factor of human fallibility.

Critics of nuclear power have argued

that many of the safety analyses done on nuclear power plants under-

estimate the risks involved because they fail to adequately incorporate
the possibility of human error.

study, the Rasmussen Report,

For example, the most famous safety

focused most of its attention on the
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question of whether the reactor design and the operating
procedures

were adequate to ensure safe operation of these facilities.

But while

these factors may be adequate in theory, what the report failed
to

adequately assess was the possibility of human error

construction of the reactor, or in its operation.

— either

in the

It underplays, for

example, the possibility that an accident could be initiated by an

error on the part of a plant employee, or that an operator attempting
to follow normal procedures during an "incident" makes a mistake and

aggravates the situation, or that an employee inadvertantly disables a
piece of equipment during maintenance making it unavailable during an
accident.-'-^

Omissions like these can be crucial.

The last two factors

mentioned were major contributors to the accident at Three Mile Island.
One major review of Rasmussen's Report

repudiated by the Energy Department

—which

— cited

finally led to its being

the fact that "operators and

other employees might make matters much worse during an accident in ways

which are intrinsically hard to analyze."-'

And more significantly, it

concluded that even though this human factor was "one of the major

contributors to the general problem faced by the (Rassmussen Report) in

making quantitative risk estimates

...

we don't know of any specific

way in which the methodology in this difficult area could have been
improved

.

"^-^

And this, of course is exactly Winch's point, that no

improvements in methodology can circumvent the problem of human agency
and failure in human affairs.

Nor can it produce the kind of extremely

reliable predictions needed in an area like nuclear power.
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Human Creativity and Social Change

Part of this problem of fallibility is related to the final

characteristic of human action that Winch feels makes precise social

prediction difficult

— human

creativity.

Human beings are blessed

with the unique ability to act and mis-act in new and creative ways.
We can invent new beliefs, new rules, new ideologies to guide out
actions.

And Winch argues that the development of these new ways of

thinking and acting may be impossible to predict, in principle .

As he

explains

Think of the way in which the game of football was revolutionized by the Rugby boy who picked up the ball and ran.
It would
certainly not have been possible to predict that revolution
from knowledge of the preceding state of the game any more than
it would have been possible to predict the philosophy of Hume
from the philosophies of his predecessors. It may help to recall Humphrey Lyttleton's rejoinder to someone who asked him
where Jazz was going: "If I knew where Jazz was going, I'd be
there already."
Maurice Cranston makes essentially the same point when he
notices that to predict the writing of a piece of poetry or
the making of a new invention would involve writing the poem
or making the invention oneself. And if one has already done
this oneself, then it is impossible to predict that someone else
will make up that poem or discover that invention. "He could
not predict it because he could not say it was going to happen
before it happened.
It would be a mistake, though tempting, to regard this as
One appears to be attempta piece of trivial logic-chopping.
against a purely
legislation
ing an impossible task of a priori
however,
showing,
empirical possibility. What in fact one is
understanding
our
is that the central concepts which belong to
of social life are incompatible with concepts central to the
activity of scientific prediction. When we speak of the possibility of scientific prediction as social developments of this
sort, we literally do not understand what we are saying. We
cannot understand it, because it has no sense.
A good example of how creativity may interfere with public policies
and policy analysis is the entrance of new beliefs and belief systems
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into the political arena.

The unexpected evolution of the environmental

movement is an instance of this.

Up until the late 1960's, the environ-

mental movement consisted of a relatively small number of people whose

main interests were largely aesthetic— the preservation of untouched
wilderness areas.

However, during the sixties, environmentalism took

an unforeseen turn and became focused on issues of health and the main-

tenance of the earth's eco-sphere on which all of human life is dependent.

Environmentalism moved beyond being a club and became a

significant social and political movement.

Looking back, this develop-

ment may seem inevitable, but few, if any, people actually predicted
this change in environmental consciousness.

In many ways, this was the

emergence of a truly new political force, and it eventually wreaked
havoc with many of the predictions made by analysts in the energy field.

Because analysts had not foreseen the growing strength and commitment
of this movement, many of the predictions made during the seventies about

how quickly new sources of energy could be utilized were overly optimistic.

Unexpectedly strong environmentalist opposition to projects

like oil pipelines and nuclear reactors was a significant factor in

frustrating analysts and policymakers attempts to develop an effective
energy policy.

Another way to say all of this is that policy models and predictions tend to become less reliable in times of socio-political
ferment and change.

During periods of relative socio-political stabil-

ity and tranquility, where there are widely shared ideological

frameworks and set patterns of social behavior, predictive models are
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more likely to be successful.

But ironically, it is when quiet times

yield to more chaotic and volatile times that the reliability of these

constructs begin to

ebb— at exactly

the time when the security afforded

by reliable predictions is most desired by policymakers.

Our conceptual

footing becomes slippery just when we desire it to be steady and firm
but such is the nature of social change and the role that human creativity plays in it.

Discouraging Over-Reliance on Models

This interpretive understanding of the inherent limitations of

prediction and modelling gives us additional insights into the nature
of policy model failures.

Most importantly, it shows that there are

good reasons to believe that public policy analysis cannot, in principle

provide the same kind of accurate and reliable predictions that the
natural sciences are famous for.

Because of such factors as human

creativity and fallibility, human relations are at best only quasicasual in form, and the enterprise of social prediction will always be a

problematic one.

Now this does not mean that we cannot ever predict

social behavior, or that models are useless, or that models can't be

technically improved.

It means primarily that analysts and policymakers

had best adopt an attitude of humility towards the capabilities of

these mathematical tools

— an

attitude somewhat closer to that reflected

in a recent poll which showed that public respect for economic fore-

casters is only marginally ahead of that for stockbrokers and astrologers.-^^

All too often, analysts typically acknowledge the limits of

,
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models in theory, and then conveniently forget about them in practiceespecially when they are enthusiastically promoting their own individual
models.

But instead of assuming (as one analyst does) that computer

models will form the "ultimate authority for public of f icials,"-^^ it

would be better if analysts erred on the side of caution and made sure
that policymakers did not become over-reliant on these models.

Ad-

mittedly, this kind of hvimility goes against the self-interest of the

model builder, and it requires resisting the policymakers desire for a
clear, scientistic answer to policy problems.

But one can hope that the

analysts integrity and commitment to truth will win out over these more

political considerations.
If taken seriously,

this kind of humility could have some impact

on the way we approach policy.

It implies, for example, that we cannot

rely on accurate models to circumvent disagreements over policies, as
some analysts have hoped.

Milton Friedman expressed the beliefs of many

analysts when he argued that "differences about economic policy among

disinterested citizens derive predominately from different predictions
about the economic consequences of taking action

—differences

that in
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principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive economics."

Assuming for the sake of argument that policy disputes are predictive
rather than normative and political, we have seen in this chapter that

positive economics probably cannot produce the kinds of clear, un-

disputable predictions that could solve these disputes once and for all.
This helps to make it clear that there are no easy ways out of policy

conflicts, and reemphasizes the fundamentally political nature of these

decisions
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Finally, a sense of humility about the power of modelling

suggests that we be wary of entering into risky or dangerous policy

projects that rely significantly on the presumed accuracy of these
models.

A prime example of this is the nuclear power program.

As we

saw earlier, the case for the desirability and safety of nuclear power
has rested heavily on a series of studies which have given very opti-

mistic predictions of the unlikelihood of a serious nuclear accident.
Given the potentially disastrous consequences associated with this
policy, we must ask whether the analyst is justified in attaching the

appearance of science and rationality to predictions which are ultimately
based on debatable assumptions.

Analysts would be doing more of a

service to policymakers and the public by abandoning the mystifying

cloak of science and acknowledging that social prediction is a very
human activity, in the most fallible sense of the word.

As Kenneth

Boulding has warned us: "Deciding under uncertainty is bad enough, but
deciding under the illusion of certainty is catastrophic."
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CHAPTER

VI

POLICY ANALYSIS AS CONTROL

Each new power won
man is a power over man as well.
Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In every
victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also
the prisoner who follows the triumphal car.
C
S
Lewis
"The Abolition of Man"
.

.

This chapter is concerned with one of the most subtle, yet dis-

turbing political biases that is present in positivistic policy analysisits manipulative, and perhaps even authoritarian, tendencies.

The

authoritarian implications of the emerging importance of policy analysis
expertise in the policy process is not a new subject.

Indeed, much

has been written about this in the context of the problem of technocracy: the vision of politics in which authority is constituted by

expertise instead of more democratic

means."*"

Since the dangers of this

kind of political perspective are relatively well known, this chapter

will focus not on technocracy, but on another authoritarian potential
in policy analysis.

This other potential is a direct function of the

notion of scientific rationality that is so central to policy analysis,
and the ideas of manipulation and control that are an inherent part
of this rationality.

The first section of this chapter will establish

a conceptual connection between this scientistic perspective and the

tendency for policy analysts (and policymakers) to conceptualize
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public policies as the top-down manipulation of the social
system.

Once these connections are established,

I

will briefly consider these

authoritarian implications in the context of our contemporary
political
climate, and the ongoing debate about the viability of democratic

approaches to policy-making.

Next

I

will illustrate how this control-

oriented perspective manifested itself in several of the key policies
in the Carter administration's energy program.
of the chapter

I

In the final section

will introduce an alternative to this control-oriented

approach to policy

—a

more bottom-up approach that will be developed

further in Part II.

Science as Control; People as Material

As we saw in the prior chapter, many policy models may be too

simple to reflect the complexities and unpredictabilities of modern
social life.

There are several ways this problem tends to be dealt with.

One can, as we saw earlier, attempt to make the models more complex,
or one can try to manipulate and reorganize society to fit into the
In other words, one can try to

simplified assumptions of the model.

make social behavior more predictable.
matter of concern to Hannah Arendt.

This latter possibility was a

One of the most insightful modern

political theorists, Arendt was a non-positivist who shared Winch's
belief that unpredictability is an inevitable characteristic of all
social and political life.^

But she was concerned that the inevitable

frustrations accompanying this unpredictability would drive political
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actors into seeking more direct ways to exert more control over social
She was afraid that this drive to eliminate unpredictability-

life.

would encourage tendencies toward authoritarian control over society.
She was also concerned that scientific rationality could have an

important role to play in this process.

Specifically, she argued that

modern policymakers when faced with the "authentic perplexities inherent
in the human capacity for action," can fall prey to the "strength of
the temptation to eliminate the risks and dangers by introducing into

the web of human relationships the much more reliable and solid cate-

gories inherent in activities with which we confront nature."-^

In other

words, Arendt was concerned that policymakers will be tempted to make the
same scientistic mistake we discussed in the last chapter
to

— the

attempt

approach social reality in the same way that a scientist approaches

natural reality.

Like Winch, Arendt warns us that this attempt to

"bestow solidity upon the realm of human affairs" is based upon a mistaken

— "the delusion that we can
affairs — 'make' institutions or

assumption

'make' something in the realm of

human

laws, for instance, as we make

tables and chairs, or make men 'better' or 'worse'

.

.

.

coupled with

the Utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other
.

materxal,

,,4

Arendt 's primary concern then was not so much with the methodological problems surrounding scientism, but its disturbing political impli-

cations.

She correctly discerned that there is an inherent connection

"manipulabetween scientific rationality and the notions of "making" or
ting" things in human affairs.

This is what makes her thought relevant
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to our analysis of public policy analysis.

It is quite possible

that the political tendencies that Arendt was concerned about are

represented in the work of policy analysts.

At least a strong con-

ceptual connection can be made between policy analysis and the notions
of scientific control and manipulation.

Much of the appeal of public

policy analysis is that it is based on the assumption that just as

scientific rationality has been "successful" in the realm of natural
phenomena, it will also be "successful" in the realm of human social
phenomena.

The implicit hope is that just as the natural sciences

have provided the kind of knowledge that allows us to successfully control our natural environment, the policy sciences will allow us to

better control our social environment.

But the word "environment"

only serves to mask the disturbing political implications of this kind
of approach.

For while the natural environment is made up of "material"

the social environment is made up of people

.

And while manipulation of

material may not evoke second thoughts, the manipulation of people
should.

Scientific rationality may indeed be an effective way to

approach the control of phenomena.

But we must question whether this

kind of effectiveness is desirable, for effectiveness at social control
has serious authoritarian implications.

While some policy analysts, like Larry Wade, are candid enough
to admit that they think it is "obvious" that the "manipulation of

human behavior is what politics is about, "^ it is probably unfair to
characterize analysts as insensitive social engineers whose goal is
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to manipulate and control the public.

intentions.

Most analysts have better

But the case for policy analysis as social control does

not rest on the assertion that analysts are intentionally interested
in manipulation of the public.

Rather, it rests on the argument

that irrespective of the individual analysts intentions, the notions
of prediction and manipulative control are an inevitable and essential

part of the paradigm of scientific rationality that is imbedded in

policy analysis.

As'

Brian Fay explains, the idea of manipulation is

intimately bound up in the very notion of explanation, that is characteristic of positivistic, scientific methodologies:

Underlying and informing the (positivist) theory of explanaation are deeper assumptions as to the nature of truth and
reality, and these deeper assumptions are rooted in the notion
of manipulative control.
So the conclusion is not merely that
scientific knowledge provides the basis for manipulative control, but also, and more importantly, that what can count as
scientific knowledge is that which gives us the means by which
one can in principle control phenomena
The scientist says
that he knowa what happened when he knows the causes of an
event, and he means by this when he knows the mechanism in
terms of which he himself can in theory produce the event in an
experimental situation. All of this means that the notion of
understanding in science is intimately bound up with the notion
of control, for it is our ability to control events, at least
in principle, which constitutes one of the criteria in virtue
of which one can be said to have given a valid scientific
It is in this way that the possibility of manipuexplanation.
lative control is a constitutive element of the scientific
^
enterprise
.

.

.

.

.

.

This logic of manipulation is most easily seen in the models used
by analysts.

As we saw earlier, the whole purpose of policy models is

the attempt to embody the law-like relation in society tn a way that

makes accurate prediction possible. And the primary reason that one wants
;
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to predict is so that one can control.^

Through models, politics

itself becomes conceptualized in scientistic terms: policies become

"independent variables" which cause certain effects on the "dependent

variable"

— i.e.,

the public.^

Inevitably, the notion of control becomes

one of the dominant concerns in this vision of politics.

We find, for

example, policy analysts who seriously argue that "modern polities are

confronted with a vast range of problems the management of which"
depends on "successful strategies of control" and a "clear-headed under-

standing of what is wanted in the way of behavior modification."^

Such

a perspective on politics and policies would certainly not be out of

place in an authoritarian state.

While the conceptual connections between the notions of prediction
and control in policy analysis are clear, it is more difficult to cite

unambiguous examples of authoritarian/control tendencies in actual
policy studies.

While analysts seem willing to talk explicitly about

the need for behavior control and modification in a theoretical context

(i.e., among themselves), there seems to be an understandable reluctance
to publicly state these concerns in specific policy studies.

Nonethe-

less, there are several examples of control-oriented studies that can

be cited.

One of the best examples is a policy study done by Space-

General Corporation for the state of California on the prevention and
control of crime.

-'-'^

The stated objectives of the study were:

Analyze the California system of criminal justice utilizing
the techniques of systems engineering and operations analysis,
and thereby explore the feasibility of application of these
techniques to social problems.
Recommend a California program directed toward more
effective prevention and control of crime and delinquency.
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The language of this study makes clear from the very beginning
its assumption that one can approach social problems in the same way

as other "engineering" problems.

It is unsurprising then that an

examination of the study reveals tendencies toward authoritarian policy
measures.

In fact, after a careful look at this study, Ida Hoos

concluded that its proposed approach embodied a significant threat to
the liberty and privacy of large groups of citizens

.

-'-^

To see how

this might be so, one must first consider the specific approaches that
the study recommended to control crime.

Among other things, the study

suggested "a systematic study of persons involved in criminal activity
and an identification of crime-susceptible groups," and a "carefully

selected program directed towards the susceptible offender groups."

Here the move from prediction to control becomes clear.

The study

seeks first to predict criminal activity by identifying certain categories
of people who are considered most likely to commit crimes.

As Hoos

points out, "high-lighted were individual characteristics of the
iil4
offenders, e.g., age, sex, colour, education, employment status, etc.

Then those categories of citizens were to receive increased "attention"
from the law enforcement system.

The obvious danger in this kind of

approach to controlling crime is that innocent individuals that happened
to fall into certain suspect categories could be subject to unwarranted

harrassment.

In Hoos' words, an individual "could be tabbed by the

system as a potential member of some designated 'risk' population, such,
and
for example, as criminal, welfare, or even politically subversive,
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thus be subject to unwelcome attention if not discrimination and

persecution. "'^

One can easily imagine a person who is unemployed and

living in a high-crime neighborhood being subject to arbitrary

surveilence or qxieatloning

,

Given such obvious potential abuses, Hoos

concluded that
control, or immediate reduction of the kinds of crime regarded
as important in this study, could only lead to severe repressive
measures, perhaps more dangerous for society than the offenses
If applied, the conclusions of the study would have
resulted in a "system of criminal justice" which would have
embodied a disastrous attack on the human liberty of the least
protected sectors of the population t-'-^

....

Once the Space-General study is seen through Hoos' eyes, the

authoritarian implications of this heavy-handed, control-oriented

perspective becomes clear.

However, often these implications are

obscured or made more palatable by the very nature of the language used
in policy analysis

—a

language which tends to desensitize its users to

the human consequences of this control-orientation.

Because analysts

spend much of their time working with statistics and models, the
public can easily come to be thought of and talked of in very abstract
terms.

Instead of speaking of unemployed people and the harsh reality

they live in, analysts tend to speak of the "unemployment rate."

Deliberately throwing people out of work can be thought of as "creating
an upward response in the dependent variable of unemployment," or more

simply, as a "Philips Curve trade-off."

This kind of sanitized language

does little to stimulate the policy analyst to the authoritarian impli-

cations of a control-oriented perspective, or the human effects resulting

125

from the manipulation of "policy variables."

As Arendt noted, people

tend to become objectified, thought of as "material."

Again, it may

seem a bit far-fetched to assert that analysts could actually
begin to
think of real people as objects

—but

we need not go too far into the

literature of public policy analysis to find an analyst who defines
public policy as involving "a desired course of events, a particular

sequence of behavior in a particular object or set of objects. "^^
This kind of scientistic, analytic language is not only an apt expression
of the control-oriented perspective of policy analysis, its rational and

objective sound serves to disguise its troubling human and political
implications

A Growing Impatience with Democracy

Before considering several more examples of this control-oriented
policy perspective, it is important to first locate this tendency in
the context of our current political climate; for while there i£ a defi-

nite concern for manipulation and control running throughout public policy
analysis, it would be a serious mistake to think that this kind of

analysis is, by itself

,

any kind of authoritarian threat.

Similarly it

would be mistaken to argue that this kind of scientific rationality is
responsible for the governments increasing concern for regulating and
controlling our economic and social system.
quite probably the case.

Indeed, the opposite is

The emergence of policy analysis with its

manipulative perspective on politics is the product of

a

political system

already highly concerned with extending control over society.

It is

hardly a coincidence, for example, that we find the beginnings of
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scientific policy analysis in the depression of the 193Q's, a
time when
the industrial world had gone out of control and political
leaders

were desperately looking for ways to increase their control over
the
economy.

The growth of public policy analysis has paralleled quite

closely the growth of big government, and in many ways it symbolizes
the concern for technical control, regulation, market manipulation,

-"-^

and planning that is characteristic of the modern state.
It is not sufficient then to simply identify the tendency toward

social engineering and manipulation in policy analysis; this has been
done before.

What is crucial is to locate this authoritarian potential

within our current political context so that we may assess whether any
political threat actually exists here.

The disturbing potentials in

policy analysis become a serious matter of concern only when they intersect and support similar tendencies in the society at large.

For exampl

as Arendt and others have pointed out, notions of authoritarian control

tend to surface during times of disorder when policies seem unable to

deal with persistent social problems.^

In such times, there is a

tendency for those in power to strengthen the reins of control in an

attempt to ensure that their policies have the effect they intended.
There is usually an accompanying tendency to complain about the inefficiencies of democratic procedures, and a call for strong and decisive

leadership.

As Guy Benveniste has pointed out, policy analysts some-

times echo these same kinds of concerns.

He notes that conditions of

social disorder "lead the expert to believe that planning has to be
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imposed from the top because the beneficiaries at the bottom cannot

perceive the outcome of their own actions.
impatient with democratic politics

and.

He becomes increasingly

insists that in times of crisis

leadership has to be reaf firmed. "^^
In other words, when there is a conflict between democracy and

control, or as it is usually put, between democracy and efficiency,
there is an inherent tendency for the analyst to support the latter.

This kind of political bias could have a part to play in the debate
over democracy vs. efficiency that is going on today.

Some influ-

ential organizations involved in policy analysis have already taken the
side of efficiency and authority.

Take, for example the policy studies

done by the Trilateral Commission.

This organization was originally

created by David Rockefeller to study and make policy recommendations

concerning the many economic and social problems facing Western Europe,
the United States and Japan. 22

it is composed not only of leading

policy analysts, but also of bankers, corporation executives, politicians,
and scholars from the three regions.

Former members include President

Jimmy Carter, Vice President Mondale, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and six

members of the Carter Cabinet.

In other words,

the commission is a good

example of policy analysis as it is done at the highest levels.
Several of the studies produced by analysts of the Trilateral

Commission have displayed marked tendencies toward reliance on top-down
control mechanisms to deal with persistent policy problems.

One study,

the Political
for instance, was completed by the Trilateral Task Force on

consisting of
and International Implications of the Energy Crisis,
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two high-level policy analysts, John C. Campbell (senior
research

fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations)

,

Guy de Carmoy (professor

at the European Institute of Business Administration, Fontainebleau)

and a former Japanese ambassador, Shinichi Kondo.^"^

In their report,

they observed that adapting to the changing international energy

situation would require "acceptance, voluntarily or involuntarily, of
governmental regulation of an increased sector of personal life. "24
They were concerned that because democracies are sensitive to the wishes
of the public, that these government may not be able to impose on the

public the kinds of policies needed to deal with our energy problems.
In their words, "it is a real question whether the necessary sacrifices

will in fact be accepted by powerful elements of the body politic
They fear a "growing extremism

.

.

.

.

.

."25

instability and turmoil" in

Western democracies as a result of these political difficulties.

26

They

finally conclude that a coordinated and effective approach to our energy
policy problems will only be possible with an increased emphasis on

"social discipline and government control."

A more wide ranging and more disturbing attack on the viability
of democratic procedures and values can be found in another Trilateral

report. The Governability of Democracies
one:

78
.

Its subject is a familiar

the inability of modern governments to solve the persistent socio-

economic problems which they face.

The report concluded that one of

the major impediments to effective government action was the democratic

process itself.

In the words of the report's authors:

129

some of the problems of governance in the United
States stem from an "excess of democracy"
the operations of the democratic process do indeed
appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of
social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms
of authority, and an overload of demands on government,
exceeding its capacity to respond. 29
.

.

.

.

.

.

The report argues that the explosion of political activity and

demands that begin in the 1960s has led to a "democratic distemper,"

which has undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of modern government.

The cure for this distemper, according to one of the report's

authors, Samuel Huntington, must begin with a realization that there
are "potentially desirable limits to the extension of political

democracy

"-^^
.

The effective operation of a democratic political system
usually requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement
on the part of some individuals and groups.
In the past,
every democratic society has had a marginal population, of
greater or lesser size which has not actively participated
In itself, this marginality on the part of some
in politics.
groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one
of the factors which has enabled democracy to function
effectively.-^-^

In effect, Huntington's arguments are a version of a point made in

earlier chapters of this work: that it is political conflict

— conflict

amplified and made more explicit by our democratic form of politics
that often interferes with effective policy actions.

Put simply,

his conclusion is that if we limit participation in policymaking,
this will in turn limit these conflicts, and the product will be more

effective public policies

—a

line of reasoning we will question in
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a few moments.

For now, it is interesting to note that this kind of

undemocratic rhetoric is really nothing new in American politics.
In many ways, Huntington's arguments are merely a modern reincarnation
of the political philosophy of James Madison who argued in Number 10
of the Federalist Papers that only a centralized federal government

could overcome the evils of political factions.

And we should remember

that the idea that "the evils we experience flow from the excess of

democracy" did not originate with the Trilateral Commission, but was

voiced nearly two hundred years earlier by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.

But the fact that these undemocratic and authoritarian

sentiments are part of the American political tradition should not
serve to mitigate their ominous political implications

— especially

considering that these views have begun to be expressed in concrete
policy proposals.

Several recent policy proposals in the area of

energy have been clearly informed by the belief that democracy and

public participation have been getting in the way of effective policies
to solve our energy problems.

Making the Reactors Run On Time

One good example is a bill introduced by the Carter Administration
(with the backing of the utility industry) that would have reduced
the number of public hearings and court challenges related to the

licensing of nuclear reactors

.

-^-^

Among other things, the bill would

and the
have authorized and encouraged utilities, reactor vendors,
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government to agree on standardized nuclear plant designs, which would
then receive near-automatic government approval, regardless of where
they were located.

It eliminated some public hearings altogether,

and cut down on the rest by mandating that if an opportunity once

existed in any hearing for discussion of an issue, that issue could not
be raised at later hearings unless significant new information had

surfaced in the interim.

Also, it would have authorized the granting

of limited work authorizations which would allow construction on

reactors to begin before formal hearings were held on the construction
permit.

Administration backers of the bill insisted that these changes

were simply procedural ones, and were only intended to make the licensing process more rational and efficient.

But opponents pointed out

that the purpose of public hearings is to provide the opportunity for

public participation in an issue of great concern, and to fully air
all the issues involved, not to license reactors as quickly as possible

At a hearing on the bill, Anthony Z. Roisman of the National Resources

Defense Council complained that the only values being discussed were

how to build reactors faster.

"(T)he licensing process is designed

to decide whether to build and operate nuclear reactors, not how

quickly

.

.

.

,"

he

said.-^'^

Opponents saw this measure not so much

as an attempt to make the licensing process more rational and efficient

but as an attempt to minimize the kind of public participation that
has frustrated the move toward nuclear power

—a

move strongly backed
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by the government and the utilities.

As John O'Leary of the

Energy Department commented, "Democracy is not the most efficient

system in the world. "-^^

Another example of the undemocratic trends surfacing in energy
policy proposals was the Energy Mobilization Board proposed by the

Carter administration.

The Board was designed to expedite the

development of a number of specific, needed energy projects like
oil pipelines, syn-fuel plants, etc.

Among the provisions and powers

included in various versions of this bill were the following:
1.

The EMB would have the power to set project timetables
for all federal, state, and local agencies.

This would

take precedence over timetables in other laws and

regulations
2.

On its own authority, EMB could order a federal agency
to streamline a specific list of procedures

consolidation, etc.

—hearing

State and local agencies may be

ordered by court to employ streamline lists if they
miss or are likely to miss a deadline.
3.

EMB could require single, consolidated federal environ-

mental impact statements.
4.

EMB could permanently waive any new requirements (environ-

mental, etc.) if it judges requirements may be impediment
to implementation of project.

Findings and decision not

reviewable by court, except for Constitutional Violations.
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5.

EMB could recommend waiver of any federal or state
or local law it considers an impediment to project

development, even if it was not related to delays in
agency decision-making
This board was an unprecedented attempt to consolidate power in a policy
area in one, small, centralized, federal board.

Particularly dis-

turbing was its ability to over-ride or sidestep federal, state, and
local environmental laws

— laws

which were arrived at after years of

debate in those democratic institutions.

This drastic attempt to make

an end-run around the democratic process was obviously rooted in the

frustrations experienced by the Carter administration and others in
their attempt to implement the kind of energy policy they desire.

As

Carter himself said in his speech introducing this proposal, the

purpose of the Energy Mobilization Board was to ensure that "nothing
stands in the way of achieving (our energy) goals."

And clearly, this

"nothing" included the public and the democratic procedures they
cherish.

Clearly it should be a matter of concern when we find policy-

makers so willing to sacrifice democratic procedure simply because they
are thought to be interfering with the "efficient" management of our

society.

We must ask whether it is really worth this price to make

sure that the trains or nuclear reactors run on time.
Of course,

the defeat of the EMB bill during the summer of 1980,

and the election of the Reagan administration could be interpreted as

movements away from a centralized, control oriented perspective.
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Indeed, the early rhetoric of the Reagan administration
appears to be

very hostile to this perspective and any form of big-government

regulation of social and economic life.

However, even a cursory

examination of the proposed policy actions of this administration reveals that it is hardly immune to the powerful, control-oriented forces
at work in the polity.

For example, in the area of energy policy where

the Reagan administration claims to be committed to "getting the

government out of the energy business" and letting the market work its
wonders, one finds plans to provide large subsidies to certain forms
of energy that the administration feels are desirable, but which have

had problems competing in the marketplace.

The Reagan budget promises

to double subsidies for the ailing breeder reactor program,

for instance.

In addition, the administration seems committed to using decision

techniques in energy policy which discourage democratic debate and

citizen input.

The most obvious example of this control-oriented

tendency is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposal to reduce the

right of the public to gather information from the commission to use
in licensing hearings.

This proposal would make it possible for the

NRC to refuse to provide public groups with the documents and testimony
that these groups often use to gather the detailed information that
is necessary to participate effectively in formal hearings.

As one

environmental spokesman described the proposal: "Basically, they

will take away the tools citizens have in a democratic proceeding."
As this example indicates, this new administration is little

different than the previous one, in that it is more than willing to

135

circumvent democratic safeguards and public participation when those
procedures get in the way of desired policies
development.

— like

nuclear power

This kind of early evidence indicates that even an adminis-

tration that is initially opposed to a government control-oriented

perspective can quickly find itself embracing techniques of regulation
(like import restrictions on foreign automobiles), subsidy, and control

when these appear necessary to achieve their ends.

Noting this, some

political analysts, like Sheldon Wolin, have argued that as the Reagan

administration becomes increasingly frustrated by its inability to
revive our faultering economy, it could easily be forced to take an

increasingly control-oriented approach to economic policy

— one

which

would ultimately be based on a technocratic justification.
If the American political economy, like the economics of West
Germany and France, has entered a period of low economic
growth that will compel state authorities to impose even
more severe wage restraints, cut-backs in services, antiinflationary measures at the expense of employment, and a
list of similar measures, it wll find itself in a true
The Reagan years promise a
crisis of legitimacy.
political economy in which the state will seek to ground
its legitimacy in the authority of technical and scientific
knowledge rather than in "democratic" consent, and the economy
will be able to count on a more trackable, less backwardlooking population who will have the President's amiable
moralizing to distract them.-^^
.

.

.

Naturally, if the Reagan administration does find itself basing
its policy proposals on technical and scientific knowledge,

then the

kinds of policy analysis described in this chapter will play an in-

creasing role in this administration
ances

.

— despite

all the initial appear-
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Is a Top-Down Approach Really Effective?

Again, the point is not that policy planners and analysts are

incipient fascists, but that their traditional, control-oriented

perspective fits very easily into any move toward more centralized,

authoritarian forms of policymaking and implementation.

As Benveniste

observed, "There is a conventional notion that planners and government
need strong power to plan;

.

.

.

that short of centralization and

strong executive control to impose the plan, it will fail."^^

As

Hannah Arendt has pointed out, the rationale for this kind of approach
to policy is as old as politics itself.

It is the belief that the only

way to escape from uncertainty in human affairs is to impose order upon
society from the top-down.

In this view, human order is something

created and maintained through hierarchical rule.

As Arendt explains it:

Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity
of quiet and order has in fact so much to recommend it that
the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could
easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical foundations and practical ways for an escape from
politics altogether. The hallmark of all such escapes is
the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are
entitled to command and the others forced to obey.^^
In some sense,

the notion that a top-down approach to policy is the

most efficient and effective one is simply the modern descendent of
the traditional political desire to create order through rule.

But

it is possible, indeed necessary for those committed to democracy.

137

to question this assertion.

Is a top-down, control-oriented ap-

proach to public policies truly the most effective one?
In considering this question, let us begin by assuming as

Huntington does, that much of the appeal of this top-down approach
lies in its ability to overcome the kind of political conflicts and

interest group squabbles that often get in the way of the formulation
and implementation of effective policies.

But is this approach

actually an effective way of dealing with or eliminating these kinds
of conflicts?

I

think not

those conflicts at all.

— for

this approach does not really address

To limit participation in the policy process,

as Huntington suggests, would not eliminate these conflicts, but only

eliminate one avenue of their expression.

It would kill the messenger

of social discord, but not the social discord itself.

A top-down

approach does not try to solve conflicts, but rather, attempts to
overpower them by imposing a policy plan on the participants.

And

while this kind of strategy can sometimes be effective in the short
run, its failure to eliminate the basic conflict itself can backfire

in the long run.

Reconsider, for example, the nuclear licensing and

the Energy Mobilization Board policy proposals that were discussed

earlier.

These were certainly good examples of a top-down approach

to our energy policy problems.

But if those bills would have been

passed, would they have been effective?
they would

— for

There is reason to doubt that

these bills, even in the proposal stage, did more to

heighten opposition to these projects than to dampen it.
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Environmentalists and other groups were angered that the government,
instead of addressing their legitimate concerns, was attempting to

eliminate their participation in the decision process and to over-ride

environmental regulations.

The governments high-handed approach

only served to provoke these opposition groups even more, and to

contribute to their determination to oppose these projects by what ever
means were available: court fights, demonstrations, occupations, etc.
This could hardly be considered "efficient."

Those who advocate more top-down approaches to public policy
tend to underestimate the importance of public support to the success
of public policies.

Truly effective public policies are a combination

of government authority and public acceptance, with the latter being

the most important ingredient

.

After all, most policies are finally

carried out by some segment of the public itself.

As we saw with the

energy bills, hints of authoritarianism may only serve to undermine
this necessary public support, by arousing political suspicions and

by stimulating more indignant opposition to those policies.

One of

the major political flaws in the scientistic approach to policy is
the fact that citizens understandably resent being treated as "dependent

variables" or "objects" to be manipulated.

The resentment often surfaces

in the form of stubborn resistence to government policies that the

public feels are being imposed on them.

Even when the government is

"successful" in using its authority to ensure compliance with a policy,
it can often be only a hollow victory.

For the use of authority and
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coercion to implement policies often only encourages the public to
search for ways to circumvent or evade those laws.

At best a dis-

gruntled public tends to only obey the letter of a law that is

— not

imposed on them

the spirit

to be truly effective if

support.

— and

it is difficult for policies

their spirit and purpose do not have public

In this sense, it could be argued that top-down approaches

to public policy are actually inefficient in that they tend to alienate

the public support necessary to ensure that they are carried out.

An Alternative Perspective: Policy as Promising

Despite these kinds of problems in the top-down approach to
policy, it is a fact that this can be a popular approach and it can
work.

Political control

policies in a society.

is^

one way to maintain order and to implement

And if there were not other ways to create

order and effective policies, accepting this control-oriented vision

would be quite understandable.

But as Arendt points out, there is

another option, another way in which human beings can create order in
their affairs and implement effective public policies.

Human order,

she explains, can also be a product of the "promises" that we make to
For her, promising is a unique human capacity which "at

each other.

least partially dispels

.

.

.

the unpredictability of human affairs;"

the
and she maintains that the "power of stabilization inherent in

which
faculty of making promises (is) the only alternative to mastery
relies on

.

.

.

rule over others.

Arendt sees mutual promises or
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contracts as a more democratic approach to creating order in human
societies.

Interpretive social scientists would no doubt take Arendt's
ideas one step further and point out that not only are mutual promises

desirable ways to organize human activity they are in fact much of
,

the way order is maintained in society already.

Peter Winch argued

that social reality differs from physical reality in that it is ordered

by the mutually held beliefs of those who live in that reality.

In a

sense, Arendt's "mutual promises" are simply a more conscious version
of the intersubjective beliefs which play a central role in ordering

all societies.

Mutual agreements and beliefs are the "glue" which

hold social life together and allows it to exist and function in a

smooth way.

This understanding of the sources of social order can

inform the way we think about "effective" policies.
if policies are to be effective,

intersubjective beliefs

— they

It implies that

they must become part of the web of

must be accepted by the public as part

of the rules which will govern behavior.

If policies fail to become

part of this mutually held belief system, it quickly becomes clear
that power and control are by themselves very inefficient tools for

ensuring compliance with policies.

For example, consider a society

that is in a revolutionary situation, where most of the citizens no

longer believe in the legitimacy of the government or its policies.
If that society refuses to function normally,

if citizens

take part

in a general strike, it is extremely difficult to force that society

work.

Even if the government has a virtual monopoly on coercion and
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violence, it is often impossible to make that society function
normally.

This is an extreme demonstration of the fact that social

order is ultimately a function of the public's agreements to act in

certain organized ways.

More importantly, the notion that order is a function of intersubjective beliefs or "promising" lays the philosophical groundwork
for a more democratic vision of public policy

— one

which is not rooted

in the notion of people as material to be manipulated, but which is

built upon the unique capacity of human beings to order their world
through shared beliefs and mutual agreements.

This is turn implies

that effective policies are not something which is imposed on the

public, but something which requires the active support and partici-

pation of the public.

"Policy as promising" suggests a view of policy

coming from the bottom-up

— as

a product of public understanding and

agreement as to the correct course of action to take to solve social
problems.

This suggests that policy formulation and implementation

cannot ignore or try to overpower conflicts in the policy, but must
be a process which attempts to resolve those conflicts and integrate

opposing viewpoints.

In this sense, public policies would be policies

which came from and were embodied in the public.
All of these are important suggestions and implications of

Arendt's views, and we will be considering them in much more detail in
the last chapters when we explore what an "integrative approach" to

policy and policy analysis would look like.

For now, however, the
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important point is that this more public vision of policy
does not
occupy a central place in the current practice and perspective
of
public policy analysis.

Indeed, it seems that the ideal public for

the positivist policy analyst is not one which is active, but
one

which only reacts in predictable ways.

In the current view, policies

can only be effective when the public acts like a good "dependent

variable."

As one non-positivist social theorist, Jurgen Habermas,

has observed, a passion for democracy is not a characteristic of

modern policy analysis.

In the activity of devising rational public

policies, "the public body of citizens confering in an unrestricted

fashion about matters of the commonwealth does not play an essential
role."'^^

For Habermas this

lack, of

concern for democracy in public

policy analysis is simply a manifestation of the disturbing change
in the function of political thought and social analysis that has been

brought about in modern industrial societies.

Emancipation by means of enlightenment (has been) replaced by
instruction in control over objective and objectified processes.
Socially effective theory is no longer directed to the consciousness of human beings who live together and discuss
matters with each other, but to the behavior of human beings
who manipulate ... No attempt is made to attain a rational
consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical
Its place is taken by the attempt
control of their destiny.
to attain technical control over history by perfecting the
^
administration of society.
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CHAPTER

VII

POLICY ANALYSIS AS CONSERVATISM

Perhaps the most important role of the intellectual since the
enlightenment has been that of unmasking ideology .... We
can confidently expect this role to be abandoned as the intellectual becomes the administrator of a new society.
Noam Chomsky
"Philosophers and Public Policy"
The last bias in policy analysis that will be considered is a

—meaning

tendency toward conservatism

that some policy analysis methods

tend to assume and conserve the status quo in society.

One important

source of this conservative bias lies within positivist thought and the

deterministic vision of the world that it encourages.

The main focus of

the chapter is on the manner in which this conservative bias has dis-

torted our perspective on United States energy policy and constrained
our choices in this area.

I

will focus in particular on the question-

able relationship between energy and economic growth, which is in many

ways the key issue animating many current energy policy decisions.
the final sections of the chapter

I

In

will attempt to illuminate the power

of this conservative bias by locating it within the broader cultural

proclivity that supports it

— the

human tendency to believe that certain

social problems are normal, natural and inevitable.

I

will argue that

this perspective is dysfunctional in that it puts artificial and undesir-

able constraints on policy-making creativity.
to address

these questions,

I

However, before proceeding

will begin with a consideration of the

nature of this conservative bias.
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The Conservative Bias in Analysis

"Policy analysis," according to Edith Stokey and Richard
Zeckbauser, "is a discipline for working within a political and
economic
system, not for changing

it.""""

They are quite right; and it would be

difficult to find a better description of the conservative bias that
afflicts public policy analysis.

In its essence, this conservative bias

is a tendency to take current socio-economic arrangements as given, and

thus lend tacit support to those arrangements.

Or to put it conversely,

there is an inclination in policy analysis to ignore approaches and solutions to policy problems which would require questioning or changing the

current structure of our American socio-economic system.

As Robert Bish

admitted in his discussion of the public choice approach to policy
analysis, policy analysis techniques often prove to be most useful to

"those who wish to discover recommendations for improving the present

structure and functioning of the American

.

.

.

public economy."

2

In

one sense, whether this tendency to conserve the status-quo is good or
bad depends entirely on whether the status-quo is considered desirable
or not.

this conser-

If one feels satisfied with current arrangements,

vative bias would probably be seen as a healthy one.

But

I

believe that

a good case can be made that this kind of perspective on policy is dys-

functional in a more general sense

— in

the sense that it inevitably

works to artificially constrain our search for solutions to present and
future social and economic problems.

As we will see, this dulling of our

political imaginations can cripple our abilities to respond adequately
and appropriately to our changing world.
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Before beginning to consider the sources and effects of this bias,
several potentially confusing points should be cleared up.

First of all,

the conservative methodological bias in policy analysis should not be

assumed to always support politically conservative (right-wing) positions

— although,

present.

as will be evident later, this potential is certainly

It is important to note that this conservative methodology

could also easily support liberal positions, in that it could work to

conserve elements in the status quo that are amenable to liberal interIt is quite conceivable, for instance,

ests.
coiald

that this conservative bias

assume (and thus support) the continuation of government interven-

tion into the economic system

politics.

—a

current and basic tenet of liberal

Thus the key point to remember about this conservative ten-

dency is that it is a methodological phenomenon that works to support
the current socio-economic structure of society, irrespective of the

particular political perspective embodied in that structure.

3

It would also be misleading to assume that this conservative bias
is always opposed to change.

Oddly enough, the conservative bias in

analysis can actually assume change,

if^

that change is a constant charac-

teristic of the present socio-economic system.

For example, as Robert

Ayers has pointed out, analyses done for mainstream social institutions
the
like government and large private corporations typically portray

more energy confuture as the present writ large—higher productivity,
and so on.
sumption, more income, more technological breakthroughs,

4

or "alpha" forecasting
This is an example of what he calls conservative

—a

analyst simply
deterministic approach to the future in which the

trends and changes
forecasts the future as the extrapolation of the
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currently at work in society.^

Thus, assuming the continuation of the

status quo could easily mean assvnning the continuation of certain
characteristic forms of change.
Finally, though some policy analysts are obviously aware of the

conservative bias built into analysis, it is not my contention that this
bias is an intentional or premeditated one.

others we have explored, is a systemic one
system of analysis itself.

This bias, like many of the

— one

that is built into the

It is in part a function of the positivistic

assumptions that lie at the heart of policy analysis, and thus operates
without the conscious effort of analysts themselves.

Let us consider

what it is about policy analysis that builds in this conservative bias.

Descriptive Models; Objectifying Our Social World

As we have seen, the construction and use of descriptive models is
in many ways the essence of policy analysis.
is to "describe the way the world operates."

The purpose of these models
Or as Buchanan and Tullock,

the fathers of public choice analysis put it, "We seek to learn how the

world works in order to make it work better, to improve things."^

This

is a laudable goal, and one which would seem to have little bias attached
to it.

But in fact, it is this conception of the analyst's work that

forms the philosophical foundations of the conservative bias in analysis.
The bias is again rooted in the mistaken tendency to equate the social

world with the physical world

ment by Buchanan and Tullock.

— an

equation that is evident in the state-

Note the language used; note that our

social world is referred to as "the" world—the implication being that

just as there is only one physical world, there is only one social world.
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But this, however, represents a mistaken understanding
of the unique

nature of human social reality, for while It may be valid
to assert that
there is one physical world, constituted and ordered
by one set of immutable natural laws, the same does not hold true for social
reality.
I

As

have argued, social reality is constituted in large part by
the shared

beliefs of those who participate in

it— and

greatly, so too can social worlds.

Indeed, the staggering diversity of

since beliefs can differ

social systems that can be seen in human history is in large part due to
the variety of possible human belief systems.

Thus it is accurate to

say that there is not one social world, but many possible social worlds.

We do not live in the world, but in our particular world, governed by
the particular beliefs that order our lives.

And therefore when modelers

claim to be "describing the way the world operates," they are in fact
simply describing the way our current social system operates.
There is more than a semantic difference here.

The posltivist

tendency to think of our world as the world is much of what creates the

conservative bias in analysis; for the variety, creativity, and possi-

bility that is such a unique and basic part of human existence tends to
get factored out in the use of these policy models.

Descriptive models

restrict themselves to describing how our current social system works,
and as a result, the rules and requirements of our particular way of life
tend to become objectified,

tend to become considered the natural, objec-

tive requirements of the world.

These objectified assumptions become

part of the criteria by which policy options are judged feasible or not,
and those policy options which violate or challenge current requirements

are considered to be unrealistic and tend to be dismissed out of hand.
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But let us move beyond a theoretical understanding of how this conserva-

tive bias works, and consider in some detail how it has affected our

national energy policy.

Constraining Energy Policy Choices

It is generally agreed now that national energy policy in the

1970 's was unduly constrained by an over-emphasis on supply-side soluQ

tions and an under-emphasis on demand-side solutions, like conservation.

In part this was because virtually all energy analysts and their models

assumed that the demand for energy would naturally have to keep rising
as it had in the past.

For most private and public analysts, the energy

crisis was defined as a problem in finding enough new and reliable supplies to meet our ever-increasing demand.

direct effect on our energy policy efforts.
to stay

This assumption had a very
It meant that we would have

dependent on foreign oil to supply at least part of this growing

demand, which has proved to not only be expensive, but a direct threat
to our national security.

We were also led to exploit more remote and

expensive supplies of domestic energy (off-shore and Alaskan oil)

contributed to inflationary pressures.

,

which

The assumptions of growing demand

also meant increasing use of coal and nuclear power, despite the very
real environmental and health risks associated with these forms of energy.

The need for growing supplies was also instrumental in supporting efforts
to undermine and rollback the environmental standards that were passed

in the earlier part of the decade.

In short, the assumption of increas-

conseing energy demand carried with it a number of quite important
choices.
quences, and played an important part in shaping our energy
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The typical reasoning underlying the prediction of increasing

energy demand was expressed well in an analysis done by the Energy

Economics Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank:

With growing economic activity and a rising standard of living,
the per capita use of energy has increased steadily in the past.
It has doubled within the last 30 years.
And evidence that it
will continue to grow at even a faster rate is unmistakable.
... It has been recommended in some quarters that the United
States should curb its use of energy as a means of alleviating
the shortage of supply. However, an analysis of the uses of
energy reveals little scope for major reductions without harm
to the nation's economy and its standard of living.
This statement captures the three main assumptions that informed vir-

tually all national energy models: first, that since energy demand has

grown steadily in the past, it was likely to do so in the future; second
that there is an "iron" link between energy growth and economic growth;

and third, that continuous economic growth was necessary and desirable.

All of these assumptions appeared quite reasonable.

There was strong

empirical evidence that energy growth and economic growth were directly
linked.

For example, the figure below was sometimes used to illustrate

the striking parallel between the growth in GNP and the growth of energy

consumption in the United States during this century.
to

Thus there seems

be little question of the direct connection between continual economic

growth and increased energy growth.

Further, it was uniformly assumed

that continuous economic growth was a systematic requirement of all ad-

vanced capitalist states, including the United States.

The structure of

prosper;
such economies requires them to grow in order to survive and

recession, and
lack of growth can only mean increasing unemployment,

eventual depression.
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1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

Fig. 1.
Per capita average power consumption and
per capita gross national product in the United States.
(Gross national product figures are given in 1973
dollars, dollar figures for previous years have been
increased to take account of inflation. )-^^

Given this model of the energy-economic system, any policy advocating vigorous conservation of major reductions in energy demand would

understandably be considered unrealistic, if not dangerous.

To slow

energy growth would imply slowing the economy, with all the economic
and social dislocations that would accompany that slowdown.

In this

context, a slow or no growth energy policy proposal could only be con-

sidered irrational.

This is a nice illustration of one of the main pur-

poses of policy models:

to specify which policy options are feasible.
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given the systemic characteristics and requirements that are incorporated into the model.

Analysts like J. W. Forrester, designer of the

Systems Dynamics National Model has argued forcefully that computer

models should play this kind of role in informing national policy decisions.

Many expectations for the future are not consistent with current realities.
By showing how assumptions and policies bring
about future consequences, the National Model should help to
distinguish between unjustified hopes .and possible futures.
Any aspirations about the future should reflect a realistic
understanding of the structure of society and a set of viable
policies capable of leading to that future. When the National
Model becomes a sound basis for judging the merit of future
alternatives, national leaders and the general public may be
able to use the Model to help set achievable national goals
and choose feasible f utures
It is exactly this kind of perspective that resulted in the label-

ing of serious conservation efforts as unfeasible and undesirable.

A

"realistic understanding" of the structure of our current society re-

vealed an energy-GNP link and an economic growth requirement that
could not be violated.
In recent years, however, the necessity of increasing energy de-

mand and the models which supported that notion have come under increasing attack.

The first chink in the armor of increasing demand was a

persuasive critique of the "iron link" between energy growth and economic growth.

There is now a growing consensus that the energy-GNP link

measures
is much looser than once thought, and that strong conservation
could be applied without slowing down the economy.

Even the Carter ad-

year
ministration admitted that energy growth could be reduced to 2% a

without adversely affecting the economy.

1

This is possible largely

being
because of the tremendous amount of energy that is currently
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wasted in the economy

proximately 30%.

13

— many

analysts estimate the waste figure at ap-

If this waste could be eliminated through increased

energy conservation and efficiency, the growing demand for energy
could be slowed without hurting the prospects for economic growth

— and

in fact, this has been the reasoning underlying the push toward more

conservation in recent years.
Thus it would appear that by incorporating a true description
of the energy-GNP link (i.e. a loose relationship), the systemic bias

against a strong conservation policy would be eliminated from our
energy models and analysis.

But in fact this is only partly true;

for

as long as we assume and promote a continually growing economy, a slow
or no growth energy policy must eventually be considered irrational.

For energy growth and economic growth can only be decoupled temporarily

— until

all of the 'slack' in the currently loose relationship caused

by waste is used up.

Once this slack is taken up, the energy-GNP re-

lationship will again be a tight one, and energy growth would have to

again keep pace

with the ever-growing economy.

William Ophuls' analy-

sis has indicated that even the best conservation program

would save up to 50%

—would

— one

that

only buy us "a decade or two of time" be-

fore we would again have to face the task of finding vast new sources
of energy to keep up with increasing demand.

14

In short, ensuring

economic growth is the bottom line in most energy analyses, and is the

central assumption which necessitates a commitment to ever-growing
supplies of energy.
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Questioning Continuous Economic Growth

Thus if conservation and limited energy growth are to be consi-

dered as serious, long-range energy options, one must begin to question
the assumption of continuous economic growth.

And in fact, during re-

cent years, several social and economic analysts have begun to criti-

cize this most hallowed American goal.

Some of the most prominent and

persuasive of these critics include Herman Daly, Fred Hirsch, and

William

Ophuls.'''^

This is not the place to examine the growth critique

in depth (the issue of growth will be addressed in more detail in the

last chapter), but the essence of the arguments is easily grasped.

Criticisms of continual economic growth fall roughly into two categories.
The first is concerned with the social limits to growth and the second

focuses on the ecological limits.
Fred Hirsch represents one form of the social critique.

In his

book. The Social Limits to Growth , Hirsch argues that while economic

growth has been successful in allowing large segements of the U.S. pop-

ulation to share in the enjoyment of material goods, this growth will

necessarily fail to fulfill everyone's social needs.

16

Hirsch identi-

fies a set of social goods (including privacy, exclusive higher education, and good jobs) as "positional goods"

— goods

that are inherently

scarce in that they can only be enjoyed by those few people who occupy
the higher positions in society.

General use only deteriorates these

goods, thus they will always be relatively scarce; not even economic

growth can change that fact.

Indeed, as material prosperity makes these

social goods more attractive to large numbers of people, frustration and
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competition will only increase.

In short, economic growth contains a

false premise of social affluence for everyone

—a

kind of general af-

fluence that can never be achieved.
The ecological critique of economic growth takes a different
tack, one which not only questions the promise of growth but also

its very possibility.

Critics like Daly and Ophuls focus on the in-

evitable environmental and health damanges that result from the increasing use of natural resources and the increasing pollution that is
the unavoidabale by-product of this growth of resource consumption.

Rather than seeing our energy problems as a matter of finding more suplies to feed our growing demand, they perceive it as a good example of
the kinds of problems that are caused by an economic structure which

requires continuous economic growth.

In essence, they argue that a

policy of unlimited growth is fundamentally incompatible with a world
of limited resources.

These authors are good examples of the kind of

analyst that will be discussed in Part II

— analysts

who begin to avoid

the positivist traps built into present forms of analysis.

Rather than

routinely accepting the assumptions and relationships that dominate our
current socio-economic system, they are willing to explore alternative

assumptions and the alternative policy paths they imply.

In this case,

both Ophuls and Daly argue that in the place of an economy which requires reliance on increasingly scarce, expensive, and risky energy
sources, we should be moving towards a no-growth or steady-state econo-

my

— one

which requires a low or constant supply of energy, much of

which could be supplied by renewable energy resources.

18
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Needless to say, this steady-state vision of the economy has
met

with little acceptance among mainstream policy analysts and
policymakers.
Indeed, for many, the notion of zero-growth is so ridiculous that
it is

used as a slur against political opponents.

In a speech attacking en-

vironmentalists. Mollis W. Dole, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
the Interior, thought it sufficient to refer to them as "stop-every-

thing zealots whose real cause is not environmental protection, but
the zero-growth society."

19

And when Craig Hosmer, President of the

American Nuclear Council, wanted to condemn a group of White House
energy advisors, he called them "bad guys" whose aim was to "convert
the country into a drab, energy less, no-growth, sleeping-bag society.

That is their goddamned transcendental notion of a great future for
the

20

U.S.A."^
The failure of the steady-state proposal to become a legitimate

part of the debate over economic and energy policy is in part due to
the conservative bias in policy analysis.

The growth requirement char-

acteristic to a particular economy has become objectified and used as
the unquestioned standard by which policy proposals are evaluated.

According to this standard, no-growth is the same as failed growth,

with all the economic dislocations that accompany that failure.

This

kind of thinking was best exemplified by an analysis in Fortune , which

argued that the severe recession of 1973-1975 was in fact "a real life
tryout of zero growth."

But as Herman Daly points out, this kind of

reasoning is faulty:

Fortune identifies a steady-state economy with a failed growth
economy.
A condition of nongrowth can come about in two ways:
as the failure of a growth economy, or as the success of a
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steady-state economy. The two cases are as different as night
and day.
No one denies that the failure of a growth economy to
grow brings unemployment and suffering. It is precisely to avoid
the suffering of a failed growth economy (we know growth cannot
continue forever) that we advocate a steady-state economy. The
fact that an airplane fails to ground if it tries to remain stationary in the air simply reflects the fact that airplanes are
designed for forward motion. It certainly does not imply that
a helicopter cannot remain stationary.
A growth economy and a
steady-state economy are as different as an airplane and a
helicopter.
(The growth assumption) remains supreme when even
the failures of a growth economy become arguments in its defense. 21

Daly's point is straightforward:

what may be a requirement for

one socio-economic system may not be for another; and that it is a
serious mistake to evaluate all policy options according to current

systemic criteria.

The current structure of our socio-economic sys-

tem may require continuous economic growth

have to always be so.

— but

it does not necessarily

As Daly demonstrates, it is quite possible to en-

vision a steady-state economy which is healthy and prosperous, with full
employment and all basic material needs adequately met.

But such an

economy would have to be structured according to much different values
and beliefs than are at work today.

Among other things, a steady-

state society would require a commitment to zero population growth; a

move away from self-indulgent consumerism and materialism and a commitment to the development of non-materialistic values; a commitment to

producing more durable goods in a manner that was less energy intensive
and more labor intensive; a system for limiting the amount of resources

consumed by the economy; and a limit on corporate growth and profits.

Given the assumptions and values of Daly's perspective, not only is a
steady-state economy rational and possible, the currently dominant
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notion of an ever-growing economy becomes seen as irrational and irresponsible.
One need not agree with Daly's specific prescriptions to see the

basic validity of the theoretical point being made here; that the notions of "necessity," "feasibility," and "rationality" that serve to

limit policy analysis and discourse are not neutral or objective terms,

but system-bound terms

— terms

theories that we assume.

relative to the system of values and

In policy analysis, the tendency is to assume

— in

the values and theories characteristic of the current social system
the name of being descriptive.

The result is the elevation of these

assumptions to the status of natural laws

— as

exemplified by the econo-

mist who reportedly supported the notion of economic growth by arguing
that "it is a law of nature, either grow or die."

statement shows a mistaken understanding of nature

First of all, this

— very

few things in

nature, besides cancer, grow continuously; plants and animals spend

most of their lives in a mature, steady-state condition.

But more im-

portantly, it displays a typical lack of appreciation for the differences between natural and social reality and the fact that beliefs that

order human societies are much more relative than the laws which order
nature.

This distorted perspective inhibits our ability to see that

what is irrational, unfeasible, and impractical in one context may actually be reasonable in another context.

All too often in policy analy

sis the powerful notions of rationality and necessity are used to elim-

inate some policy options and justify certain choices—without any ref-

erence to the potential relativity or questionability of those standard
where
A typical example has been the debate over nuclear power policy,
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the concept of "necessity" has occurred again and again
as one of the

key justifications for the advancement of this program.

Because of the

acknowledged risks, few analysts and policymakers enthusiastically
embrace nuclear power; instead, they usually argue that whether we
like
it or not, nuclear power is "necessary" if we are not to
freeze in the

dark in the future.

As one report typically put it, ".

.

.

to nuclear power will continue to grow out of necessity ."^^

commitments
And it is

significant that Hans Bethe, a distinguished phsyicist, chose to call
his article on nuclear energy in the Scientific American , "The Necessity
of Fission Power."

23

Of course, what is usually not mentioned in these

arguments is that nuclear power is only necessary given a system of increasing energy demand and the neglect of conservation and alternative
forms of energy.

Thus the illusion of necessity, supported by "neutral"

descriptive models, has served to advance the development of nuclear
power

The Political Advantages of the Conservative Bias

The conservative bias in policy analysis exists and persists not

simply because of the positivistic assumptions characteristic of analysis, but because it is advantageous to certain groups in society.

For

example, it has certainly proved convenient to policy analysts themselves.

The artificial limits this perspective puts on policy choices

certainly serves to make the analyst's job much easier.

If the policy

analyst's job is to simplify a complex world of innumerable choices,
then a conservative bias can be quite helpful in that process.

As

Charles Lindblom has pointed out, taking for granted the prevailing
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belief system or ideology automatically eliminates a whole set of policy options from consideration, and thus serves as an "enormous and in-

dispensable aid to the analysis of public policy."

... to a pluralistic democracy and corporate enterprise, for example, permits a policy analyst greatly
to restrict his search for policies and generally to simplify his
analysis so that he can better grasp it. In effect, an ideology
takes certain beliefs out of the gunfire of criticism. These
beliefs
can therefore be introduced into policy analysis
as though they were settled facts. 24

A working commitment

.

.

.

— values and theories — gets introduced into
"facts" — not as a matter of deception, but simply

Thus ideology

discourse as

it is convenient to analysts to do so.

policy

because

Intellectually, it is much

easier to restrict one's attention to "conventional" or "realistic" al-

ternatives, than to have to critically assess the whole range of options.

Kenneth Boulding has described this kind of dogmatism as intel-

lectual agoraphobia (fear of open spaces)

— in

this case, a "fear of open

spaces of the mind" which is characterized by a "tendency to retreat into the cozy, closed spaces of limited agendas and responsibilities."

25

But all of this discussion of the conservative bias as a function
of policy analysis and policy analysts can be very misleading for the

primary force behind this perspective on policy is political, not intellectual.

In the real world of policymaking, policy agendas are

limited and policy options are ignored largely for political reasons,
not analytic ones.

And the tendency in policymaking to preserve the

status quo is primarily due to the fact that certain specific interests

benefit from the preservation of current socio-economic arrangements.
because
Thus the conservative bias in policy analysis is important, not
because it can
it by itself serves to limit our policy options, but
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play a supporting role to political groups who promote and benefit from
those limits.

For example, the main reason conservation has not been

considered a viable energy option is not simply the models used in analysis, but the ability of energy suppliers to focus the attention of

policymakers on supply-side options.

The oil and gas lobbies are

widely recognized as two of the most effective forces in Congress.

As

the Hairvard Business School study pointed out, there were few powerful

economic groups supporting conservation.
interest

— economic

or otherwise

— in

"What economic entity has an

promoting (conservation)

Congress, spending millions to advertise the case?

,

lobbying

Thus the energy

suppliers pretty much shaped the terms of the debate, and established

what was important and what was not."

26

And what was not important,

of course, was conservation; a view that was helped along by the

"neutral" energy policy models discussed earlier.
Thus the conservative bias in policy analysis can often lend

explicit support to various special interest groups

— not

through any

conspiracy between analysts and special interests, but simply because
they both share the same systemic or ideological assumptions.

A good

example of this process can be found in our petroleum policy.

Virtually

all energy analysis models assume, in Lindblom's words, "a working com-

mitment to corporate enterprise;" the presumption that private oil companies have the inherent right to own, develop, and profit from oil
resources.

Even the analyses done for President Carter, clearly one

of the most outspoken critics of the oil industry to ever inhabit the

White House, presumed that "the private sector will continue its

primary role as the major producers of energy resources."

The
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prevalence of this assumption is of course primarily due to the fact
that the right of private ownership and profit are two of the most basic systemic characteristics of the American economy

— two

of the essen-

tial elements of capitalist ideology.

However, these kinds of assumptions may have the uncomfortable

effect of supporting oil company interests when they conflict with the

public interest.

Analyses which assume the right of corporate owner-

ship and profit implicitly lend support to the right of oil companies
to "hold oil for ransom"

they are ensured

a.

— to

refuse to produce vitally needed oil until

high enough profit margin.

Thus if one presumes the

continuation of present economic arrangements in the oil industry, one

must logically support oil industry proposals for decontrol and enormous profits.

For given a system of production for profit, the only

"realistic" and "viable" way to increase oil production is decontrol.
Thus the systemic assumptions built into most energy policy analyses

can work very much in the private interests of the energy industry.

They effectively eliminate from serious consideration the option of

nationalization

— despite

the fact that we are now the only major indus-

trial nation which does not have a nationally owned oil company.

Naturalness and Apathy

Acquiescence to the prevailing ideology is, of course, not a
unique characteristic of public policy analysis—it is a common feature
of all societies.

All cultures tend to be ethnocentric in the sense

and inevitable,
that they think of their own way of life as being natural

more formalized
The conservative bias in policy analysis is simply a
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version of this perspective.

The persistence of this bias is partially

a function of the fact that it matches a bias already present
in the

culture at large.

A bias which matches one's own seems not to be a

bias at all.

However, as Barrington Moore

ethnocentricity
as natural

— can

— this

Jr. has observed, this kind of

tendency to think of our particular social world

have some detrimental effects on politics that we have

not yet considered.

It can, he argues, contribute to the view that

certain kinds of social and economic problems are "natural" or "inevitable" and therefore do not deserve serious policy attention.

In his

study, called Injustice , Moore examined examples of people who have

been the victims of injustice, from the Hindu Untouchables to the Jews
of Nazi Germany and found that "people so often put up with being the

victims of society," because they believe that "the portion of human

misery caused by the workings of social institutions" are not really
man-made, but "part of the natural order of the universe."

27

Thus a

positivistic perspective on our social world may only serve to produce
or reinforce apathetic attitudes toward persistent social problems.

One good example of this phenomena is the problem of structural

unemployment.

It has been common for modern economic analysts to

maintain that a certain level of unemployment
figure

— is

normal or natural.

— 4.5%

is now a popular

In fact, some have suggested that we of-

ficially redefine full-employment to mean 4.5% unemployment or less.
In effect this would "solve" the problem by declaring it normal

defining it away.

— by

But of course this level of unemployment is simply

a characteristic of our particular economy and not an objective
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necessity.

Indeed, many socialist states and even some Western Euro-

pean states do not consider 4.5% to be normal, and this level would be

considered a matter which would demand immediate attention.

But if

some analysts have their way, once unemployment here is down to 4.5%,
it would cease to exist as an issue at all.

Again, this acquiescent attitude in policy analysis would not be
so worrisome if it did not dovetail so neatly with developing public

sentiments.

As numerous opinion polls have indicated, the public seems

to be becoming increasingly pessimistic about the future and especially

our ability to solve many of our persistent social and economic problems.

On the policymaking level, this kind of pessimistic perspective

was best expressed in President Carter's famous observation that
"government cannot solve all our problems,

.

.

.

cannot eliminate pover-

ty, provide a bountiful economy, reduce inflation, save our cities,

cure illiteracy, provide energy, or mandate goodness."

28

Positivist

policy analysis can help legitimatize this kind of resignation by portraying our socio-economic problems as natural and inevitable

simply "facts of life."

— as

As "realistic" policy analysts are fond of

pointing out, "the descriptive approach (to policy analysis) accepts the
facts of life."

29

To be fair, it may be true that certain problems are

indeed inevitable

— our

a good example.

But the false air of naturalness that positivistic

limited supplies of natural resources might be

analysis can lend to problems can only do a disservice to policymakers
and the public by obscuring the issue of which of these problems are

indeed "facts of life," and which are simply a function of the present

structure and operation of our particular socio-economic system, and
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thus may be potentially solvable.

Normalizing Risks

The final form of the conservative bias that we will consider is

also one of its most currently popular forms:
sis.

comparative risk analy-

Typically, this technique involves comparing the risks of some

new activity

— say

cinogenic effects

the production of a new chemical that may have car-

—with

the "normal" risks taken by people in our so-

First one Identifies a series of risks that people normally

ciety.

accept.

Automobiles are a favorite example:

thousands of people die

every year in car accidents and yet people continue to buy and drive
Also although dams are known to burst, people continue to volun-

cars.

tarily build houses downstream from them.
ders despite the risks, and so forth.

People normally climb lad-

One then calculates the probabil-

ities for these kinds of accidents and these figures become the standard
of acceptability for new public projects.

One calculates the cancer

risks involved with the new chemical, and if those risks are similar or

lower to the "normal" risks, the chemical is approved.
This kind of reasoning is typical in policy analyses which have
tried to minimize the health risks associated with complex energy

technologies like synthetic fuels and nuclear reactors.
Report,

30

The Rasmussen

for example, included a table comparing the estimated proba-

bilities of a nuclear fatality with those for auto accidents, falls,
fires, tornadoes, etc., in an effort to show that nuclear reactors are

more Innocent of risk than most of life's hazards.

And in his article

arguing the "relative safety of nuclear reactors," Hans Bethe invoked
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this same technique, arguing that "A reactor accident

...

is less

serious than many minor wars." 32

There are of course a number of different problems with this

approach to risk evaluation.

For example, this approach seems to have

a very questionable method for ascertaining whether the public accepts

For instance, from past public behavior, it is simply inferred

a risk.

that Americans accept the fact that 50,000 people a year will die in

auto accidents?

Do people really "accept" this?

to accept this risk?

When did they "decide"

Acceptance implies that there is some kind of

voluntary choice involved, but in fact most people have very little
choice about driving a car.
the car

— say,

If there are no viable alternatives to

extensive mass transit systems

"accept" the risks associated with driving.

— people

can do little but

In short, observing be-

havior often tells us little about whether public acquiescence to a
risk is conscious or voluntary; and would thus seem to be a poor way
to make those crucial value judgments about risks.

It would make more

sense to consult the public directly, and let them express their views
of risks through democratic political processes.

For our purpose, though, the most telling criticism of this

approach is the following:
past

— say,

even if people accepted one risk in the

living downstream from a dam

— it

is faulty to assume that

they would be willing to accept additional numbers of comparable risks

— let's

say,

living close to a nuclear reactor also.

tional person accept one of those risks, but not both?

Could not a raIs there not a

limit to the number of comparative risks that a person would want to

accept?

It is one thing to accept one potentially carcinogenic food
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additive, but it is quite another to accept scores of them.

Compara-

tive risk analysis makes the mistake of assuming that values are

— that past risk choices are a legitimate indication of future
choices —which leaves out the distinct possibility that the public
stable

could change its mind on what an acceptable risk is, or on the number
of risks it is willing to take.

This is another example in analysis

of the tendency to see the future as merely an extrapolation of the

past.

It is also another argument for why risks decisions should be

made directly by the public, instead of through analytic technique
the political approach could more easily express changing public senti-

ments on the acceptability of the risks of modern industrial life.
These shortcomings in comparative risks analysis would only be
of theoretical concern, if not for the fact that they quickly translate

into political problems.

Because of its tendency to rationalize the

acceptance of risks, this method of analysis has quickly been seized
upon by numerous political and economic groups who wish to promote

products and projects that serve their own interests, but have been impeded by the fact that they expose the public to significant risks.
The nuclear industry is only one example; as David Noble points out,
the chemical industry has also gotten heavily into this method as a way
of dismissing public concern over the safety of its products.

In the past when regulators identified a chemical as carcinogenic, that charge alone was enough to alarm the public, rally
support behind the regulation, and put the chemical industry
Today corporations like Union Carbide have
on the defensive.
begun to shift the very nature of the debate. They now readily
concede that their products are carcinogenic, but blandly insist
that the acknowledged risk of cancer be put in "perspective,"
that it be compared with other risks and traded off against proHorrified by the
Life after all, is risky.
duct benefits.
.

.

.
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consequences of carcinogenic pollutants? You take a greater
risk driving to work every day.
So what's all the fuss
about? 32

Unfortunately, this kind of argument can be very effective, not because
it is rational, but because people usually get tired of thinking about

all the risks they face in their food, water, and air.

One cannot

live with continual fear; and so if risks continue long enough, they

begin to be thought of as normal
at all.

— or

more accurately, not thought of

And so it is quite possible that the public will eventually

get bored with the risks of carcinogenic chemicals or nuclear power,
the same way they have become bored by the 50,000 deaths a year on our

highways, or the hundreds of thousands who die each year from cancer

caused by smoking.

What is worrisome about this is not just the risks

and dangers that are being ignored

— but

how deadened and insensitive

we can become as human beings.

The Necessity of Flexibility

Finally, it is worth reiterating the point that one does not
have to be anti-nuclear, anti-corporate, or anti-growth to conclude
that the various forms of conservative bias we have discussed are un-

desirable ways to approach public policy.

For irrespective of the par-

ticular interests and policies that this bias supports or undermines,
it can be considered dysfunctional simply because it stifles policy

creativity and puts artificial limits on our policy options.

It

limits our vision to those policies which are compatible with current

systemic characteristics and ideology

—a

process which Introduced undue

inflexibility and narrowness to our political considerations.
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Flexibility is an extremely important value in policymaking.

It enables

a society to respond to the unpredictable and ever-changing develop-

ments that it inevitably faces.

As we

s'aw

earlier, part of the problems

we are experiencing in energy policy stem from an inability to adapt
our socio-economic system to the developing scarcity of energy resources.

A blind commitment on the part of policy analysts to "working within
our political and economic system" only serves to worsen this problem.
If a society is to remain healthy and prosperous, it must be able to

question its own assumptions and to adapt and change its structure in
the face of changing conditions.

Thus, if there is any law of nature

that is to serve as a guide for public policy analysis, it should be the
one that mandates that any organism or eco-system which cannot adapt

itself to a changing environment faces sure extinction.
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CHAPTER

VIII

POLICY ANALYSIS AS PROMOTING POSSIBILITIES

Normal politics is indeed "the art of the possible"; it
consists in working as best one can for valued objectives
"within the system" that is, inside the current political
paradigm. However, politiking (to give it its true name)
is only one part of politics, and the lesser part of that;
in its truest sense, politics is the art of creating new
possibilities for human progress.
William Ophuls
Ecology and the
Politics of Scarcity

—

As the previous chapters have shown, many of the problems affecting public policy analysis are rooted in its conceptual structure, in
the positivistic assumptions and quest for scientific rationality that

underlie this perspective on policy.

Therefore any attempts to over-

come these problems must necessarily begin with an effort to modify
this analytic perspective.

That is the subject of Part II of this

dissertation.
It is important to note, however,

that a non-positivist approach

to policy analysis is more than simply an attempt to not make the

positivist mistakes described in the previous chapters.

The non-posi-

tivist approach to be discussed in the next chapters in an attempt to

bring a new perspective to policy analysis

— one

of the interpretive approach to social analysis.

based on the insights
This interpretive

approach will add something to policy analysis; a new understanding of

176

177

the nature of social reality and nature of policy decisions that
will

give us a fresh perspective on issues like energy and growth.

Probably

the most crucial element that an non-positivist/interpretive approach

will add to policy analysis is a humanism

;

for in many ways the central

problem with the positivist perspective is its denial of some of the
most basic characteristics of human reality.

Often the scientistic

approach obscures the intensely human nature of the subject being
studied.

For example, the positivistic assumption of the methodological

unity of the natural and social sciences (a notion explored in chapters
V and VII above) explicitly denies the uniqueness of human reality.

It

ignores the fact that human reality is constituted in part by our

mutually held beliefs, whereas physical reality is not.

A humanistic

approach to policy analysis would necessarily attempt to incorporate
this new interpretive understanding of the unique nature of human

reality into its approach to policy studies.

As will soon be evident,

this new analytic assumption brings with it new implications for how

we perceive policy choices.
In these next five chapters,
to positivistic policy analysis

analysis.

I

I

—a

will build an alternative approach
humanistic approach to policy

will discuss not only the essential elements of this

approach, but also consider how these elements can be incorporated into

actual policy studies.

This discussion will also include a considera-

tion of the extent to which some policy analysts have begun to do

studies which embody this humanistic model.
three basic elements:

The approach consists of

As mentioned above, one of the' elements of a humanistic

perspective is the assumption that human reality is constituted by the beliefs of those who participate in it.
In the rest of this chapter,

I

will show that this assumption

carries with it some important implications for how we

should perceive policy options.

In particular, this

assumption implies a more serious development and exploration of a wider range of policy possibilities than is typical
in positivistic policy analysis.

Another key assumption in a humanistic approach to policy
analysis is that values lie at the heart of all human
decisions, and that analysts can and should begin to bring

rationality to these value choices.

This notion stands

in contrast to the positivist assumption that a consider-

ation of values is basically inappropriate in rational
policy analysis.

In Chapter IX,

I

will use the work of

modern moral philosophers to support my argument that the
rational analysis of normative issues deserves a key

position in policy studies; in Chapter X.

I

will illustrate

how this value-oriented policy analysis can impact on
on specific policy decisions.
The final animating assumption of the humanistic approach
is

that policy analysis is an inherently political activity.

Given that human policy decisions are inherently political
in nature, a humanistic perspective necessarily acknowledges

that the activity of recommending policy choices has strong
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political implications.

In Chapter XI, I will explore

the political ramifications of an approach to analysis
that focuses on values, and delineate how this per-

spective logically supports a more participatory mode
of policy analysis and policy decisions.

To finish my consideration of this humanistic approach to policy

analysis, there will be a final chapter in which

I

will return more

explicitly to the subject of energy growth and illustrate how this

humanistic analytic perspective would effect the way analysts and policymakers approach this vital policy issue.

For now, however, let us begin

the consideration of the first element in the humanistic model.

I

will

start where the previous chapter ended, with a consideration of the

conservative bias in analysis.

I

will show how humanistic analytic

assumptions can help to overcome this bias, and how this new perspective
can begin to illuminate a wider range of policy possibilities.

Transcending the Conservative Bias

By acknowledging the unique characteristics of human reality

policy analysis can begin to overcome the conservative bias in policy
analysts.

By recognizing that social reality is constituted in large

part by our beliefs, and that those beliefs are subject to change, two

important changes in perspective can be accomplished.

First, analysts

can begin to pierce the naturalistic mask that overlays much of

current policy.

Many of the key terms that analysts use to describe
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current policies— "realistic," "feasable," "rational," "necessary,"
"viable," and "practical"— can begin to be stripped of their neutral
and objective connotations.

These terms can now be perceived as

ideological and system-bound concepts; concepts that are relative to
the socio-economic system that is assumed by the analyst.

A human-

istic perspective on policy would make it clear that many of the

constraints that limit our policy choices only exist given our current

socio-economic arrangements, and that what may seem impractical, unreasonable, or irrational in one human system, may not in another.

A second, more positive implication of the realization of the
unique and changable nature of human reality is that analysts can begin
to

more actively explore and report on a wider range of policy options

including options which challenge or go beyond current socio-economic
assumptions.

Policy studies developed from the humanistic model of

policy analysis would not confine themselves to proposals that are

consistent with the reigning ideology or the conventional wisdom,
but also seek to include a serious consideration of proposed explanations and solutions to our social problems which would require modifi-

cation of current assumptions and social arrangements to become viable.
Moreover, from the perspective of a humanistic model, the job of the

analyst would not be simply to dismiss those goals and values which
"are not consistent with current realities," but to show us how

current realities can be changed in order that we may achieve those

cherished human values.

This would be an important shift in emphasis;
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for now the role of the analyst would not be to limit our political

vision and imagination, but to expand them by offering a truly wide
variety of policy alternatives based on different theories and models
of social life.

From a humanistic perspective, public policy analysis

should not dampen our public hopes, it should enliven them.

As we

have seen, the positivistic perspective can all too easily become

burdened with a sense of determinism and inevitability, where trend
becomes fate, and where the social world becomes solidified and
closed-up.

In contrast to this, a more humanistic approach to policy

analysis would embrace a more open and more hopeful vision of society,

based on the recognition of and faith in the human capacity to be
creative and change.

It would assume and emphasize our ability to

solve problems by living differently and beginning anew.

In this

sense, a humanistic approach to policy would function as an optimistic

voice in the modern world

— one

which encouraged hope rather than

resignation and hopelessness
Such terms as "faith" and "hope" may seem out of place in the

context of such a serious (i.e., scientific) activity.

To use such

terms leaves one open to charges of naivete and idealism.

To be

taken seriously, most policy analysts must cultivate an image of

themselves as hard-nosed realists.

To a realist, notions like hope

represent a kind of irrationality, a kind of wishful thinking that
can only produce well-intentioned, but doomed policies.

This view
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betrays a very unrealistic understanding of social reality,
and a
failure to appreciate the very real role that faith and
hope can
play in policies promoting social change.

Hope can be seen as

rational, and it can play a beneficial role in policy analysis—
but
in order to see this, we must reconsider once again the difference

between natural and social reality.

Hope as a Self-fulfilling Prophecy

Social reality, unlike natural reality, is ordered by beliefs;
and part of those ordering beliefs are those theories and assumptions
that are generated and promulgated by policy analysts and policymakers.

Thus the social theories and models used in analysis can actually

become part of the subject they seek to describe

— those

theories can

enter into society and actually help to orient social behavior.
that is part of their intention.

Indeed,

But a curious phenomenon can result

from this: those theories and assumptions can become self-fulfilling

prophecies

They can contribute to their own fulfillment.

The existence

of this unique social phenomenon means that it can make quite a differ-

ence whether analysts assume pessimistic or optimistic social theories.
As one interpretive theorist, William Connolly, has pointed out, a

pessimistic theoretical assumption can sometimes work to create the
very situation it fears.
Suppose, as a participant in a social setting, I hold the
Hobbesian theory that human beings are essentially egoistic.
Influenced by this belief, I will be tempted secretly to break
community rules based on mutual trust. If I don't, my reasoning goes, others will, and I will then be placed at a

183

comparative disadvantage. As others realize that I respond
in this way to them, they will conclude that it would be
dangerous for them to abide by the common rules: for such
conformity threatens to put them at a disadvantage against
people like me. As each suspects that the others will not
do their part, the arrangements of mutual trust become
unstable. My theory about human nature thereby contributes
both to the instability and to the production of evidence
in support of my initial theory.
The evidential support in
turn encourages others to conclude that the theory is correct
and thus to reinforce even further defensive responses to
the expected selfishness of others.
The theory itself thus
again encourages the behavior it expects and the behavior
provides more evidence to sustain the theory.-^
A process very similar to this can occur in policy analysis.

The

models used in policy analysis produce predictions about the way that
our social system will operate; these predictions serve as guides
for our policy actions, actions which may in turn ensure that society

does in fact operate in the way predicted.

We can see this phenomenon

at work in policies concerning continuing economic and energy growth:
if we assume a society in which growth must be continual, then we will

enact policies to ensure that it will happen, which in turn is taken
as evidence that growth is necessary and inevitable.

Herman Daly

explains the logic of this process nicely:
Suppose that a forecast shows that the future will very
likely be X. Next it is shown that for X to happen, the
necessary conditions Y and Z must also happen. Then it is
concluded that to ease the transition toward our "destiny,"
But as often as not, either
K, we must strive for Y and Z.
Y or Z or both turn out to be not only necessary but also
sufficient conditions for X, so that in preparing for the
predicted future we in fact bring it to pass. The prediction is self-fulfilling because it was, from the beginning, more in the domain of planning than of prediction.
If the Edison Electric Institute makes a projection of energy
demand for the year 2000, and the number is such that supply
can meet it only with a crash program of building breeder
.

.

.
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reactors, and we undertake such a program, then barring
technical failure and nuclear war, the Edison Electric
Institute's projection will be borne out.^
Thus social predictions are not simply just detached descriptions
of the future, but can function to actually help create the
future in

their own image.

planning.

As Daly points out, they become a kind of de facto

This process of analytic theories and assumptions becoming

self-fulfilling prophecies is, as we saw in the last chapter, often
most evident when assumptions tend to perpetuate the status quo.

But

could not this same phenomenon be at work in the process of social
change?

Could it be that analytic assumptions which view optimistically

the possibility of change may actually make change more possible?

Or

to put it more in terms of policy analysis, might not policy plans

which are guided by analyses which assume the possibility of a different and better way of life also become self-fulfilling prophecies?
In other words, as long as the assumptions in analysis can sometimes

contribute to their own fulfillment, why not favor the more optimistic
assumptions?

This is, in fact, exactly what Connolly argues:

Concepts and beliefs about social life help to some degree
Therefore, privileging the more
to constitute that life.
optimistic assumption might well help both to bring out
evidence in its support previously unavailable and to contribute itself to the optimistic possibility .... Conduct
based on more optimistic beliefs can sometimes contribute
Arnold Kaufman, in his defense of
to their fulfillment.
citizen participation in group decision processes, captures
this idea nicely: "The effort to achieve a possible good
(sometimes) depends on our belief in the possibility of
the very nerve of our effort to achieve a
that achievement
good may be cut by premature admission of its impossibility.-^

—
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Lest this begin to sound like pollyannaism or policy through

wishful thinking, it should be pointed out that not all assumptions
are self-fulfilling prophecies.

Also, it is not being argued that

optimistic assumptions are sufficient in themselves to cause desired
social change, only that optimistic assumptions can sometimes be a

necessary factor in the process of change.

Still, despite these

obvious limitations, there is reason to believe that there are potential

benefits from "privileging the more optimistic assumption" in policy
analysis.

Consider, for example, some recent policy changes enacted

by several local libraries in the United States.

One of the per-

sistent problems afflicting many libraries is that of book thefts and

over-due books.
assumptions

— two

In dealing with this problem, roughly two sets of

models of public behavior

library policymakers.

— have

been available to

First, one can adopt the "realistic" model,

and assume that this problem is due to the irresponsible and selfish

nature of the public.

Assuming that human nature will not change,

the logical policy option is to install expensive and elaborate

electronic detection systems at their doors to deter thief s, and to
initiate a stiff fine system to ensure books are returned on time.

While producing some success, this system has also produced some
resentment on the part of patrons.

On the other hand a handful of

libraries have adopted a radically different policy and have eliminated check-out systems entirely, allowing patrons to take as many

books as they want and return them when they are done.

The assumption
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here was that if people are treated as responsible beings, they
tend to act that way, and an effort was made to educate the public

on how the effective running of the library depended primarily on
them.

Many of these libraries have enthusiastically reported this

policy is working as well or better than previous systems.'^

Thus it

seems that in at least this case, policies based on trust and an

optimistic view of human nature can be self-fulfilling prophecies.

Given this phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy, then, a good
case can be made for including a serious consideration of a wide

variety of policy proposals and assumptions in policy studies
those suggestions which

may.

— even

not appear at first to be "realistic."

This phenomenon also implies that the inclusion of an element of faith
or hope in policy analysis is not necessarily a "naive" or "hopelessly

idealistic" act.

There are good reasons why these notions are a central

part of human experience, and why they deserve a place in practice of

policy analysis
world.

— they

are often crucial to any prospect of a better

In some situations, faith and hope are the only realistic

alternatives.

Multi-Perspective Policy Analysis

What would a humanistic policy analysis informed by this sense
of hope and wider possibilities actually look like?

It would most

likely have to be some form of multi-perspective approach

— that

is, an

approach which incorporates a number of competing perspectives on
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policy issues.

This would be an explicit attempt to get away from

the use of one model and one set of assumptions by using several

different sets of models and assumptions.

Instead of analysts re-

stricting themselves to the one most "plausible" or "realistic" set of
assumptions, they would be encouraged to explore a wide variety of
assumptions.

For example, a study might give consideration to several

different explanations of a particular socio-economic problem and

demonstrate the implications these competing explanatory frameworks
have on policy formation.^

One of the obvious advantages of the

multi-perspective approach is that once policy discourse is cast in
terms of competing perspectives, it is more likely that citizens

and policymakers will become more aware of the importance of assumptions
in policy analysis and decisions.

Clashing perspectives tend to expose

rather than obscure underlying presuppositions.
Of course, a multi-perspective approach to policy analysis is

not a totally new suggestion.
this direction already.

There have been several steps taken in

One of the most promising is a multi-scenario

approach to analysis in which studies explore a number of competing

visions of the future.

Scenarios start with the present state of the

world, and then shows, in a step by step fashion, how various futures

might develop.^

Importantly, scenarios are not intended to be pre-

dictions of the future, but explorations of various possible futures
even those which may not seem particularly plausable at the moment.
poorly.
Scenarios, like any form of analysis, can be done either well or
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When they are done well, they emphasize, instead of a future
that
is the product of inevitable trends and constraints, a
future that is

shaped by the decisions we make today.

Multi-scenario analysis

accentuates the importance of human agency in human affairs.

It was

once said that science discovers order in the world, while art seeks
to create new orders.

If this is true,

then a multi-scenario approach

to analysis is more like art than science,

for it seeks to explore how

various new future orders can be created.

Let us consider what the

art of multi-scenario analysis can look like in practice.

Several of the most provocative analyses of our national energy

policy done to date have utilized verions of this approach.
example is A Time to Choose

,

A classic

the comprehensive study of energy policy

released by the Ford Foundation in 1974.

The study began with a

macro-economic models developed by Data Resources Inc.

The exogenous

assumptions of the model were first calibrated to produce a Historical

Growth Scenario.

In this scenario it was assumed that energy demand

in the United States would continue to grow at the historical rate

3.4% annually

— until

at least the end of the century.

It further

assumed that no deliberate effort would be made to alter current patterns
of energy use, and that a vigorous effort would be made to enlarge non-

renewable supplies to keep up with rising demand.
Next, the energy assumptions in the model were adjusted to

produce another scenario

— the

Technical-Fix Growth Scenario, in which

it was assumed that energy conservation practices and energy saving
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technologies would be incorporated into production and consumption

patterns to the extent possible within existing life-styles and
economic organization.
rate.

Energy demand would grow at a 1.9% annual

In the words of the study, "Technical Fix is leaner and trimmer,

but basically on the same track as Historical Growth."

Finally, the

models was adjusted to produce a Zero Energy Growth Scenario, in which
it was assumed that in addition to the technical fix measures, there

would also be changes in life-styles and economic structure to produce
a situation of constant energy consumption.

This would be primarily

accomplished by "small but distinct redirections of economic growth,
away from energy-intensive industries toward economic activities that

require less energy."^
The study caused quite a controversy when it was made public.
It concluded, among other things,

that the Historical Growth Scenario

which dominated policymakers considerations at that time could produce
major economic, environmental, and foreign policy problems in the
near future, and severely limit our ability to pick and choose among

various energy sources.

Virtually all sources would have to be ex-

ploited heavily, including coal and nuclear power.

Further, the other

two scenarios suggested that the growth in energy demand could slow or

stop without unduly harming

economic growth.

This was the first

major study to seriously question the iron-link between energy and GNP.
These conclusions gave a considerable boost to those groups seeking
to emphasize conservation and alternative energy sources, and the
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report was one of the first to lend some legitimacy to
the Zero

Energy Growth alternative.

As Herman Daly pointed out, "the Ford

Foundation Energy Policy Project took seriously the alternative
of
zero energy growth, and included it as one of their three
possible

scenarios for the future, thus giving a certain respectability
to

what (many in government) and others evidently still consider a 'far
out'

idea." 1°

In addition,

the study played a part in informing

Jimmy Carter's energy plan, with several top analysts from the project

participation in its early development.

Carter's emphasis on conser-

vation (in word, if not in deed) can be partially attributed to the
influence of this scenario study.

The Need for Pluralistic Research Funding

However, inspite of its contribution to broadening the range
of energy policy debate in the U.S., the Ford Study is perhaps not
the best example of this multi-scenario technique.

Ideally, if this

analytic technique is to be most useful and provocative, it must in-

corporate a wide variety of assumptions.

For example, scenarios should

include a range of possible socio-economic theories
are one of the key constraints on policymaking.

— for

these theories

But the Ford Study

actually incorporated only a very narrow range of different assumptions,
The models used in the scenarios were virtually alike, except for

differing assumptions about the level of energy demand.

"The general

specifications of the macro-economic model were held unchanged in the
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three different energy scenarios; only energy specific
parameters

were varied to secure the move between the three alternative
growth
paths.

Thus none of the scenarios seriously challenged conventional

economic theory, or the need for continuous economic growth.

All

scenarios simply assumed "a steady growth in gross national product and
income."nl2

It is of course debatable as

to

how wide a range of assump-

tions is desirable in this approach; but if one of the purposes of this

technique is to avoid the conservative bias, then it would seem

necessary to construct scenarios which embody truly competing socioeconomic theories
To be fair, it might be too much to expect one policy analysis

team to produce scenarios embodying a full range of socio-economic

assumptions.

It is difficult for one analyst to be intimately familiar

with more than one theoretical system.

This however is not so much

an argument against the feasibility of this scenario technique, as
it is a commentary of the limitations inherent in the One-Big-Report

approach to policy analysis.
a

Instead of expecting one team to produce

series of analyses based on different assumptions, it would be more

realistic to commission a series of reports done by analysts with

different theoretical frameworks.

This would ensure that truly alter-

native scenarios were presented with equal vigor.

All too often,

policy research grants go to those organizations which uphold current
assumptions, instead of groups who seek to challenge those assumptions
and propose alternative socio-economic arrangements.

But just the
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opposite should be the case; policy research funding should seek to

break down analytic hegemony by going, in part, to those research
groups who seek to expand our options beyond current horizons.

This

would enable alternative perspectives on policy issues to be more
fully developed and presented to a national audience.

This approach

assumes of course that the purpose of funding policy research is to

expand our choices and not to simply confirm current political prejudices

—which

is a highly debatable assumption.

Scenarios as Qualitative Analysis: The Work of Amory Lovins

Perhaps the most famous scenario analysis done in the area of
energy policy is the Hard Path/Soft Path choice set out by Amory Lovins.

Beginning with his article in the October, 1976 edition of Foreign
Affairs

,

"Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken," Lovins has argued that

the choice facing the nation in energy policy is between two mutually

exclusive paths, one characterized by hard technology, the other by
soft technology.

The Hard Path assumed continued energy growth met

by non-renewable resources utilizing centralized, complex, capital

intensive technologies, with an emphasis on centralized electricity
production.

In contrast, the Soft Path emphasized conservation,

renewable resources, and relatively simple, decentralized technologies
that were more compatible with the environment.

One of the most unique and provocative aspects of Lovins'

analysis is its emphasis on a qualitative as well as quantitative

description of these two scenarios.

Instead of focusing, primarily
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on the quantitative

— usually

economic

— dimensions

of our energy

choices, Lovins seeks to give equal time to discussing the moral,

social, and political implications of these two different energy
paths.

In his book. Soft Energy Paths

^
,

Lovins not only includes

chapters on economic issues like the capital requirements of different

technologies, but also chapters with titles like "Sociopolitics
and "Values."

,

He concludes that following the Hard Path is not only

economically undesirable, but that it would also tend to encourage
elitist technocracy, concentrate economic and political power, foster
increased bureaucratization and alienation, encourage urbanization,
and produce greater distributional inequity within and between nations.

On the other hand, he claims that the Soft Path would foster more
local control, increase participation in the political and economic

system, encourage the creation of a society that is more diverse,

pluralistic, and egalitarian.
The effect of Lovins' analysis was immediate.

Less than two

months after publication of his article in Foreign Affairs

,

Lovins

was summoned to Congress to testify about his work before

a

joint

hearing of two U.S. Senate committees.

Soon afterward, he was also

asked to vist the White House and the Department of Energy to present
his controversial views.

Irrespective of whether one thinks of

Lovins as a "genius" or a "pied piper," it is clear that his analysis
has changed the way many people think about our energy choices.
book. Soft Energy Paths

,

has been called the

"

Bible" and the

His
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"Das Kapital" of the alternative energy movement, and Lovin's
has

been described even by one of his critics as "the most articulate writer
on energy in the world today.
I

"''^

believe that at least part of the success of Lovins

can be attributed to his methodology

—a

'

analysis

scenario approach which ex-

plicitly addressed the moral, social, and political implications of
our energy options.

By including these elements in his scenarios, he

was able to portray a much more rich and vivid vision of the future

implied in our energy choices

—a

vision described in very human terms,

and thus more easily understood and appreciated by the average citizen.
As Lovins explains it, scenarios should be "descriptions of how future

events (could) unfold, described chronologically and at least quali-

tatively in sufficiently vivid detail that readers can readily imagine

themselves participating in the events they describe. ""^^

Conventional

forms of policy analysis, like cost-benefit analysis, because they tend
to focus on the quantitative,

economic implications of policies,

often times fail to portray the full human implication of policy choices.
As Charles Taylor has observed,

they can distort our understanding of

policy decisions by portraying them as decisions about having more or
less of something
1

society.

— as

if policies only produce quantitative changes in

c

He argued that in actuality, most important policy decisions

were qualitative in nature and involved choosing between this way of
life and that way of life.
By using scenario analysis, it can be made clear that the choices

facing us in areas like energy policy are not simply technological or
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economic, but choices between different ways of living our lives,

different sets of moral, political, and environmental relationships.
For example, the fact that we are talking about alternative ways
of life is made very evident in the following frugal, soft-path scene

painted by Robin Clarke:

A countryside dotted with windmills and solar houses, studded
with intensively but organically-worked plots of lands; food
production systems dependent on the integration of many different
species, with timber, fish, animals, and plants playing mutually
dependent roles; with wilderness areas plentiful and available
a life-style for men and women which involved hard physical work but not over-excessively long hours or in a tediously
repetitive way; ... a political system so decentralized and
small that individuals all individuals could play more than
a formal, once-every four years role.l^
.

.

.

—

—

One need not agree with this somewhat extreme vision to appreciate
the power and utility of the scenario approach it illustrates.

When

it is done well, it portrays in a vivid way the full human implica-

tions of our policy choices.

In this way, it is a useful way of trans-

cending the kind of narrow, "factual" perspective on policy issues
that was discussed in Chapter I.

Instead of relegating the social

and political dimensions of policy issues to a secondary status, a

scenario approach to analysis helps to bring them to the forefront
and grants them a legitimacy in policy deliberations.

Thus one of the

most exciting potentials present in this scenario approach is not only
of
its ability to widen our analytic vision by portraying a number

different possible futures, but also its ability to deepen our
vision
analytic understanding by giving us a more rich and detailed
of what policy choices mean to our lives.
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Incorporatin g Multiple Normative/Theoretical Perspectives
While scenario analysis has promise as a way of developing
a sense
of wider possibilities in analysis, it is not a fully
developed form
of multi-perspective analysis.

In order for an analysis to be truly

multi-perspective, it must not only incorporate a number of different
models and visions of the future, but it must also evaluate them from
a number of different normative/ theoretical frameworks.

If,

for

example, no attempt is made to consider a variety of value perspectlvss
in the evaluation of different policy options and scenarios, scenario

analysis could easily degenerate into just an elaborate form of cost-

benefit analysis.

Cost-benefit analysis does consider a variety of

policy options, but these options are evaluated from a single, fixed

value perspective.

It assumes uniform agreement about what is a cost,
1

what is a benefit, and what they are worth.

Q

But in a fully developed

multi-perspective analysis, this uniformity would not be assumed.

In-

stead, it would assume a plurality of value and interest perspective
as actually exists in the real world.

As a result, it becomes more

clear that policy choices are not simply a matter of objective calculations, but a matter of value choices.

A policy study which Illustrates

this point very nicely is Solar Energy in America's Future

,

a report

done by the Stanford Research Institute for the Energy Research and

Development Agency in

1977.-*-^

The report studied the feasibility and

desirability of expanding the role of solar energy in our energy system.
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Almost immediately, the researchers realized that one's understanding
and evaluation of solar energy depended primarily on one's "perspec-

tive"— i.e., one's normative-theoretical framework.

So they set out

to produce an analysis which demonstrated that what was at
issue here

was not so much a set of technological choices, but a choice between
different views of reality, of which values were a crucial part.
Their aim, in their own words, was to produce an "analysis of policy
issues (beginning with the assumption that groups experience different

perceptual realities

.

.

.

(that) when people appear to be arguing

ab out technical issues or choices among energy options, they may in

fact be arguing from different fundamental perceptions of the nature
of social reality. "2^

First, three scenarios were constructed: A Reference Scenario
(the familiar hard path, with high demand met with hard technology);
a Solar Emphasis Scenario (high demand, with an emphasis on soft energy

technologies); and a Low Demand Scenario (low demand and soft technology)

.

These three scenarios were then evaluated from the perspec-

tives of three individuals using different normative and theoretical

assumptions.

The first perspective (which

I

will call the Status-Quo

Perspective) assumes that continued economic, material, and technological growth; centalization, and free enterprise are all desirable
and necessary.

The second perspective (the Environmentalist Perspective)

stressed the limits to growth, and emphasized the desirability of

decentralization, simplicity, and frugality, and seeks to maximize
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social and environmental values.

The third perspective (the

Radical Perspective) assumes the values of the Environmentalist
Perspectives, but differs theoretically by stressing that those
values
cannot be realized within the current structure of society and the
economy, and emphasizes the necessity of fundamental transformation of
culture, institutions and world view as the answer to our energy/

environmental problems.

Table

2

summarizes how these different per-

spectives view the three scenarios

.

The Relativity Trap

In some ways, the SRI study is multi-perspective analysis at
its best; for it allows us to fully sense not only the range of possible

policy paths but also the extent to which our evaluation of those
options depends so highly on the values and theories that we assume.
It also enables us to appreciate the coherence of other perspectives

on energy policy.

However, while this study is a good illustration

of the potentials of this style of policy analysis, it also reveals

one of its most potentially serious problems

— the

inherent tendency

of this style of analysis to degenerate into an immobilizing kind of

relativism in which each scenario is seen as desirable and valid as
the next one, given the assumptions contained in particular perspectives.

As Table

3

illustrates, each scenario can be considered "Right on!"

given a particular perspective.
of this problem:

22

The authors of the report are aware
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TABLE

2

PERSPECTIVES ON SCENARIOS

SCENERIOS

PERSPECTIVES

Status Quo

High Demand
Hard Tech

—

Environmentalist

Radical

The costs of this
scenario greatly
exceed the benefits.
Strong
measures must be
taken to reduce
energy demands
below the levels
of this scenario.

This scenario represents gluttonous
use of energy in a
world becoming resource poor.
The
outrageousness of
social and environmental costs
help to demonstrate the need
for a new social
order

Solar energy
should be stimulated only moderately; it is generally desirable
to keep interference with the market to a minimum.
It is also important to keep
energy prices
down to insure
a strong economy

The society must
move in the dirto renewable energy
sources and
lowered demand.
The strong stimulation of solar
energy development
in this scenario
is highly desir-

Stimulation of
solar development
is desirable but
the total energy
demand is much too
high.
In addition fundamental
change in economic
and social institions will be required for a
rational energy

The low- demand
scenario is absurd;
it endangers all we
have built up and
imposes unnecessary
sacrifices on the
individual.
It
would inevitaby
bring a depressed
economy

We must choose vol-

Of the three, this
is the best future
for the U.S. and
the best hope of
raising the standard of living of
the poor nations.
Above all, the
nation needs e-

nough energy to
keep the economy
rol 1 ing.

High Demand
—Soft Tech

Low Demand
—Soft Tech

able.

future

untarily a scenerio
with energy demands
as low as this or
lower, in order to
avoid terribly serious costs in the
long run.

Energy demand as
low or lower than
this must be achieved, but this
is incompatible
with the structure
of the eoncomy.
Fundamental change,
probably coming
about through a
traumatic transition period, will
be necessary to reduce environmental
and social assaults
to tolerable levels.
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TABLE

3

HOW PERSPECTIVES VIEW EACH OTHER

IMRESSION OF
BY PERSONS
WHO HAVE

Status Quo
Perspective

Environmentalist
Perspect ive

Radical
Perspect ive

Status Quo
Perspective

Right onl

Idealistic
Impractical

Dangerous
Revolutionary

Environmentalist
Perspective

Irresponsible

Right onl

In the right
direction

but too

radical

More gradual,
rational approach is
better.

Radical
Perspect ive

Dangerous
Dinosaur-like

In the right
direction, but
unrealistic
about the extent
of fundamental
institutional
change that is
required

Right on!
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As we have seen, all three of these perceptions represent
views found among decision makers, analysts and citizens.
All have to be honored in some sense since each "fits" the
observations of his environment as made by the person holding
that view. Presently there appears to be no clear way of
standing apart and objectively determining that one of the
views is more "true" than the other two. No one of these
views can be disproven by "facts" taken from another.
Whichever view society comes to accept, that view will tend
to become more "real. "23
In this sense, the strength of the multi-perspective approach is

also its chief weakness.

It requires us to open our minds and to

suspend our notions of common sense in order to appreciate the multi-

plicity of options and perspectives that should be considered; but if
our minds remain too open, we run the risk of slipping into total

relativism and becoming unable to decide which perspective and option
is the right one.

assumptions.

Each appears coherent and right given its own

It does little good to avoid the trap of ob jectif ication,

only to fall into the trap of relativism.

It does little good to

multiply options, if we cannot provide some way to choose between them.
This is not merely a philosophical or academic problem.

As

Martin Rein has pointed out, it is often difficult for analysts and
policymakers to choose between competing normative/ theoretical frameworks.

This is particularly clear in the area of value assumptions,

for as we saw earlier, most analysts adhere to the positions of value

non-cognitivism and value relativism

— the

belief that values are

essentially subjective and cannot be proven to be correct.

But it

also seems equally difficult to prove which theoretical assumptions

202

are valid.

If a particular theoretical or explanatory framework

could be shown to be correct, it would not only be shown to be
correct, it would not only indicate what social model we should adopt,

but it would also give

us an indication about which values it is

valid to adopt, for as we saw earlier, models help to indicate which
values are practical and achievable in a given society.

But the

efforts to test and prove these theories have not been successful or
reliable.

For example, it is sometimes helpful to compare various

theories with the known "facts," and thus eliminate from consideration

those theories which are obviously incompatible with our present

information.

However, as the SRI report concluded, the present facts

often can support a number of different paradigms.

"It may be imposs-

ible at this time to establish which picture among these pictures of

reality is "correct," because the available data can be fitted into
more than one pattern."
Some analysts have suggested a more sophisticated way to test

theoretical frameworks

— the

construction of policy "experiments" in

order to test which theories actually work in practice.

This is the

thrust, for example, of the suggestion put forward by Alice Rivlin in

Systematic Thinking for Social Action

.

The obvious intention here

is to imitate the analytical approach to the natural sciences.

But

again, while this scientistic approach has proved helpful in some
cases, it is far from a reliable technique.

theoretical and practical problems.

It is fraught with both

For example, because it does not
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acknowledge the unique nature of social reality, it fails to appreciate that "experiments" cannot serve the same purpose in social
analysis as they can in the natural sciences.

As I pointed out earlier,

social theories, because they can become self-fulfilling prophecies,
can actually create their own evidence.

Testing the predictive

powers of social theories becomes questionable when it is understood
that theories and predictions can actually contribute to their own

fulfillment.

2

Moreover, if a policy experiment fails, this does not

necessarily invalidate the theory underlying it, but only indicating
that it may not be applicable at this point in time.

Changes in the

beliefs and values which organize and orient social action might

make that policy a viable one in the future.

For example, consider

the policy experiment conducted by one Alaskan town.

They took all

of the unclaimed bicycles at the police department, painted them

white, and distributed them in bike racks around town so that residents
could ride from place to place

—a

sort of poor man's transit system.

Initially, some of the bicycles were stolen and some people called
the program a failure.

But the mayor insisted that the program con-

tinue, arguing that it would work once people realized that the

bicycles would always be available and they wouldn't have to steal
them.

The changeableness of human beliefs and behavior make theory

testing a difficult endeavor.

There are also more practical problems with constructing valid
social experiments.

For one thing, it is often difficult to measure
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social variables with the accuracy necessary for
careful experiments.
For instance, in order to draw connections between
various variables,

we need to be able to measure them accurately,
which is not always
possible.

In addition, in social experiments we are
often not in a

position to control all the variables involved.

Social situations

are so complex, so full of different variables, that it is
difficult
to isolate out the limited number of variables necessary
for a valid

experiment.

And when an experiment fails, it is often difficult to

identify just which variable or variables was actually responsible.^^
In other words, society often makes a poor laboratory.

Back Again Into Politics

Now all of this does not mean that there is no way to choose

between competing frameworks

— only

that there is no sure, empirical

way to do so.

It only indicates what should have been obvious from

the beginning:

that the choice of frameworks and perspectives

and thus the choice of policies

— is

a decidedly political activity,

one which depends highly on the values of the chooser.

This should

have been clear from our own personal experience, since we all tend
to adopt those socio-economic theories which are most compatible with

our own values.

This normal process of choice is usually seen by

policy analysts as a biased and self-serving way to choose among
theories.

And there is some truth to that contention; strong value

commitments can tend to blind us to the faults in our favored theories,
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and lead us to ignore facts which are inconsistent with them.

But

this does not mean that values never have a sensible place in the

choice process.

When we are faced with a situation in which the

facts support a number of different theories, we may be forced to

appeal to values as a final criterion.

And as

I

pointed out earlier,

it may actually make sense to favor the more optimistic assumptions

and theorize in these situations; for given the nature of social

reality, these assumptions may actually contribute to the fulfillment
of valued goals

For some, this acknowledgment that the choice of perspectives
and policies is ultimately a value-laden, political activity is a

discouraging admission.

It seems to imply that the essence of policy

decisions is forever beyond the realm of rational analysis.
not share this discouragement.

First of all, it can only be helpful

to see policy decisions for what they really are: human,

moral, decisions.

But I do

and therefore

A truly humanistic approach to policy analysis

must acknowledge this simple but difficult fact.

Secondly, a value-

oriented humanistic approach to policy analysis can only be discouraging
if one assumes that there is no way to evaluate normative issues

— that

there is no way to begin to say that some value decisions are worse
than others.
lenged.

But this is an assumption that can and should be chal-

Indeed, if the humanistic style of policy analysis is to be

relevant and effective, it must not only include acknowledgement of the
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of the centrality of values in analysis, but also a demonstration of

how those value issues can be analyzed rationally in policy studies.
This is the second important element in the humanistic approach and
it forms the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER

IX

POLICY ANALYSIS AS MORAL RATIONALITY

To assert the necessity of ultimate values in this day and
age is heretical.
Scientific orthodoxy says that values
have no epistemological standing; any statement that one
value is to be preferred to another is therefore scientifically meaningless. And since science is our standard of
social reality, value questions must not be socially meaningful either
Yet wisdom, if only the rough and ready
kind acquired by everyday living, tells us that not all values
are equal and that virtue matters in life.
William Ophuls
Ecology and the Politics
of Scarcity

....

We have seen that many- of the limitations and distortions in public
policy analysis are due to the analyst's reluctance or inability to

directly address value questions.

But any thorough and relevant approach

to policy analysis must include an attempt to deal

questions.

with these crucial

Martin Rein has argued that what is needed in the profession

is a "value-critical" approach to analysis,

become the object of analysis.""''

in which "values themselves

Robert Dorfman, a leading environ-

mental analyst, has also observed that the ability to address the moral
dimension of policy questions is "the missing ingredient in current
policy analysis."
No one challenges seriously that, in a slavish way, the new
analytic techniques have vastly amplified our ability to design
and appraise projects in the light of given objectives. The
challenge is, rather, that our skills in attaining objectives ^
has outrun our skill in determining or even articulating them.
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In addition, Laurence Tribe, one of the most
thoughtful students
of policy analysis, has observed that in the 20th
century social

thought reason has become separated from morality. ^

Reason has come to

be thought of as instrumental rationality, which as Dorfman
observed
above, is merely concerned with means not ends.

Tribe argues that what

is needed in policy analysis today is a "reintegration of reason
and

moral perception."'^

It is important to see that this is more than a

philosophical need, that it is a political need as well.

The political

world of the 1980 's is an increasingly fragmented one with a multiplying
number of moral and political perspectives on our pressing policy
choices.

Not only is there the newly polarized conservative right and

liberal left, but we also have the Environmentalists, the Born Again
Christians, the Libertarians, the Unions, Minority groups, and so on.

We live in a time when society is dis-integrating, a time when society
is increasingly unsure of its values and goals.

Policy analysts could

have a constructive part to play in this confusing situation by beginning to bring a thoughtful and analytic approach to the various competing

values being debated in the policy; but as Tribe points out, our current
analytic tools fail us.

Inherited from an era when certain basic values and ideals
seemed to be more clearly (if tacitly) understood and widely
(if not universally) shared, the intellectual and institutional
techniques available to any policy-oriented research institute
seem distinctly ill-adapted to the task of helping to reach
important decisions in more fragmented society, a society which,
for a variety of reasons, is no longer confident about the
priorities among its values, and which is becoming increasingly
aware of the inherent difficulty of choosing among values in
conflict, coupled with the increasingly unavoidable need to do
so

^
.
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Clearly, then, a relevant and humanistic approach to policy

analysis must include the attempt to address these crucial normative
questions.

Rein, Dorfman, and Tribe all agree that the first step in

this process is to abandon the positivist-emotivist-relativist per-

spective on values which assumes that value judgments are the purely
subjective, arbitrary preferences of the individual.

We need a

perspective which assumes that one can critically judge value decisions
and that some values are more important than others, and which begins
to describe how those judgments can be made.

That is the object of

this chapter, to remove some philosophical deadwood, and to sketch out

what such a normative policy analysis would look like.
this, we will have to travel into unfamiliar waters

philosophy.

In order to do

— the

realm of moral

It is here that the most useful thought concerning the

rationality of moral and value judgments has taken place.
The academic literature advancing the rationality of moral
judgments is extremely rich and varied, ranging from the careful expositions of moral philosophers like Stephen Toulmin and John Rawls
to the more popular forms of "values clarification" that are currently

This is clearly not the place to

taught in many secondary schools.

exhaustively survey this field, but it is certainly possible to explore
some of its important contours.

I

will consider several of the central

thinkers in this area and sample some of their classic lines of argument.

My intention will be to establish the minimum claim of this chapter
that it is possible for policy analysis to begin to bring at least some
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rationality to the analysis of the normative judgments in policy
decisions.

In the interest of consistency, I will focus primarily on

ethical thinkers who fall roughly within the interpretive approach to
social and philosophical thought

— the

post-positivist tradition that

has been touched upon throughout this dissertation.

The Rationality in Normative Judgments

It usually comes as a surprise to policy analysts to learn that

their view of values is at least 20 years behind the times

cally speaking.

— philosophi-

As Steven Rhoads observed:

If pressed, most sophisticated analysts would probably say
that there can be no transubjective standard to help determine
what is in the public interest, and they would be surprised
to learn that the contemporary student of philosophy Richard
Flathman has said, "The position that reason is relevant to
value selection and adjudication has the support of the overwhelming majority of contemporary writers in the fields of
ethics and value theory.

What Flathman has stated is true; ever since the early 1950'

s,

many of

the prominent philosophers of ethics including Stephen Toulmin, Kurt

Baier, and Kai Nielson have argued that there is a rationality in moral

and value judgments that can be evaluated.^

In an approach which is

obviously indebted to the work of the later Wittgenstein, they argue
that the rationality in these judgments should not be judged by the same

standards of rationality commonly applied to scientific judgments.

Moral and scientific discourse are two different activities (or "forms
of life" as Wittgenstein would say) with somewhat different standards
of nationality.

Thus to establish the validity of a normative judgment,
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one need not prove it to be empirically true as in scientific
rationality, but simply demonstrate that it is supported by sound reasoning
that could be understood by any rational actor.

In keeping with this

understanding, these philosophers have focused their attention on the
logic of moral reasoning, and have argued that it is possible to

evaluate normative judgments, to establish that some moral or value
judgments are more rational and acceptable than others.
However, before we begin to consider how this can be done, a prior

question must be answered: How can moral and value judgments be considered rational at all?

How is it concluded that these judgments are

not simply the arbitrary, subjective preferences of the individual?

answer this question,

I

To

will turn to the work of Charles Taylor, a

leading interpretive social theorist whom we have encountered before in
this dissertation.

Once Taylor has laid the philosophical groundwork

justifying the presence of rationality in normative judgments, then
we can move on to consider the work of other moral philosophers who
begin to explain the nature of that rationality.
Is his essay, Neutrality in Political Science , Taylor illustrates

one of the classic lines of argument that demonstrates that there is
o

some rationality in normative judgments.

He begins by showing that our

everyday language indicates that we in fact do not consider our moral
judgments to be merely emotional or arbitrary preferences.

He argues

that in our everyday lives we all honor an implicit distinction between

moral judgments and mere preferences.

He points out that we rarely use

the two notions interchangably in common speech.

It sounds natural,

for
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instance, to say, "I prefer chocolate ice cream," or "Genocide
is

wrong."

But it would sound quite odd to say, "I think chocolate ice

cream is wrong," or "I do not prefer genocide." These last phrases
sound odd because the notions of preference and moral choice are not

interchangable

— one

cannot be reduced to the other.

Taylor maintains that part of the implicit difference between

preferences and value judgments is that we tend to require reasons of

justifications for value judgments, but not for preferences.

When

someone prefers a certain kind of ice cream, or a certain color, or
kind of music, we do not usually require justifications for those
choices.

But we do for moral judgments.

We tend to not notice this

requirement when we agree with a moral judgment, but it becomes evident

when we disagree.

We might not question a person who stated that

genocide was bad, but if someone said that genocide was good, we would
most likely demand reasons for such a claim.
used by Taylor.

miscegenation.

Or consider the example

There are two segregationists who disapprove of
In defense of the claim the first argues that mixing

races will produce general unhappiness, a decline in the intellectual

capacity and moral standards of the race, the abolition of creative
tension, and so forth.

The second, however, refuses to make any of

these arguments: the race will not deteriorate, man may even be happier
in any case they will be just as intelligent, moral, etc.

insists that miscegenation is bad.

And yet he

When pressed to produce some reason

he simply says "I do not need to give reasons, moral judgments are
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simply subjective preferences, and cannot be ultimately justified by
reasons and therefore none are required.

Micegenation is just bad."

As Taylor concludes,

Now no one would question that the first segregationist was
making the judgment "miscegenation is bad." But in the case
of the second, a difficulty arises.
This can be seen as soon
as we ask the question: how can we tell whether this man is
really making a judgment about the badness of micegenation and
not just, say, giving vent to a strongly felt repulsion, or a
neurotic phobia against sexual relations between people of
different races? Now it is essential to the notions of "good"
and "bad" as we use them in judgments that there be a distinction of this kind between these judgments and expression
of horror, delight, liking, disliking, and so on.^

In short, while some philosophers have gone to lengths to arti-

ficially reduce moral and value judgments into the category of pure

subjective preferences, a careful consideration of the nature of
everyday moral discourse reveals that we demand and give reasons for
those judgments.

argument

— an

Taylor is making here what is called a transcendental

argument that contends that certain principles must be

regarded as correct if certain forms of life or forms of discourse are
to be

possible at

all.'''^

In this case, Taylor is saying in effect that

for common moral discourse and debate to exist at all, there must be at

least some rationality to normative judgments.

Moral discourse would

make little sense, we would have little reason to engage in it if we
believed that values were totally irrational and arbitrary.

Thus the

widespread customs of moral persuasion and discourse presuppose that
values can be debated and that moral judgments are based on reasons that
can be evaluated and discussed in a rational manner.
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Taylor's argument against the subjectivity and irrationality of

moral judgments is in many ways simply a modern restatement of a
line
of thought that is over 30 years

old— one

first developed by moral

philosophers like Kai Nielson and Kurt Baier.

Nielson, Baier, and others

were part of a movement in moral philosophy that began in the early
1950 's in reaction to emotivist and prescriptivist theories of ethics

which dominated the discipline then.

Their approach, which was at

least indirectly based on the philosophical methods associated with
the work of the later Wittgenstein, was to focus on the purposes and

defining characteristics of the activity of moral judgment.

They

argued that one of the defining characteristics of moral judgment is
that it is not entirely subjective in nature.

For them, moral dis-

course was understood to be inherently concerned with establishing what
are good and bad moral judgments and doing so in such a way that those

conclusions can be reached by any reasonable person.

This means that

the validity of such judgments cannot be "dependent on some cultural

or individual idiosyncrasy of the persons involved," but rather, must

be "publically warrantable, that is admit of some publically determin-

able procedure in virtue of which any informed and rational person could
come to accept

it."-'--^

This understanding of the nature of moral judg-

ments is confirmed by the way we use the terms "objective" and "subjective" in evaluating moral judgments.

By an objective judgment we

mean one which would be arrived at by any impartial, rational person.
We naturally tend to accept such judgments because, as Nielson observes,
well as the
"a procedural rule of morality is that the moral agent (as
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moral critic) must, in making moral judgments, try to assume the
viewpoint of an impartial observer. "^^

In contrast, to call someone's

judgment "subjective" is a way of criticising it.

As A. Phillips

Griffiths explains.

When someone's judgment is stigmatized as subjective rather
than objective, this means that some idiosyncratic factors
such as the hopes and fears or special interests of the speaker
have affected his judgment; an objective judgment, however, is
one not affected by such idiosyncratic factors but one which
any reasonable and unbiased person would form in the circumstances. -'-^
For example, if moral judgments are to be objective or publically

warrantable, then they must be supported by the facts that are commonly
known.

As Nielson puts it, "in making a moral judgment

....

it must

be possible to give factual reasons in support of the moral claim. "'^
If a moral claim cannot be supported by the facts of a situation this

might indicate that the reasons supporting the claim are primarily subjective.

For instance, if someone were to argue that homosexuality

(and therefore gay rights)

is bad primarily because gay people harass

straight people and break up their families, but it is well-known that

extensive research has shown that this is not the case, then we might
conclude that the person's judgment is not an objective one, but a
subjective one based on some idiosyncratic factor like a neurotic fear
of homosexuals.

In this case, as with the genocide example cited

earlier, it is legitimate to conclude that the argument being made is

not really a moral one at all, but one which simply appeals to sub-

jective prejudices.

Nielson and his cohorts insisted that this factual
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support requirement is simply one of several criteria by which we
can begin to judge the rationality of moral judgments.

Let us now

examine several of the other important criteria.

Initial Criteria for Moral Rationality

Nielson maintains that there are certain trans-subjective and
transcultural criteria that we can use to help determine if a moral
judgment is objective or not.
criteria mentioned above.

One of these is the factual-support

There are also other criteria that can be

applied, criteria of consistency or rationality that are built into
the very nature of moral judgments themselves.

For example, it can be

shown that one of the essential features of any moral judgment is

"universality."

By universality it is meant that if

ought to do a certain thing in some situation,

I

I

judge that I

also must implicitly

judge that similar persons in similar situations also ought to do it

unless there are some relevant differences.

This willingness to

generalize is part of what constitutes a moral judgment.

As Nielson

maintains
Moral utterances are objective in the sense that they do not
apply exclusively to any given speaker or class of people
but are meant to count for all people in like circumstances.
Moral utterances are universalisable they must be so if they
are to count as "moral utterances ."^5
;

The analyst can use this universality criterion to begin to rationally

criticise the moral reasoning underlying certain public policies.

For

example, one can criticise Japanese trade policy as morally incoherent

when that country asserts their right to trade their goods freely in

oi
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country, but imposes sti££ trade barriers against the importation
of our goods.

This is a subjective position in that its acceptability

depends largely on the idiosyncrasy of being Japanese.

Its incon-

sistency and lack of objectivity can easily be identified and bemoaned,
even across cultural barriers.

Another example of the use of this

universality criterion occured during the crisis over the presence of
Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979.

Some critics of America's reaction

claimed that our moral indignation over having foreign troops so close
to our borders was

self-contradictory considering that we had our

American troops stationed right in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay.
There is also another version of this universality criterion
that can be of use to policy analysts.

One further rule of universality

is that any form of treatment thought to be right for one person must

also be considered to be right for all others

significantly different.

— unless

the others are

This logical requirement of moral judgments

is essentially equivalent to the requirement of justice or equal

treatment in our dealings with others.

For the policy analyst then,

this requirement forms a rational basis for condemning public policies

and institutions that are discriminatory on the basis of race, sex,

and so forth

— the

argument being that these differences are in most

cases not obviously relevant differences on which to justify ignoring
the requirement of equal treatment.

Philosophers of ethics have also pointed out that another
essential feature of moral judgments is that they are "practical"--

whlch is to say that "moral questions are fundamentally questions about
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what we are to do."16

^^^^^ judgments are not theoretical, but

practical in the sense that they are meant to guide
our actions.
if a moral judgment cannot fulfill this

Thus

function—if, for example, the

action described in the judgment is impossible to do—then
it is not
considered to be a legitimate or rational moral judgment.

This is the

point made by John Ladd,
If we say that P ought to do X, we imply that he is able to
do X; for ought implies can.
The principle "ought implies can"
operates as a presupposition of moral discourse. To say that
it is a presupposition means that if it is false, that is, if
the agent is not able to perform the action in question, then
the moral proposition containing the "ought" is void and pointless.
There is no point in telling someone that he ought to
do X if in fact he is unable to do X.l^

This practicality criterion should already be somewhat familiar
to the reader.

It is this criterion that is invoked when we use

social theory to demonstrate that a certain policy goal is impossible
or impractical, and thus not a rational goal.

This is the criterion

that is used by both sides of the energy and economic growth debate

discussed in Chapter

5.

There we found traditional economists arguing

that a viable no-growth economy was an impossibility, while advocates
of no-growth argued that continuous growth was impractical and ir-

rational in a world of limited resources.

Since socio-economic theories

help to establish what is possible and impossible in human affairs, they

become quite relevant in assessing the rationality of goals and values.
Before, this was seen as a matter of common sense, now it can be under-

stood as function of the logic of moral reasoning itself.
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The Good-Reasons Approach

Criteria like universality and practicality can begin to add
some rationality to the evaluation of moral judgments.

But these

criteria apply essentially to the form of moral judgments, not to
their specific content.

Universality can help us detect inconsisten-

cies in a moral position, but it does not by itself serve to justify
the legitimacy of a given moral judgment.

Thus we need to be able to

specify just what constituted a good reason for believing that a moral
judgment is a legitimate and reasonable one

—a

"good-reasons" school of ethical thought.

The good-reasons school is

task which spawned the

actually a permutation of the line of thought of philosophers like

Nielson that we have been exploring.-'-^ This school argues that a careful examination of the way we think about and discuss moral questions

reveals an inner logic

—a

timacy of moral judgments.

set of good reasons for accepting the legi-

One of the strongest forms this argument

takes is the proposition put forward by Kurt Baier in his famous work,

The Moral Point of View

19
.

He argues that a moral judgment can only be

considered legitimate if it meets certain criteria, one of which is that
the judgments "considers the good of everyone alike."

His point is

that a judgment cannot really be considered to be a genuine moral

judgment unless it takes into account the welfare of the others in
society.

In other words, moral judgments necessarily embody some notion

of the common good.

Again, the assumption here is that one of the

Inherent purposes of moral is the promotion of the common good

— that

a
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morality that didn't do this would be nonsensical.

This can be a

useful observation, for it logically follows from it that any judgment

which attempts to base itself purely on self-interest would be morally
invalid.

For instance, if a coal miners union attempted to justify a

nation-crippling strike solely on the basis of self-interest, an analyst
could reasonably assert that they have not morally justified their action.

Baier's argument thus serves to establish the notion of common good as
an essential criterion ir evaluating the validity and rationality of all

policies which claim to be moral.

Another moral philosopher concerned with this good-reasons
approach to moral judgment is Stephen Toulmin.

Like Baier, Toulmin

attempts to explain in his Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics

how moral judgments can be justified.

He argues that if we examine

carefully the way moral reasoning is carried out in moral discourse,
certain characteristics become evident.

He concludes from his examina-

tion that moral rules and practices are typically judged on roughly

utilitarian grounds.

Utilitarianism typically states that we should

accept those moral rules and practices which create more pleasure than

pain for society as a whole.

Toulmin actually favors a negative formu-

lation of this criterion, that we ought to accept those rules and

practices which cause the least amount of suffering for humanity.
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He

prefers this formulation because he believes that it is very difficult
to stipulate what will make people happy, but less difficult to deter-

mine what causes suffering.

In any case, he argues that it is roughly

on these grounds that we tend to justify our moral claims

— that

this
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utilitarian reasoning constitutes a good reason for accepting
such a
claim.

There is clearly much truth in Toulmin's thesis; we need only
examine any current policy debate to see that each side typically
tries
to justify its case by arguing that their policy will produce
the

greatest good for the greatest number, or at least will cause less

suffering than their opponents proposals.

This is typically part of

what people mean when they argue that their policy is in the public
interest.

This kind of utilitarian criterion should ring a bell with

policy analysts, for it is roughly equivalent to the Kaldor-Hicks

criterion that is commonly applied in cost-benefit analysis.

This

criterion states that a policy should only be adopted if the societal
benefits exceed the costs, and that we should choose the policy which
produces the most societal benefits (pleasure).

In fact, the cost-

benefit approach to policy analysis can best be understood as the

modern reincarnation of utilitarianism, with dollars and cents used to
measure the pleasure and pain.

The good-reasons approach to ethics

would seem to indicate that cost-benefit analysis is the ideal way to
approach the rational justification of policy goals.

Ironically, then,

it might seem that policy analysts already have a sufficient method for

approaching normative decisions rationally
true.

— but

unfortunately this is not

This utilitarian criterion is useful in a general way, but it is

not sufficient; and as we will see, the manner in which it has been

traditionally pursued by policy analysts has transformed it into a way of

avoiding rather than facing the question of what a good normative judgment
is.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is probably the most popular form of public
policy analysis, in large part because it is a prescriptive form of

analysis which appeals to our common sense.

It offers a precise formula

for choosing between competing policy options: one simply adds up the

costs and benefits of the prospective policies and picks the one which

maximizes the benefits.

But while this approach brings with it all the

appeals of utilitarianism, it also brings with it all of the classical

deficiencies of the ethical theory.

For example, one has to be able

to attach prices to all the costs and benefits,

and this is very diffi-

cult for those social, political, and environmental values which have

been called, "soft," "fragile," and "intangible."

But for our purposes

the main problem with the utilitarian approach of cost-benefit analysis
is the problem of justifying the prices one gives

and benefits involved.

to

the various cost

The choice of policy is obviously dependent on

how we value the various results of the policy.

But how can we justify

those key value judgments, how can the analysts rationally demonstrate
that each cost and benefit is actually worth what they say it is?

Un-

fortunately, though this is obviously the fundamental question in cost-

benefit analysis, analysts seem to work very hard to avoid facing it.
Indeed, they have labored to produce a number of techniques which would

assess values automatically.

This kind of "cop-out" is rooted of course

in the analysts positivist conviction that value judgments cannot be

rational

— that

they are entirely subjective.

Given this assumption,
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they have resorted to devising techniques which would attempt to

measure the value preferences of the individuals in society.

The

favorite technique is to presume that the market price of the costs or

benefits actually represents what they are worth.

The main probl em

with this kind of approach (and utilitarianism is general) is that it
does not give us any kind of critical perspective on the values being

considered.

For instance, nary a thought is given to Oscar Wilde's

warning that one can know everything about prices and nothing about
values.

The analyst is never encouraged to ask if the commodities and

services being considered actually are worth the prices given to them
in the market.

value.

Prices are presumed to represent something's correct

Cost-benefit analysis simply attempts to ascertain what the pre-

vailing prices and values of the public are

— and

does not question them.

As Stokey and Zeckhauser acknowledge, techniques like cost-benefit

analysis are merely intended to "provide a procedure for infering and

pursuing existing values; their role is descriptive and positive, rather
than prescriptive or normative."
Of course, assuming and describing the prevailing values are not
the neutral acts they pretend to be,

for this process lends credence

to those values which happen to be dominant at the time.

It presumes

are
that those public policies which reflect dominant societal values

desirable and should be carried out.

This may seem reasonable until we

consider that societies have been known to be wrong.

The values of the

educational systems,
public can be shaped by irrational fears, by biased
our values, and so
or advertising or propaganda designed to structure
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forth.

In such far from uncommon situations, the traditional analyst

is left with little critical moral leverage.

If a large part of the

public believed that the space program was much more exciting and worth

much more than a program to aid inner-city ghettos, there is nothing
in cost-benefit analysis which would question this assessment.

If the

market puts a high price on the pelts of rare animals, the oil of
whales, and the tusks of elephants, there is little in this traditional

approach which would challenge a policy of hunting them to the point
of extinction.

Moreover, if we were to compute the average value of a

human life at $285,000

— as

has been done by some government analysts

and we find a diamond with a market value of $300,000, given the logic
of cost-benefit analysis, we must conclude that the rock is worth more

than human life.

No questions asked.

Individual analysts could of

course question such judgments on an informal basis; but significantly,
there is nothing in their formal approach which requires or encourages

them to do so

Perhaps what is most impressive about this perspective is not its
lack of morality, but the casual way in which analysts often defend not

having to have a moral perspective.

Consider, for example, the logic

of Arthur Okun:

like other economists, accept people's choices as reasonably
rational expressions of what makes them better off. To be sure,
by a different set of criteria, it is appropriate to ask skeptically whether people are made better off through the production
Are
of more whiskey, more cigarettes, and more big cars
superare
that
there criteria by which welfare can be appraised
defense
Without
ior to the observation of choices people make?
I,

.

.

.
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and without apology, let me simply state that I will not
explore those issues despite their importance. That merely
reflects my choices, and I hope they will be accepted as
reasonably rational. 29

A better example of the faults of this perspective would be hard to
find.

I

see no reason at all to accept Okun's "choice" not to address

such a critical question as being "reasonably rational."

Indeed it

seems a highly irresponsible position for a serious intellectual to

adopt

— and

he probably should apologize for it.

This apparently cava-

lier dismissal of the analyst's moral responsibilities begins to make

more sense when we realize that techniques like cost-benefit analysis
are designed, in part, as ways for analysts and policymakers to avoid
the messy task of making value decisions.

It provides a relatively

painless and automatic calculus for determining the desirability of
policy goals.

I

believe Herman Daly touched on a central truth when

he described cost-benefit analysis as a good example of the "selfimposed blinders that economists habitually wear in order to avoid
on

facing up to some hard issues."

In short, cost-benefit analysis is

certainly a convenient approach if one agrees with public sentiments,
or if one does not want to have to go through any soul-searching in

recommending certain policies.

But it is certainly not a particularly

thoughtful or moral approach.

This is not to say that the utilitarian

criterion is an undesirable one, but simply that for it to be a useful
and critical one, we must have a way of rationally assessing the value

judgments that go into it.

Sound moral judgments about which policies

priorities.
are right or wrong depend on sound value judgments about

judgments are
Thus, instead of simply assuming that everyone's value
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equally correct and rational, we need to be able to criticize people's

value judgments, and especially the way in which people rank various
values.

We must be able to say whether the environment or human life

are really important values, instead of presuming that this is simply
a matter of opinion.

As Robert Dorfman has pointed out, we cannot

truly assess the desirability of a policy unless we can legitimately

make "the assertion that some values are better than other values. "^1
Let us consider one way that might be done.

Evaluating and Ranking Values: The Basic-Needs Approach

One could begin in the spirit of Taylor and Toulmin by asking

whether there is any inherent logic to the way values are commonly
ranked in value discourse.

It is clear that values are often ranked,

and that there is some persistent rationale to this process.

Let us

consider a simple example. It seems reasonable to say that one's house
is more important than one's television, or that one's health is more

important than one's jewelry.
those judgments.

choices so clear.

But why?

Most people would undoubtedly agree with

What is the reasoning that makes those

Basically it is because things like health and shelt

are basic needs, while television and jewelry are conveniences or

luxuries.

Health and shelter are human necessities, while TVs and

diamonds are not.

It is just this rationale, 1 would contend, that

serves as one of the main ways in which we rank values: the most importhe
tant values are those which correspond to basic needs and thus to

continuance of human life.
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In a sense,

the argument being made here is a transcendental

one: one that assumes that giving a high priority to basic human needs
is a necessary characteristic of any human moral or value system.

One

of the fundamental functions of any moral and value system is the pres-

ervation of human existence

— it

would be non-sensical and self-destruc-

tive for such a system to do otherwise.

Values associated with human

basic human needs must necessarily be ranked highly if human life is to
be possible at all.

Thus policies which violate this kind of prioriti-

zation could justifiably be deemed irrational.

Consider a stylized

policy example, a situation of economic depression where there is widespread malnutrition but where farm prices are so depressed that farmers
can no longer make a profit on their produce and are going out of

business.

In such a situation the analyst could legitimately say that

it is irrational for policymakers to put a high value on the preservation
of the market system in agriculture.

To be rational, policymakers must

put a higher priority on encouraging food production

need

— than

—a

very basic human

on ideological purity, and begin to subsidize prices,

nationalize farms, or whatever it takes to pursue the fulfillment of
that need.

Of course, this may simply seem to be common sense

— but

that is exactly my point.

Roughly speaking, then, values can rationally be ranked on a

continuum from basic needs to luxurious or frivolous wants.

Not all

desires need to be thought of as equal, we can rationally say that
give us
some are more fundamental and important, and this can begin to
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the critical leverage we need to assess the priorities
embodied in

public policies.

We can legitimately criticize national priorities,

for example, when they put wants before basic needs.

We can rationally

criticize our nation for spending more every year on jewelry than on
needed decent housing for the poor, or for spending more on pleasure-

boating than on welfare. 3 2

We need not accept these warped priorities

simply because they are an accurate expression of public preferences,

we can justifiably condemn them for putting luxuries before basic needs.
Likewise, the logic of this basic-needs approach would force us
to admit that there is some moral validity to the complaints by many in

the Third World that the United States uses one third of the world vital

energy resources each year and squanders some of that on conveniences
like electric toothbrushes,

big cars,

escalators, air conditioning,

excess lighting, and so forth, while many areas of the world have little
or no oil or electricity for basic domestic or industrial needs.

Oil

supplies are so tight, for instance, that even if these poor countries
could afford to buy the oil they required for their developmental needs,
not enough would be available due to the way in which the U.S. and other

developed countries monopolize the market.

Indeed some have gone as far

to argue that the market system itself is immoral because it allocates

basic resources according to demand instead of according to need.

They

point out for instance that there is enough food in the world to allow

everyone a decent diet, but that malnutrition and starvation are present

because food goes to those countries which can generate the money to
33
afford it, rather than to those countries which desperately need it.
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A major advantage of the basic-needs approach is that
it allows
the analyst to validly give certain values high priority
even though
this is not reflected by the market or in public opinion.

consider the environment.

For example,

There is hardly a more basic need than main-

taining a viable relationship with our natural environment.
and very existence depend on it.

Our health

An analyst who adopts the basic-needs

criterion can justify giving environmental values an important place in
policy evaluations without having to show that the public puts a high

value on them and without having to devise some artificial way to put a
market price on them.

In a sense, environmental values could be con-

sidered to be objectively important values.

In fact,

this is very much

the rationale that was finally adopted by the analysts of the Stanford

Research Institute in their search for a way to rationally choose between
the competing perspectives they were considering.

Recall that when we

saw them last in the preceding chapter, these analysts had concluded that

examination of the facts was not a sufficient way to choose between the
competing paradigms and that they stood on the very edge of value
relativism, without any apparent way to adjudicate between the paradigms.

Aware of the pressing necessity to choose an energy policy path, the
analysts sought some criteria that could fairly be applied to all of the

paradigms

— in

their words, "criteria which are relatively independent of

perception, or rather, would seem reasonable in any perception."

They

concluded that one such criterion concerned whether the paradigms being

considered "lead toward system adaptability and hence, toward survivability."
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Adaptation refers to the process by which living systems
maintain system stability (homeostasis) in the face of
short-term environmental fluctuations and, by transforming
their structures, through long-term nonreversing changes
in their environment as well.
Rappaport has discussed the
conditions under which societies maintain adaptability. He
concludes that "as energy flux has increased, the disparity
-between the direction of cultural change and the goal of
biological survival has widened," raising the question of
whether the continuing growth of high-energy industrialized
society is, in the long term, maladaptive 35
.

Thus this environmental criterion of adaptability can be seen as
an "objective" criterion which can and should be applied to the assess-

ments of the competing normative/ theoretical perspectives used in energy
policy.

In this case, the SRI analysts are suggesting that the per-

spective which assumes and values continuing high energy and economic
growth is irrational in that it neglects this need for adaptability and
could in the long-run threaten our ability to live in our eco-system.

The Human Bias

If it is not evident already,

it should be pointed out that this

basic-needs criterion does rest heavily on the assumption that human life
itself is good and desirable.

Some people, almost exclusively philoso-

phers, would argue that this is a highly questionable assumption, and
thus that this basic-needs approach is an elaborate castle built upon

sand.

There are, however, several acceptable counter-arguments to this

objection.

First, in keeping with the transcendental style of argument

moral
developed throughout this chapter, it could be observed that the

human life.
enterprise itself assumes necessarily that there is value in
The assumption is inescapable.

A concept of morality which denied the

for as Baier
value of human life would be inconsistent and nonsensical,
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observed, "a genuine moral rule must be for the good of human beings. "36

One could of course still deny the value of human life, but this would
also require the abandonment of morality itself

—a

step that few serious

social analysts would be willing to make.

There is also another line of argument which support the assumption
that humans must value human life.

It posits that unless we adopt this

assumption, we will inevitably fall into some serious contradictions.
The point of this argument is best illustrated by the following anecdote.
One day, in a very large and prestigious university, a philosophy pro-

fessor was very disgusted with his class.

He knew they were bright

students, but they were not making an effort to engage the philosophical

questions he posed.

With only a few minutes left in the hour, he

declared that he was going to take a philosophical position and that
everyone would remain until either he was proven wrong or the class
admitted defeat.

He adopted the position that there was no real value

to human life and defended it vigorously.

Try as they might, the students

could not overcome his arguments and soon became sullen and near to

giving up.

At that point a student who had remained silent throughout

raised his hand and made the following statement.

"I am prepared to

accept your position that there is no value to human life," he said to
his teacher, "provided that you commit suicide right here and now in

order to prove it."

Needless to say, the professor quickly admitted

that the central contradiction in his own position had been discovered,

and class was dismissed.
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Avoiding the Materialistic Bias

There is a more practical problem with this basic-needs approach
to value evaluation.

It can tend to exacerbate a tendency in Western

thought to think of basic needs in purely physical or materialistic
terms

— food,

warmth, physical security, and so forth.

Even in the

hierarchy of needs developed by Abraham Maslow, a man who was sensitive
to people's social and psychological needs, material needs are rated as

more basic than those "higher" needs.

There is of course some truth

to this ranking, but the degree of difference between physical and other

kinds of basic needs should not be exaggerated.

Food may be a more

basic need than, say, a sense of belonging and being

loved';

but this

does not mean that a sense of belonging is not a very basic human need
also

— one

that is essential to human life.

Humans clearly have a wide

variety of basic needs: physical, social, emotional, etc.
are necessary for human life as we know it.

vision of what human life consists of.
we do not live by bread alone.

— all

of which

We must have, then, a full

It is not merely biological,

A purely biological existence, without

emotion, contemplation, friendship, and so on could hardly be legiti-

mately considered a human life.

Truly human life could not exist

without some of these values and practices.

Indeed, when people see

little or no possibility of meeting their basic emotional and social
needs, they often consider ending their biological existence.

Or

consider the fact that people often will forego basic physical needs
non-materia!
like sleep, food, and safety in order to pursue these other
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needs.

Thus analysts must be careful to consider the full range of

basic human needs in their evaluations.
It is true that it is not as easy to identify basic social and

political needs as it is to identify basic physical needs.

But again

transcendental arguments are useful in establishing which non-materialistic needs are essential to any policy evaluation.

The work of the

political scientist Charles Anderson is a good example of how this can
be done.

In his article, "The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, "38

he argues that certain political values must be considered essential to
any rational policy analysis.
As standards of policy evaluation, (some political values) are
not simply preferences. They are, in some sense, obligatory
criteria of political judgment. To justify any policy recommendation, one must argue that it is within the legitimate
powers of government, that it is, in some sense, "in the public
interest," that it is consistent with lawful rights, that it
is fair, and efficient in the use of resources. 39
To justify the necessity of invoking these political values he points

out that "certain criteria of choice are inherent in the activity of

politics itself, that they are part of what we mean by "making a

political judgment, or as Wittgenstein might have put it, that they are
part of politics as a 'form of life.'"^*^

In other words, certain values

are part of what constitutes what we mean by a political decision.
In a larger sense, it could be said that values like legitimate

authority and justice are a necessary part of political life.

Much of

the purpose of moral and value systems is not only to make physical

existence possible, but to make political and social existence possible
as well.

We literally could not live together in societies without some
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allegiance to notions like fairness, authority, etc.

A society in

which those kinds of values and needs were consistently being violated
for instance, an illegitimate dictatorship which was viciously oppressive

and unjust

existence.

—would

be unstable and would ultimately undermine its own

Any ongoing, harmonious society would not only have to meet

its citizens physical needs, but their social and political needs as well.

Normative Rationality: Incomplete but Necessary

For some, the excursion into normative philosophy in this chapter

may have seemed largely a waste of time

— for

it is clear to even the

casual observer that many of the rational criteria that we have sought
to establish as valid are already being used by most policymakers in

their decisions.

The consideration of such criteria as justice or

basic needs is already a matter of common usage and common sense in
policymaking.

And indeed this is true

—but

that is exactly the point.

We need an approach to policy analysis which does not ignore or violate
our moral and political common sense

—a

form of analysis which does

not endorse, for example, taking money from the poor and giving it to
the rich, simply because there is a net benefit.

We need a humanistic

form of analysis which can speak to the kinds of reasoning that policy-

makers often try to use in judging policy options; a form which allows
us

to

wade into the center of public policy controversies and be

helpful in sorting them out.

Including criteria like basic needs,

justice, universality, and so forth in public policy analysis is one
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way to create this more humanist form of analysis.

It would help

make this activity less of an abstract intellectual exercise which
the
public and policymakers have difficulty relating to, and more of an

activity which speaks to the concerns of those people.

Only when

analysis begins to deal with policy issues in the terms that are commonly
used

— though

hopefully in a more precise and illuminating way

—will

policy analysis begin to be fully relevant to the real world of politics.
It should be noted that though these criteria begin to add some

rationality to the consideration of the moral and value questions in
policymaking, they do not add up to a complete ra-tionality

.

They do

not always unfailingly serve to indicate the one rational policy path
to pursue.

On the contrary, they can usually only serve as a rough

guide to solving value problems.

This is so for several reasons.

First,

like all human notions, these criteria require interpretation; and there
are inevitably some differences in interpretation.

needs criterion.

Consider the basic

While some physical needs are obviously in the category

of basic necessities,

there could easily be legitimate disagreement

over the status or importance of other needs.

A final and complete

schedule of human needs is probably impossible to determine.^"'"

Further,

sometimes these rational criterion will be in conflict, especially

considering that we have not even touched upon all the different possible
criteria.

It is quite possible,

for example, that a utilitarian

criterion could favor one policy, while a consideration of justice or
basic needs could favor another.

Also, it is not unusual to find

relatively equal values and needs to be in competition.

For example,
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how could we decide whether to put more funds into producing
adequate
health care or into producing an adequate national defense?
pretty basic human needs.

(Of course,

Both are

it could be pointed out that

such choices between basic values are often more difficult in the

abstract than in practice.

For while such values may be equal in the

abstract, they may not be equally fulfilled in reality.

Choices between

such values are made more tractable by determining which of those
values
is currently in most need of fulfillment and favoring those in policy

decisions.

Thus in the case of health vs. defense some have argued

that since we already have the nuclear capability of destroying our

enemies several times over, and since there are still many people without adequate health care in the U.S., we should allocate more of our
funds for health.

Of course others disagree, and although consideration

of degrees of fulfillment may be helpful in clarifying our choices of

value priorities, it too is open to competing interpretations.)
However, in spite of these kinds of limitations,

I

believe that

the rational normative criteria that have been discussed here are an

important aid to concerned policy analysts.

And as Kai Nielson con-

cluded, despite our doubts, it is clear that certain important moral
and value judgments can be arrived at by normative analysis:

Social practices which drastically frustrate our need for sleep,
food, sex, drink, or elimination; or practices that pointlessly
diminish self-esteem, appreciation and concern for others,
creative employment and diversion, or practices that seek to
destroy our tendencies to prise integrity, conscientiousness,
knowledge, and the contemplation of beautiful things are
practices which must be said to be morally inferior to social
practices which do not so frustrate us. This is not to deny
the obvious, namely that there are sharp disagreements over
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the value of some things and that there is even considerable
disagreement about the moral priority of those very things we
universally prize, approve of, or admire. But even with our
less than exact conception of human welfare, we can still
show that there are many sets of social practices both
imaginable and actual that intelligent and correctly informed
people judge without equivocation to be morally inferior to
comparable sets of practices ^-^
.

The point then is that even though normative rationality is incomplete,
it is very useful, and it is both relevant and necessary to the thought-

ful analysis of public policy choices.

The purpose of our excursion

into moral philosophy has been to demonstrate that this attempt to be

moral and political can be a thoughtful and responsible activity, and
that the philosophical excuses which have prevented analysts from

facing up to their moral and political obligations are no longer valid.
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CHAPTER

X

APPLYING MORAL RATIONALITY

From Theory to Practice

Given that rational moral analysis is clearly theoretically
possible, what would this element of a humanistic policy analysis

actually look like in practice?

In this brief chapter,

I

will move

from the philosophical arguments supporting a normative policy analysis
to the consideration of how moral rationality can be applied to a

specific issue in energy policy.

The issue to be addressed is the

desirability of publicly-owned utilities

—a

sub-issue in the debate

over public ownership of energy resources and energy production facilities.

Currently there are more than 3,000 public power systems in the

United States

— including

1,900 municipally-owned systems, 900 rural

electric cooperatives, 100 regionally-owned systems, and
state and federal systems.

a

handful of

In several states there have been movements

toward transforming some privately-owned utility systems into publically-

owned systems.-^

Wherever this attempt has been made, debates have

raged over the desirability of these competing forms of utility ownership.
I

Using the various standards developed in the previous chapter,

will attempt to pass judgment on the rationality and irrationality

of the value judgments and moral arguments that have been a central

part of these policy debates.

I

will indicate when criteria like
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universality are correctly or incorrectly applied, when value
rankings
are questionable, and so forth.

Among the normative areas to be con-

sidered in this analysis are economic values, distributional justice,

political values, and ecological values.

The basic intention here is

to demonstrate that it is quite possible for policy analysts to

rationally analyze the normative dimensions of policy issues and to
arrive at recommendations that are both clear and defensible.

.

Economic Costs and Benefits

Much of the controversy over public ownership concerns the
economic costs and benefits involved.

Will more people be better off

economically under publicly-owned utilities (PCUs) or under private,

investor-owned utilities (lOUs)?

The central question is whether

POUs would mean higher or lower prices for electricity than that

charged by lOUs

.

A consideration of the facts would seem to support

the notion that public power systems are cheaper.

Federal statistics

gathered in 1974 indicated that publicly-owned utilities (municipals
and public utility districts) offered rates that were 29% lower than

those charged by private utilities.

The rates charged by consumer-owned

2
cooperatives were 10% lower than those of the lOUs.

lOUs counter these figures by arguing that much of the difference
in rates is due to the fact that many municipal and public utility

districts pay no local taxes and they also benefit from tax exempt

municipal financing.

lOUs must pay taxes, and they are financed by

regular bonds and the sale of stock to investors.

lOUs appeal to the
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universality criterion and complain that they are not being
treated
fairly, and that both public and private utilities should
pay the

same taxes.
closer.

If this was done,

it is insisted,

the rates would be

Public power advocates retort that POUs should not have to

pay the same taxes as private utilities, that there is a very relevant

difference here: lOUs are profit-making enterprises while POUs are not.
Our government has traditionally considered this to be a relevant

difference, and a legitimate jutification for requiring less taxes for

non-profit, public service organizations.

It is also pointed out that

some POUs do in fact make "payments in lieu of taxes" to local governments, often in amounts that approximate what the lOUs pay in local
taxes
lOUs argue that at least some of the savings experienced by public

power customers may be illusory.

They maintain that the tax breaks

given to public power utilities have to be made up by governments somehow, and that higher taxes on the public will be used to make up for
the lost revenues,

tion.^

though this claim is not supported by any documenta-

In a sense, however, much of this tax dispute is beside the

point, because even if POUs paid similar taxes as the lOUs, in most

cases their rates would still be lower because they are not profit-making

enterprises which must pay dividends to stockholders.

Much of the

millions of dollars that lOUs pay out in dividends every year would be
conceivably saved in a non-profit, publicly-owned utility.

Support for

this is given by an American Public Power Association study which de-

termined that approximately 42% of the lower rates offered by municipals

247

can be traced to their lack of profit margins.^
Of course it should be kept in mind that general figures can

mask individual differences between utilities, and that it is quite
possible, for instance, to find publicly-owned utilities that charge
as high or higher rates than some investor-owned utilities.

But in

general, the figures indicate the POUs tend to offer substantial

economic savings to their customers, and thus can be considered to be

preferable to lOUs on these economic grounds.

The Distributional Issue

Besides questions of which system produces the most economic
benefits, there are also the moral questions of how those benefits are

distributed and which system provides the most desirable and just

distribution of those benefits.

Both public and private systems provide

reliable power to their customers, but there is a basic difference in

how the surplus revenues generated by the utilities are distributed.
The profits from lOUs go to their stockholders, while any profits from

POUs are refunded to the public in various ways.

It is important to

note that on the whole, utility stockholders tend to constitute a small,

financially well-off elite.

In the United States, only one family in

six is comfortable enough to afford to invest in stocks, and approxi-

mately one-tenth of that small group owns 80% of all the stock in the
country.^

In contrast to this small group,

recipient of the surplus profits from POUs.
to

the general public is the

Some POUs return these funds

the public in the form of lower electricity rates in the future,
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others have a policy of refunding excess revenues by reducing local
taxes or improving community services.

One city, Jacksonville,

Florida, has financed the construction of several city buildings with
the help of utility revenues; another, Carthage, Missouri, finances
its fire department with those revenues.

Several of the moral principles that we discussed earlier could
be applied to help indicate which of these distributional schemes is

more just or desirable.

For example, the principle of favoring the

public interest over narrow private interests would seem to clearly

support the case for publicly-owned utilities.

In addition, the needs

criterion developed in the previous chapter would also clearly favor
the POUs.

A system which distributes benefits across the spectrum of

economic classes is more likely to aid in the fulfillment of basic

human needs than a system which diverts benefits to those who are
already relatively well-off.

Lower income and even some middle income

families can use every penny they can get in these inflationary times
to meet their basic needs.

Objectivity Criterion
Some of the arguments in this controversy do not stand up to

standards of objectivity.

Most notably, private utilities have long

contended that private corporations are more efficient than public
organizations.

A specific example of this argument occurred in a 1976

campaign in Massachusetts to create a state-owned utility system.
lOUs contended that such a system would only breed more bureaucracy

inefficiency
and inefficiency, stating that "all are familiar with the
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of government. "8

This proved to be a highly effective argument in

the ultimate defeat of the proposal; but the rationality
and objectivity
of this argument are questionable.
of all,

It has little factual basis.

First

it could be noted that lOUs require state bureaucracies as

well in the form of the state utility commissions which must be
created to regulate them.

Further, experience has shown that public

power systems have had little trouble in attracting the same kind
of able administrators and skilled technicians that are typical of the

private sector.

Finally, federal statistics indicate that in 1973,

municipal utilities were actually more efficient than the ICUs, spending 7% less on operation, maintenance and production expenses than the

lOUs

.

The Massachusetts lOUs indirectly revealed the non-objectivity
of their efficiency arguments by not backing them up with facts and by

resorting to a kind of guilt by association argument.

They argued that

a state-run system would be inefficient because several other state

agencies had been found to be wasteful.

Here is their argument in its

entirety:

There is no reason to believe that a Massachusetts government
power authority will be an efficient, well-run operation. The
track record of government operation in Massachusetts is nothing
The MBTA, and Massachusetts Welfare Department,
to brag about.
among others, are part of the reason that Massachusetts may be
the only state in the nation requiring new taxes in 1975.
This is clearly a scare tactic, since there is nothing in this

argument to demonstrate why a state-owned utility would be liable to the
same problems as the welfare department.

This kind of argument seems
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intended to take advantage of anti-government feelings, and indeed,
ever since the onset of public power systems, private utilities have

sought to equate POUs with a "big-brother" image.

In the 1950s, for

example, when there was a push for more publically-owned utilities,
lOU trade organizations took out advertisements in magazines showing a

man with his daughter and son (who is dressed in an Army uniform)

,

with

the man saying, "Sure, I used to think that it wouldn't do any harm
to have the government run the electric business.

mind.

But I've changed my

Because when government meddles too much in any business, you

get socialism.

And who'd want to leave a socialistic U.S.A. to his

kids?"ll
These kinds of arguments are hardly objective

— they

are not based

on an impartial consideration of the facts of the situation, but rely

heavily on the individuals fear of socialism, or fear of higher taxes.
They cast serious doubt on the objectivity of the lOUs and indicate that
'
their own personal interests are biasing their perception of the issue.

Political Needs

Another area which deserves serious consideration in this moral
analysis is whether basic political needs are given a high priority in
the POUs and the lOUs

.

Specifically it is important to consider how

these two organizations tend to fulfill the need for legitimacy and

accountability in our public institutions.

Increasingly, the American
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public is feeling alienated from the large, centralized institutions
(both public and private) that control so much of their lives.

'

There

is a very strongly felt need to gain more control over these insti-

tutions so that they truly promote the public interest.

Proponents

of public power argue that publicly-owned utilities can be more demo-

cratic and thus more responsible and accountable to the public than
the lOUs.

There are good reasons to believe this.

The board of

directors of an lOU is not accountable to the public at all, but to
the stockholders of the corporation.

Often these directors are not

members of the communities served by the utilities, but representatives
of the large banks which hold interests in the lOUs and from oil and

coal companies which supply them fuel.

In the priorities of the

directors of lOUs then, it is more important to be responsive to their

stockholders than the public.
In contrast to this, most directors of public power systems are

elected by their customers and directly responsible to them.

If the

public is dissatisfied with the policies of a POU, they can elect

different directors that will carry out their will.

For example, in

the West Florida Electric Co-op, officials were under attack because
of rising rates and because they refused to recognize a newly-formed

utilities workers union.

Citizens organized a successful campaign to

defeat all nine incumbent board members, and the new board then fired
the co-op's manager and began bargaining with the union.

Changing the
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board of an lOU is much more difficult, requiring the cooperation of
the stock-holders, who are often not particularly sensitive to the

complaints of consumer groups.

-^-^

lOUs argue that they are under public control, that they are

regulated businesses which are held accountable to the public through
their state utility commissions 1^
.

They must hold public hearings to

justify rate increases, and so forth.

But in practice, this kind of

regulation is often not a very effective check on the utilities.

As

critics have pointed out.

Many private utilities have successfully used their political
clout to influence the selection of the very individuals who
are supposed to regulate them.
For example, in 1975,
Pennsylvania utilities successfully pressured their state Senate
to reject the governor's nomination of two strong consumer
advocates to the state's utility commission. 1^
Moreover, even when public hearings are held, well-financed lOUs often

have the advantage in them.

They are able to marshall experts and

studies that overshadow the efforts of overworked and understaffed

citizen groups and commission staffs.
It is important to note that not all publicly-owned power systems

are responsive to their customers.

Experience has shown that the larger

and more centralized these institutions are, the less responsive they
tend to be.

This is most true on the federal level where organizations

like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Admins tration have both been severely criticized by citizens groups for their

arrogance and insensitivity to criticism from the public.

In contrast

were more
to this, one study found that the public utilities that
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responsive and lenient concerning disconnect and deposit
policies,

were those "in small towns where the utility officials know
many of
their customers. "16

Decentralization may foster more responsiveness,

but it certainly does not guarantee it.

Even small publicly-owned

utilities can be unresponsive to the public, if the public does not
seek to take an active part in making and influencing the decisions
of
the utility.

Professionals on any level tend to resent the "inter-

ference" of the public in their decisions, and often must be forced to
take into account the wishes of the public.

However, despite these

problems, it does seem the public utilities, and especially the smaller
ones, offer a better opportunity for responsiveness to the public than
lOUs do.

Ecological Needs

For the utilities, the needs of the environment are usually

embodied in the issue of conservation.

Conserving on electricity pro-

duction not only lowers the ecological damages and risks associated with
recovering and transporting energy resources like coal and oil, but it
also lowers the damage caused to the environment and human health by
the burning of these fuels

etc.).

(acid rains,

the problems with SO2 and CO2,

Despite the importance of conservation, there is reason to

believe that private utilities tend to rank profits ahead of conservation.
lOUs place a very high value on making profits, that is part of their

purpose.

Profit levels in lOUs are generally fixed by state commissions

as a set percentage

facilities.

(

~

12%-13%) of their capital investment in their

Thus if profits are to increase, they must build more plants
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and sell that increased amount of electricity.

Conservation is

obviously incompatible with this built-in drive toward expansion.

As

one Florida utility executive said, "If we succeed in getting the public
to conserve energy to the point where our revenues drop 15 to 20 per-

cent, we may all be looking for a job.''^-^

As a result of this logic,

many of the conservation programs adopted by lOUs have not been particularly agressive.

Publicly-owned utilities do not have to maximize profits, and as
a result, many of these utilities have led the way in encouraging con-

servation by their customers.

For example, Seattle City Light and Los

Angeles Department of Water and Power are two municipal utilities that
have initiated impressive conservation programs.

Facing the serious

need to conserve, Seattle began a Kill-a-Watt program which reduced

electricity use by 7% in the first year, while in Los Angeles the
savings was over 15%.

A report by the Rank Corporation attributed

much of the success of the L.A. program to the fact that it was a

municipal facility and could command the full resources of the city
government in its efforts.-'-^

Much of the problem of conservation of electricity can be traced
to a tendency to charge large commercial and industrial customers lower

rates than residential users.

Sometimes this takes the form of what

is called "declining block rates" whereby lower rates are charged as

consumers increase their use of electricity.

Both public and private

utilties have been guilty of engaging in this kind of wasteful rate
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structuring.

But federal statistics reveal that the differential

between industrial and residential users tends to be more than
twice
as small for publicly-owned utilities than for lOUs."*-^

Moreover, while

most lOUs have vigorously opposed proposals to modify their rate
structures, public power systems have been more amenable to change.

As

early as 1975, the American Public Power Association maintained that

"new types of rate structures, designed to conserve resources
should be followed by the industry. "^^

.

.

.

A specific example is the city

of Wellesly Massachusetts, whose municipal utility has eliminated block

rates and designed a system of flat rates.

Besides encouraging con-

servation, these rates were thought by most city residents to be more
equitable.
In terms of the environment, a final point against the lOUs has

been their general reluctance to pursue or encourage the development of
alternative, renewable sources of energy like solar and wind power.

Not

only do such sources save on non-renewable resources, their environmental

impacts also tend to be less serious.

As a rule, lOUs have been apathetic

about these alternative sources, arguing that they can only be viable in
the distant future.

A report done for the Florida Energy Committee by

the consulting firm of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton concluded that "the

utility stance is to avoid, and even possibly to discourage, solar energy
development, out of the apprehension that the only result can be a

reduction in utility revenues.

Solar energy is viewed essentially as a

threat which the utilities have not yet determined how to turn into- a

benefit.
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On the other hand, some publicly-owned utilities have
also had
a record of apathy towards alternative energy sources
and hostility

toward their advocates.

But again,

this problem is most typical of

those POUs that are large and federally owned— like the TVA.

Some of

the more decentralized public power system have been more
open to these

alternatives.

For example, some rural co-ops have been promoting the

use of solar crop dryers as an alternative to ones using electricity or
propane.

The head of one solar dryer project run by the East River

Electric Power Co-operative justified their project by arguing that "rural
electric co-operative are interested in far more than just selling

electricity to their members. "^^

Conclusions

In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that a policy

supporting the predominance of private, investor-owned utilities in
the United States is an irrational one.

In terms of values,

they put

profits ahead of environmental needs, and they put allegiance to special

private interests before responsiveness to the public and the public
interest.

This kind of value ranking is warped, and can only seem reason-

able if one is a member of the interest groups that benefit from lOUs.

Even if there is not an economic advantage to POUs, they would probably
still be the most rational form for utilities because their structure

allows for the maximization of important ecological and political values,
that can easily be neglected by the lOUs.

A rational assessment of the
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moral and value issues involved, thus clearly favors a policy encouraging the creation of more public utilities

— preferably

on the most local

level possible.
Of course, not all rational investigations of the normative issues

surrounding policy issues will produce results as clear as these.

But

this example shows that it is quite possible to make rational normative

recommendations concerning public policies, and that this can help to
ensure that our public policies are morally legitimate.
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CHAPTER

XI

POLICY ANALYSIS AS POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Freedom is not merely the chance to do as one pleases; neither
is it merely the opportunity to choose between set alternatives.
Freedom is, first of all, the chance to formulate the available
choices, to argue over them and then, the opportunity to choose.
That is why freedom cannot exist without an enlarged role of
human reason in human affairs.

—

C. Wright Mills

The Sociological Imagination

All styles of policy analysis have political implications.

This

chapter will explore the political implications of the humanist-non-

positivist/normative approach that has been set out in the previous
chapters.

Are there substantial political disadvantages or biases in

this approach?

For instance, might it not be argued that the possibility

of a normative policy analysis would only encourage analysts to think of

themselves as moral or ethical "experts?"

This would only worsen the

problem of technocracy that is already inherent in policy analysis.

We

would not only have policy experts directing technical policy decisions,
but analysts seeking to dictate value decisions as well.

disturbing possibility
technocracy

— that

— the

possibility of encouraging a kind of moral

could make many policy analysts reluctant to embrace

value analysis as part of their craft.
so,

It is just this

Many might feel, and justifiably

that they have no right to be making moral decisions for others.

In fact, one reason that techniques like cost-benefit analysis are so
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popular is that they seem more democratic, in the sense that
the
analysts are only trying to measure public values and are
(supposedly)
not in a position to impose their individual values on the public.

While it might be acknowledged that the moral relativism typical
in

cost-benefit analysis has its problems, it could be argued that the

moral dogmatism and moral dictatorship would be even worse.
However, the case can be made that normative analysis actually

discourages the possibility of moral technocracy.

Indeed, there is a

much greater danger of moral technocracy in the scientistic approach
than in the normative.

For as we have seen, in the scientistic approach

there is a tendency for value judgments to be introduced surreptitiously
in the form of tacit modelling assumptions, objective looking cost-

assessments, etc.

It is much easier for analysts to impose their value

judgments on policymakers by disguising them as "value-free recommendations" than it would be if moral and value judgments were recommended
to policymakers in an axplicit and straightforward manner.

Hidden values

biases in policy studies may escape detection by policymakers and the
public, but clear and open value recommendations would not.

In this

sense, normative analysis would actually help to undermine the possibility
of moral technocracy by clearly labelling value judgments and thus exposing

them to criticism and discussion for what they are.

And while policymakers

might bow to the technical recommendations of analysts, it is unlikely that

many would naively accept explicit value judgments without question.

As
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I

have continually stressed, policy analysts have little power
to

actually impose their views upon policymakers or the public, and
this would be especially true in the area of moral and value
judgments.

Furthermore, a correct understanding of the nature of the

knowledge addressed by normative policy analysis mitigates against a
dogmatic or technocratic approach to policy judgments.

I

took pains

to point out that although one can approach moral and value judgments

rationally, that rationality can never be complete or fool-proof.

While

it is certainly possible to label some moral judgments to be irrational,

and to conclude that some value rankings are not justifiable, the

rational status of many moral and value judgments is quite debatable and
there can be genuine disagreement by rational and impartial people.

In

this sense, moral knowledge is often tentative, and must be left open to

question.

It simply lacks the kind of precision and accuracy that is

needed to justify a technocratic approach.

Normative analysis simply

cannot produce the kind of indisputable, objective answers that would

justify letting a moral "expert" make the final decisions on these
matters.

Instead, the inherent tentativeness of normative knowledge would

more likely serve to support an argument for a more democratic approach
to these decisions.

For it could be reasonably argued that if it is not

possible to arrive at some final, objective answer to policy questions,
such decisions should ultimately be left up to the public or its legitimate

representatives.

If knowledge cannot be an unambiguous guide to policy

choices, we must turn to democratic decision-making mechanisms which ex-

press as directly as possible the choices of the entire public

legitimize public policy choices.

— to
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Tentativeness is not only a characteristic of moral knowledge,
but of other areas of human knowledge as well.

As noted in prior chap-

ters, our knowledge about the socio-economic theories which help
to

guide policy decisions is also somewhat tentative.

Because of the

nature of social reality, these theories simply cannot be "proven" true
or false in the same way as theories can in the natural sciences.

Thus

social theories are another crucial area of human knowledge where our

knowledge is probably not precise or reliable enough to justify letting
experts make the final decisions.

As I suggested earlier, it makes

much more sense to encourage a policy research system which produces a
pluralistic variety of socio-economic theories, with the final choice

being made again through some legitimate democratic mechanism.
We might even extend this argument into that most objective area
of knowledge, "facts"; for even in issues of scientific fact, where

clear, undisputable answers are at least theoretically possible,

definitive, unambiguous answers are usually not forthcoming in practice.

More often than not, respected scientific experts disagree about the
facts of the matter in environmental impacts, or nuclear safety, or
the extent of our energy reserves.

Scientists are typically found lining

up on both sides of policy disputes, and so are the facts.

And so again

it must ultimately be up to the public to choose which expert to believe

and which set of facts is most reasonable and important.

All of which

is not to say that we do not need good policy research, but only that

a non-positivist understanding of the limited and tentative nature of
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human knowledge requires that we approach that research with a healthy
sense of doubt, and that we should not rely on "experts" to settle

crucial policy questions.

In this sense, while positivistic and

scientistic forms of policy analysis can give the illusion of objectivity
and scientific precision upon which technocratic arguments are built,
a non-positivist approach cultivates a doubt which is anti-technocratic

and pro-democratic.

As E.E. Schattschneider was fond of saying,

"Democracy is a political system for people who are not sure that they
are right. "'•

From Pollster to Provocateur

The activity of normative policy analysis is not only compatible

with democracy, it may even do more to encourage it than traditional
forms of policy analysis.
a much different

— and

For example, the normative approach implies

probably more helpful

in the democratic political process.

— role

for the policy analyst

The traditional public choice/cost-

benefit analysis approach fosters what could be termed the "Pollster"
model of the analyst's role in the democratic process.

In this model,

the job of the analyst is to enhance the democratic process by attempting
to gather up whatever the public's individual value judgments are

— either

through use of market prices, questionnaires, or observation of previous

choices

— and

to try to use them as a standard for recommending certain

public policy choices.
the policymaker.

In essence,

the analysts serves as a pollster for

But one of the problems with this approach is that there

is no guarantee that what is collected is the public's best or most

thoughtful judgments.

It is simply assumed that since moral and value
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judgments are essentially subjective, the individual's choice must be

accepted as rational.

But in practice, most peoples' buying habits and

value judgments are affected by all kinds of irrational and unconscious
factors.

Those choices can be shaped by advertising, socialization,

irrational fears, propoganda, personal prejudices, and so on.

A pollster

approach does little to make people conscious of these factors or to
encourage more rational and thoughtful judgments on their part.
In contrast, the assumptions contained in normative analysis

encourage the analyst to bring forth the best judgments by the public.

If

it is realized that some degree of rationality in moral and value judgments
is actually possible,

then the task of the analyst is not merely to try

to collect individual opinions, but to encourage and enable those citizens
to make the most thoughtful and rational judgments possible.

Thus in-

stead of assuming the legitimacy of the individual's priorities, the

analyst might actually challenge and even criticise those priorities.
The analyst could use the criterion of rational normative judgments to

analyze and critique the judgments and lines of argument being made in
the public realm.

In this sense,

the role of the analyst changes from

pollster to provocateur; and the public policy analyst becomes a public
policy analyst who is interested in making his or her analysis public in
order to stimulate more informed and rational public judgments.

This is

exactly why it is important for the normative policy analyst to take

reasoned stands on policy issues and to make those stands as public as

266

possible, through publications of studies, press releases, talk show

appearances, or whatever.

This needs to be done, not because these

stands should be considered to be the final answer to a particular

policy problem, but because such stands are an effective way of stimulating critical public thought on policy issues.
Furthermore, despite its democratic pretensions, the traditional

pollster approach to policy analysis does very little to encourage
the public to actually become engaged in democratic processes of

policymaking.

Indeed, the thrust of this approach is to attempt to

devise elaborate ways to discern the policy preferences of the public

without their ever having to become involved in the political process
at all.

Now besides the fact that many of these elaborate "polling"

techniques are of questionable accuracy, this approach totally neglects
the fact that the essence of a healthy democratic system is an intelli-

gent and actively involved public.

It also somehow neglects the fact

that one of the best ways for the public to express their policy

preferences is to do so directly

—by

becoming actively involved in

influencing policymakers and the policymaking process.

Thus it seems

that if an analyst is truly interested in promoting democratic choices
of policies, he or she had best adopt the role of provocateur, and

attempt to stimulate more informed and thoughtful public participation
in the policymaking process.

can be done.

Let us consider several ways in which this
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Friedman, Commoner, and the National Issues Forum

We needn't consider hypothetical examples, for there are several
real example people and programs that have adopted this more publically

oriented, provocateur role.

On an individual level, analysts like

Milton Friedman and Barry Commoner, though they are of very different
political persuasion, share a passion for provoking public thought.

Both

are deeply interested in our pressing policy problems and are committed
to specific and sometimes provocative recommendations to solve those

problems.

Both have written extensively for the public, both in popular

magazines like Newsweek and the New Yorker
enjoyed large public readerships.

,

and in books that have

To be sure, each of these men speaks

to a different public, but they have sought to get their arguments heard

by anyone who would listen to them, and have made significant contri-

butions to the public debates over economic, energy, and environmental
problems.

Not all analysts can become national figures like these two,

but it is surely possible for most analysts to become more publically
active in their local political areas.

A more institutional example of this approach is the National Issues
Forum on energy policy called "Energy and the Way We Live."

This

ambitious program was carried out during February, March, and April of
1980 by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges with

funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the U.S.

Department of Energy.^ The program was an effort to use the mass media
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and public forums to facilitate a "serious and thoughtful examination
of past, present, and future dimensions of the energy issue""^ by the

citizens in several hundred communities nationwide.

In each community,

the local newspapers ran a series of 15 weekly newspaper articles on

various aspects of our energy problem that were written by a number of

different energy policy analysts and experts.

On Saturday afternoons,

the National Public Radio station in each community ran a series of

seven consecutive weekly broadcasts on related energy issues.

Com-

munities ran Energy Fairs and tours of local energy facilities and solar
houses in conjunction with this media campaign.

And finally there was

a series of forums or town meetings in which local energy experts,

humanists,

and city and county energy planners discussed the nature of

the energy problem with each other and the public audience who attended.

This kind of coordinated effort served as an excellent opportunity for

both local and national energy planners and analysts to share their

information and recommendations with members of the public.

How successful are such programs?

Unfortunately it is very diffi-

cult to say; for although these programs are obviously desirable, it is

quite difficult to measure their exact impacts.

For example, it is hard

listened
to have any clear idea of how many people read the articles, or

will affect
to the radio shows, whether they learned anything, or how it
their future actions.

One of the only significant figures available on

took part
this particular project is that approximately 150,000 people
in the community forums nationwide.

This is a figure that some program
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officials considered disappointing.

Others argued that this poor

attendance was due to cases of poor publicity, or the fact that
by
1980 many of the public have already been able to familiarize them-

selves with our energy problems/

In any case,

even though results of

such programs are difficult to measure, it seems clear that such
public

education programs can only be a positive contribution to raising the
level of critical public understanding of complex issues like energy

policy.

A Dialogical Approach to Policy Analysis

It should be emphasized that critical public thought on policy

Issues is best stimulated not by public education
of views from the analyst to the public

— but

in give and take dialogue with the public.

—a

one-way transfer

by the analyst engaging

Critical thought is best

cultivated not in individual isolation, but in public, by participating
in arguments and discussions.

One learns to question one's own theories

and assumptions by having other people do so.^

One learns to be more

thoughtful about one's values by having one's moral inconsistencies

pointed out by others.

Paulo Friere, the respected Brazilian philoso-

pher/educator has argued that "authentic thinking does not take place
in ivory tower isolation, but only in communication

.

.

.

Only dialogue,

which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical
thinking."^
This suggests that the role of the analyst is not only to make

recommendations, but to engage the public and policymakers in analytical
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discussion, to share with them the analytic process itself.

This

could be called a "dialogical" approach to policy analysis.

Such an

approach could serve as a viable middle path between the twin
pitfalls
of merely letting superficial public opinions determine public
policy

and allowing an intellectual elite to make those decisions in an

undemocratic manner.

By engaging the public in analytical policy

dialogue, the analyst can put his or her expertise and knowledge to
good use, but in a manner that is consistent with democratic processes
and values.

Unfortunately, however, initiating such discussion is not

always an easy task.

For example, even policymakers, who are often

relatively accessible to staff analysts, sometimes prefer only brief

written summations of policy studies (Robert MacNamara was fond of
saying, "I can read faster than you can talk,"); and most policymakers
are not eager to critically discuss their own values and assumptions,

especially with analysts they consider their subordinates.

It is even

more difficult to engage in dialogue with the public at large.

The

public is not readily accessible to the analyst, and so they must take

responsibility to create opportunities for discussion.

This may

involve things like attending or even helping to organize meetings with
civic and community groups.

Staff policy analysis should try to take

advantage of the public hearings held by most government bodies, and
attempt to turn them into an opportunity to engage in dialogue with the
public.

Let us consider how this could be done.

Creating Interactive Public Hearings

Several important changes would have to be made in the way
that
public hearings are approached and structured if they are to
become

situations where true discussion and exchanges with the public can take
place.
1.

Instead of being attempts at one way communication, with

either the staff analysts overwhelming the public with
long "educational" presentations or various spokespeople

reading long-winded, formal statements, hearings should be

made as interactive as possible, with give and take exchanges between the public and policymakers and analysts.
In part, this means that the public must have the oppor-

tunity to ask policymakers and analysts questions, to

Identify Issues to be discussed, and to be generally treated
as equals in these situations.
2.

To facilitate discussion, policy proposals should be in

non- technical, non-bureaucratic language that is easily

understood by the general public.

Also, scholars of citi-

zen participation techniques uniformly agree that public

participation in helping to analyze and formulate public
policies is most effective when the value Issues involved
in the policy are emphasized.

8

This suggests that analysts

should spend less time on the technical issues involved
and more on provoking discussion about the various moral
and value judgments Imbedded in the various policy

proposals, a topic that people usually feel more
comfortable
and confident about addressing.
3.

Most traditional public hearings are dominated by
special
interest groups who have both the time and money to
take
part in these meetings.

If

the analyst is truly interested

in a dialogue with the whole public, or a representative

sample of the community, they must take steps to ensure
that this is possible.

Hearings notices must be adver-

tised where the public is likely to see them, not, as is

typically done, by simply inserting a small notice in the
legal sections of newspapers.

Also, hearings should be

held at convenient times and at places that are readily

accessible to the public

— for

example, holding a hearing

in the evening at a neighborhood school.

Finally, analysts

should support programs to give various public groups
financial assistance to enable them to prepare for and
attend important public hearings.^

Those few government agencies which have begun to experiment with
this kind of interactive approach have produced some promising results.

For example, Barry Checkoway, a perceptive critic of traditional public

hearings, has cited an innovative hearing approach used by the North-

eastern Illinois Planning Commission in their consideration of the
Chicago regional transportation plan.

9

In order to reach the most public,

they conducted the hearing at a local television station.

Sixty tele-

phones and tape recorders were staffed by volunteers in the studio to
enable viewers to submit testimony and to ask questions which the
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planners answered during the broadcast.

The commission found, unsur-

prisingly, that many more citizens expressed their view and suggestions
than at any previous hearing, and more importantly, those suggestions

resulted in 23 changes in the final plan.

Another promising example is a series of experimental, interactive
style hearings that were held by the Virginia Department of Health in
order to get citizen input for a porposed state health plan.

Before

each of the hearings was to take place, the department staff analysts

made every attempt to notify people who might be interested in or affected
by the proposed policy.

They used the mass media, posters, and even

direct mailings to announce the meetings.

Instead of using the usual

courtroom or auditorium-like set up, the staff searched out large accessible rooms with movable tables and chairs
the hearing,

— like

school cafeterias.

At

the public was presented with written summaries of the policy

proposal and was given a brief and lively presentation by staff analysts.
The presentation included, among other things, the steps followed in

developing the proposal, the key individuals involved in defining the
problems and solutions, and the definition of the problem and solution

offered by the proposal.

Participants were then broken down into small

discussion groups (6-8 people) and a discussion of the policy plans was
conducted with a staff person acting as a facilitator.

Each group ana-

lyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals, and developed a

prioritized list of suggested modifications which was eventually presented to the whole group.

At the end of the hearing, individual

itself
questionnaires were handed out and collected, and the staff made

available for informal discussion.
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According to Bryan Tomlinson, Director of the Department of
Health Planning, such an innovative approach was not easy to set

up.''"^

He had to spend much time "selling" this approach to the Plan Develop-

ment Committee, and finally had to agree to abandon it quickly if any
problems were encountered.

He also pointed out that such a format

requires a staff that is enthusiastic about this kind of participatory

experiment.

They must be willing to be trained as discussion facili-

tators, and to stay with this difficult and sometimes frustrating
task.

But the pay-offs were even greater than expected.

As Michael

Appleby, a professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute who was instru-

mental in designing and Implementing this format, observed,
Hearings, which were previously a form of the theatre of
cruelty, became productive.
Staff analysis of the hearings
showed a huge increase in the quantity and quality of comments
over traditional hearing formats. The process often Involved
angry doctors who, upon becoming engaged in the review,
decided not to formally present a prepared speech and instead,
The
became involved in a constructive give and take
staff still speaks of the hearings as the best event of the
year and recounts the tense moments in attempting a new process

....

Not only were the citizen's comments more detailed and of better quality,
but as Tomlinson pointed out, because of face-to-face contact with those
citizens, the staff analysts were better able to understand what the

comments meant.

"Staff people came out with a very strong sense of

One-on-one discussions gave them a better feel

what the public wanted.
for what was being said.

but why they held it.

They not only got to know a person's view,

They got to know where a person was coming from.
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No question it was a great leap over the traditional format."
Citizen

evaluations were equally enthusiastic; they were mostly

8

'

to 10 on a

10 point scale.

Tomlinson's staff also made a unique attempt to let the public

know what happened to their suggestions and criticisms.

They drew

up a lengthy document which listed each suggestion, how it was ranked

by each hearing throughout the state, its rationale, the staff's

analysis of the suggested change, and what the Planning Committee
finally decided.

According to Tomlinson, the process of ranking the

suggested changes was one of the most important parts of the experiment,
for it proved quite helpful in indicating which of the many suggestions

made by citizens were considered most important by most of those at
the hearings.

This combined with the discussion yielded a very good

sense of what changes were crucial to make

— and

why.

Tomlinson's only

regret was that these hearings did not take place earlier, so that

citizen Input could have been used at the very beginning of the development of the policy plan.

An important point here is that not only did this dialogical
approach foster a better informed and more involved public, but it also

produced a better policy.

Over 230 changes were made in the final stat

health plan as a result of those interactive hearings.

We tend to forg

that policy analysts can learn much from encounters with the public.
very
But Bryan Tomlinson stresses that the interactive hearings "were a

educational experience for the staff."

As Paulo Freire maintains, one

like all
person can only have a partial view of reality; and analysts,
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specialists, tend to become isolated and narrowly focused on their
areas of expertise.

Dialogue with the public can perforin the vital

service of pulling the analyst out of that narrow perspective, it
can sensitize them to issues, perspectives, and arguments that they

may not have considered seriously.
cases it is the public

public policies

—who

— those

To give only one example, in many

who actually live with the effects of

are the experts on how useful or effective those

politics really are.

As one of the earliest policy analysts, Aristotle,

argued, "[a house] is something which can be understood by others

beside the builder: indeed the user of the house
the householder

—will

— or

in other words

judge it even better than he does.

In the same

way, a pilot will judge a rudder better than a shipwright does: and
the diner

— not

the cook

—will

be the best judge of the feast.

In

other words, policy analysts would be negligent in their duty to produce
the best public policies if they did not take advantage of the unique

knowledge that can be gotten from direct encounters with the public at
large

Integrative Policy Analysis

Interactive hearings are basically a way of including more of the
public in the very process of policy analysis and planning; and the

reasoning behind this that the more input and dialogue we have in this
process, the more it will enhance that chance of producing more rational

public policies.

To take off on Schattschneider

's

earlier comment:
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democracy may be the best political system for making sure that
we
are right

— in

the sense that policy rationality is enhanced by free

and extensive democratic dialogue.

But a dialogical approach to policy analysis may also prove

helpful in improving the effectiveness of public policies in another way
as well.

One of the main obstacles to the solution of some of our

current social problems is not the lack of good policy studies and

recommendations, but the substantial gap that exists today between the

policymakers and the public.

Even when policymakers are democratically

elected, there is no guarantee that their policy decisions will actually

reflect the will of the public, and in those cases where it does not,
public resistence can inhibit public policies.

As we say in Chapter 4,

the temptation in these situations is to resort to methods of manipula-

tion in an effort to impose the "right" policy upon the public.

Policymakers and analysts seek the correct independent variable which

will produce the desired public behavior.

But efforts to manipulate or

control the public often only increase the alienation

Dialogical policy analysis may offer an alternative to

and lawmakers.
this.

between citizens

Interactive public hearings, for example, could help to ensure

at least some public input before policy decisions are made, and this

could enhance the chances that these policies will gain public acceptance

and support.

This is especially likely if citizen input is present from

the very beginnings of the policy planning process.

This approach is a good example of what "policy as promising"

could look like.

"Policy as promising" was a notion based on the ideas
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of Hannah Arendt that was briefly discussed in Chapter 4
as an alter-

native to "policy as control."

This alternative posited that truly

effective public policies were not those which were imposed on the
public from the top-down, but those which embodied the public's under-

standing and agreement as to the correct policy action to take in a
given situation.

Activities like interactive hearings are one mechanism

by which policies can begin to be designed by those who are ultimately

responsible for living them out

— the

public.

Of course, one of the main problems' with the viability of this

approach is that we don't currently have a public in the United States;

we have many different publics, many different interest groups which
are often in conflict.

Indeed, these basic disagreements between these

publics are probably a much more serious obstacle to effective policies
than the alienation between policymakers and the public.

We live in a

deeply divided society, where serious conflicts and stalemates between

interests groups can prevent the development of coherent policy solutions
to our social problems.

And even if rational plans are developed, power-

ful interest groups can block their passage, or their effective imple-

mentation.

In a society where these kinds of conflicts and deadlocks

exist, even the most thorough and thoughtful policy analyses, even the

best normative/non-positivist analyses are insufficient, because the
central problem is not an analytical or intellectual one

— it

is a

political problem.
Standard forms of policy analysis are of little help in these conflictual situations, for they too only attempt intellectual solutions.

279

For example, analyses based on economic theory usually take
competition
and conflict for granted, and merely attempt to calculate
the most

efficient policy— the one which best maximizes the satisfaction of
the

conflicting groups.

Given a conflict between coal operators and

environmentalists, for example, the rational economic approach would be
to attempt to split the difference and discover that policy produces

the most coal and the most environmental protection.

But often it does

little good to simply calculate the "best" policy, if the basic conflict is left intact.

For, in practice, the result is that the conflict-

ing parties usually continue to inhibit policy agreement in the legis-

lative branches, and to block implementation through court challenges,

intentional misreadings of the policy, and so on.

And this in fact has

been the case in coal policy, with both environmentalists and coal
companies adopting obstructionist tactics against policies they oppose.
However, a dialogical approach to policy analysis could begin to

provide a way around these kinds of problems.

Instead of seeing their

role as being purely intellectual, policy analysts could begin to get

involved in the political conflicts and negotiations between competing
interests groups.

And instead of simply assuming that competing values

are purely subjective and must be taken as given, the analyst can

attempt through rational argument and persuasion to change the value
positions of the conflicting parties and bring them more into harmony.
It is certainly possible,

for example,

that by engaging in authentic,

critical dialogue, conflicting parties could become aware of unconscious
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assumptions or disguised motives which are irrational or
questionable.
Or they could be made aware of previously unknown
rationalities in

opponents positions.

After all, rationality rarely inhabits only one

side of an argument.

Dialogue between parties could also help to

eliminate distortions, or to reveal previously hidden common concerns.
All of these possible effects of dialogue could produce changes in

opponents positions and bring them closer together in terms of values
and policy proposals.

Thus, by encouraging reasoned dialogue not only

between analysts and the public, but among differing segments of the
public as well, the analyst could help to undermine the conflicts which
are interfering with effective policy actions.

This dialogical approach is similar to what Paul Diesing has
termed an "integrative approach" to social problems.
in Society

.-^-*

In his book. Reason

Diesing argues, like many non-positivist theorists, that

all societies require shared values and consistent beliefs to exist and

Persistent conflicts over beliefs and values weaken and de-

prosper.

stabilize societies and lead to continuing deadlocks and stalemates which
inhibit effective social action.

In such situations, he argues, "social

rationality" dictates that an attempt be made to mend those social splits
and to integrate divergent value positions.

In the integrative approach,

"the competing desires and habits of which all problematic situations

are composed" are not simply taken as given, but are perceived as "symptoms
of a

.

.

.

social system in conflict."

One attempts to resolve such con-

flicts by an "integrative process in which the desires are changed rather
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than satisfied.

And according to Diesing, an essential part of this

integrative approach is the establishment of "discussion relationshipstalking and listening, asking questions and answering them, suggesting
courses of action and adopting
-

them."-'-^

Admittedly, this dialogical/integrative approach to policy prob-

lems could easily be labeled optimistic, or even idealistic in terms
of the amount of faith it puts in the human capacity to settle con-

flicts through reason.

solved in this way.

Obviously, some conflicts are too basic to be

And Diesing is careful to point out that even

when this approach is effective, it is
process.-'-^

a laborious and time-consuming

It could take years for entrenched positions to change

to any degree.

And yet despite these problems,

I

would argue that we

must have faith in the potentialities of human reason
but a reasoned faith.

— not

a naive faith,

A reasoned faith is one based upon the notion of

self-fulfilling prophecy that was discussed earlier.

The success or

failure of rational discussion is in part a matter of self-fulfilling

prophecy

— it

depends partially on the beliefs that we bring to it.

If

we assume, like some, the inevitability of conflicting values, discussion has little chance of success.

Conversely, if we enter into

discussion with some faith in our ability to resolve those conflicts,
our chances for success are heightened.

Faith in our ability to reason

together certainly does not ensure success, but it is a necessary pre-

condition.

In this sense, such faith is not simply a naive hope, but

a deliberate political act.

In any case, we need not base our evaluation
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of the potentials of dlaloglcal analysis merely on theory,
there

are some concrete examples of this approach which can be
examined.

Dialogue in Practice; Environmental Mediation

One example of a dialogical/integrative approach is the relatively

new phenomena of environmental mediators.

These mediators enter into

situations of conflict over environmental standards and attempt to

negotiate a compromise policy that the various parties can agree upon.
One successful example of this approach involved the attempts of the

New England Electric's Brayton Point, Mass., power plant to convert from
oil to coal.

The Department of Energy was insisting on the conversion

and also requiring the installation of costly scrubbers needed to

prevent an increase in air pollution, a requirement also endorsed by
area environmentalists.
scrubbers.

The utility insisted it could not afford the

The conflict intensified until David O'Connor, an environ-

mental mediator, convinced all sides to come together to exchange
information.

One year and eighteen meetings later a compromise settle-

ment was accepted by all parties.

It was agreed to allow the utility

to install less costly environmental equipment that would keep emission

Harold Keohane,

levels comparable to that of an oil fired facility.

a regional DOE official estimated that the conversion would lower fuel

costs by $20 million a year, while "nothing was given away on the
environment."-'-^

A more ambitious example of this approach was

a

project which

attempted to bring together environmentalists and coal companies on a
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national level.

Needless to say, coal policy has been one of the

most controversial and frustrating areas of our national
energy plan.
On the one hand we have enormous domestic potential in coal—
some say
over 300 years worth at current consumption rates.

Exploiting these

reserves could mean decreased dependence on foreign oil and large

profits for those companies involved in coal production.

On the other

hand, there are the numerous health and environmental impacts that

would come from increased coal use.
of conflicting values and interests

This is a classic policy problem

—with

the coal companies and

utilities on one side and the environmentalist on the other.

And as

might be expected, the fight over coal policy has been characterized
by vilification, ad hominem attacks, and oversimplification by both
sides.

The intensity of the feelings in this situation would seem to

make it one of the least promising for a dialogical/integrative approach
to analysis of these issues.
18
And yet an undertaking called the National Coal Policy Project

demonstrates how useful this approach can be even in difficult areas
like coal.

The project, jointly headed by the corporate energy manager

for Dow Chemical Company and a former president of the Sierra Club, was
a yearlong series of meetings between leading conservationists and top

and middle-rank executives from coal-mining and coal-consuming industries,

Many of the participants themselves were cynical about the possible worth
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of such encounters, and more than a few expressed
skepticism when it

was announced that the "rule of reason" was to be the
principle governing the approach to resolving the disagreements.

For the purposes of

the project, this rule of reason consisted of the following
guide-

lines 1^
:

1.

All pertinent facts should be shared.

2.

There should be no misleading by the use of unfair tricks

3.

Each other's motives should not be lightly impugned.

A.

Dogmatism should be avoided.

5.

Complex concepts should be simplified for communication
to lay persons

.

.

6.

Subjective considerations should be identified and isolated.

7.

Distinctions should be clearly drawn between facts and

value judgments

.

For antagonists used to battling each other in no-holds barred courtroom

fights, this kind of "reasonable" approach would be a novel one indeed.

The project was divided into five task forces, each responsible
for a different area of interest: Mining, Coal Transportation, Air

Pollution, Fuel Utilization and Conservation, and Energy Pricing.

In

addition, an Ad Hoc Task Force was established to deal with the Issues
of emission charges which overlapped several of the other task forces'

areas of interest.

Each of these groups was composed of equal numbers

of environmental and industrial members.

environmental and industrial co-chairman.

Likewise, each group had an
In this particular experi-

ment, there were no separate, neutral mediators which ran the meetings.
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As the participants settled into a series of meetings,
punctuated
by actual visits to coal operations, they found much to
their surprise
that there were numerous areas of policy in which agreement could
be

reached.

In the projects draft report, released in February of
1978,

the groups professed "80 percent agreement," and cited a list of

literally hundreds of specific policy recommendations on which they
concurred.

Both sides made serious modifications in previously held

positions. Industry representatives, for example, accepted the principle
that several coal bearing regions of the U.S. should be placed virtually

off-limits to mining operations.

These areas included scenic areas in

Appalachia, valuable farm land in the Midwest, difficult to restore arid
areas in the Southwest, and areas with groundwater aquifers or springs
that would be disrupted by raining.

For their part, environmentalists

made a surprising retreat from their long standing insistence that every

new coal-burning plant install the "best available technology" to reduce
emissions, agreeing with industry that some flexibility in this require-

ment could help to encourage the development and use of more experimental
and cheaper ways of meeting emission standards.
the project,

Although at the end of

there remained several areas of basic disagreement, virtually

all the participants expressed astonishment at the degree of their success.

Assessing the Success of Dialogue

Despite this kind of enthusiasm by the project participants, this
particular project has been less than a success in real policy

terras.

Interviews with project directors and participants reveal that few of
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the mutually agreed upon policy recommendations have been
implemented

or even seriously considered by Congressional policymakers.

When asked

what the real policy effects of this project were, the typical responses were, "Not much," "Not enough," "Not very many," and "You
really go for the jugular, don't you."^^

This lack of impact seems

largely due to the fact that many of the recommendations have failed
to get the support of

organizations

— like

the powerful coal and electric industry trade

the Edison Electric Institute.

Without such

backing, the recommendations have little chance of being enacted into
law.

22

Also, some environmental groups, like the Environmental Policy

Center, have also been critical of the projects recommendations, arguing
that few "real" environmentalists took part in the project and that
the recommendations represent a sell-out to the industries involved.

Thus in terms of concrete policy pay-offs, this particular attempt at

dialogue might be called a failure.
But we should not be too quick to label such "failed" projects as
a

waste of time.

As Hannah Pitkin has argued, just because attempts

at dialogue do not produce agreements which effectively deal with the

problems being addressed does not mean that they are total failures.
Her analysis, again informed by the work of Wittgenstein, of the nature
of moral and political dialogue suggest that there are several purposes

served by dialogue besides that of reaching possible agreements.

She

points out, for example, that one of the benefits of dialogue is that it

encourages antagonists to see each other more as human beings.

As we
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saw in Chapter 4, there is a real tendency in modern,
large-scale
politics to view other human beings as abstractions,
as objects to be

manipulated.

But dialogical encounters can begin to undermine
this

tendency by actually bringing people together in face-to-face
situations.
It is much more difficult to see people as objects or
abstractions when

one is having prolonged conversations with them.

As Pitkin argues,

the

whole activity of persuasion tends to require one to view the other
person as a human being.

Moral discourse is precisely the kind of exchange which Martin
Buber calls an "I-Thou" relationship, in which the other is
addressed and conceived of as a human being, a person basically
like oneself
It is a relationship that requires mutual identification and empathy. Thus, one can say following Hannah Arendt,
that moral discourse is a mode "in which human beings appear to
each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men."^'^
.

Again, this kind of humanization is not a guaranteed product of a

dialogue

— but

again, the experience of many in the National Coal Policy

Project demonstrated that it is possible for adversaries to move from
scorn to mutual respect.

Journalist Tom Alexander relates an example

of one such experience:

At first, the indusrial members of the mining task force were
horrified when they heard that one of the members picked for
the environmental side was Robert Curry, professor of geology
In the past, Curry's biting
at the University of Montana.
testimony before courts and hearings had often lacerated the
technical competence and the motives of his industrial opBut by the time the mining task force had completed
ponents.
its first field trip through the lignite fields of the Gulf
States, Curry's expertise and evenhanded attitude had earned
"If I wanted to open a
the industry men's profound respect.
mine in the West," says lawyer John Corcoran, co-chairman of
the mining task force and a former board chairman of Consolidated Coal, "Bob Curry is the first man I would go to about the
environmental problems. "^^
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Pitkin also points out that one of the main purposes
of dialogue
is

to increase understanding,

even if final agreement cannot be reached.

"The point of moral arguments," she explains," is not
agreement on a

conclusion, but successful clarification of two people's
positions

vis-a-vis each other.

Its function is to make the positions of the

various antagonists clear—to themselves and to others. "^6

xhus one

of the benefits of even "failed" dialogues is that they can help
both

sides better understand their own assumptions, values, and arguments,
as well as those of the opposition.

At times, this dialogue may only

intensify disagreement, as when the parties discover more basic or

previously obscured reasons to disagree.

But even this helps in the

sense that the conflict will now be a more clear and straightforward
one

— not

one based on misconceptions or distortions of other people's

positions.

For example, it could be that an environmentalist going

into a discussion with a coal company operator might believe that much of
the problem with coal companies has to do with the insensitivity of

their owners and managers.

They may be seen as greedy corporate ogres

who almost enjoy despoiling the environment.

But after several en-

counters the environmentalist would most likely see that these managers
are people much like himself and that they are not ogres and are not

totally insensitive to the needs of the environment; but rather, that
it is the requirements of

their business which encourage them to avoid

their environmental responsibilities.

Being profit-making enterprises,

it is simply rational for them to ignore environmental requirements that
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would lower their profits and thus threaten their ability
to compete
and survive in the market-place.

Thus the environmentalist can realize

that the problem here is not so much a function of the individual
people

involved, but is a function of the structure of the industry itself.

This may mean that the problem is even more basic and intractable
than

previously thought, but at least now the real nature of the problem
and disagreement is clear.

Thus one need not be naively enthusiastic

about the prospects of possible agreement to pursue this dialogical
approach, for even if one believes that most policy disagreements are
too basic to be solved by rational dialogue, dialogue can still be

seen as a way to make those conflicts more well-defined.

Dialogue may

not be able to eliminate political fights, but it can make them better
ones

The Policy Analyst as a Political Actor

It could be argued that some of these activities implied by a

dialogical approach cross the line between policy analysis and political
activity; that an effort at integrative analysis, for example, puts
the analyst more in the role of a political actor intervening in the

process of political disputes than that of a neutral analyst.
is true

— but

I

This

have contended all along that policy analysis is not

an apolitical, intellectual activity, but a political activity with

real political effects.

All this dialogical approach does is to make

this more explicit, and seek to delineate how the analysts can act
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politically to enhance the rationality and morality
of public policies.
This alternative perspective sheds the illusion
of apoliticism and
not only acknowledges but embraces the fact that
in order to ensure
the production of the best public policies, the policy
analyst must

sometimes become a political actor.

Much of this chapter has been

concerned with showing that a new, more humanistic approach to
public

policy analysis involves more than using different kinds of
theoretical
assumptions and writing different kinds of policy reports— it also involves redefining how an analyst acts in the political system.

A commit-

ment to more rational and moral public policies is also necessarily a

commitment to certain kinds of political action.

In particular, it

implies a commitment to the creation of the kinds of genuine dialogue
and discourse which fosters more policy rationality in the political

system.

And this commitment in dialogue in turn implies a commitment

to the creation of the kind of democratic and participatory political

system in which that kind of interaction is maximized.
These kinds of commitments mean that the policy analyst must
sometimes become an advocate of change in the political system.

For

example, changes in our political system may be necessary to ensure that

fair and open policy discourse takes place, to ensure that policy debates

are not structured in a biased way or that certain participants are

excluded arbitrarily.

While few people in the United States are actively

prevented from taking part in policy debates, the structure of some of
the institutions in which debate takes place can work to indirectly
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favor certain speakers and exclude others.

In particular,

the

mass media is structured in such a way that access
to it is very

directly related to financial clout.

Newspapers, television, and

radio constitute the central means by which policy issues
are debated
in

public— but

the ability to take out advertisements in these media

which promote and argue certain policy positions is directly a
function
of the financial resources of the particular interest group.

This means

that policy debate can often be dominated by well-financed interest

groups

i

which should be a matter of concern for analysts committed to a

fair and rational dialogue on the important policy decisions that are

facing us.
This kind of defacto bias in the media can have real effects in
the policy.

Consider the debate which took place over Proposition

the 1978 California election.

in most public areas.

5

in

That proposition attempted to ban smoking

Polls taken in August, two months before the

election, revealed that the public favored the measure, 58% to 38%.

Sensing a threat to their interests, the big five tobacco companies
(Brown & Williamson, Liggett and Myers, Lorrillard, Phillip Morris,

and R.J. Reynolds) poured nearly $5.6 million into a massive and high-

powered media campaign against the measure.

(This was more money than

Governor Brown and his opponent spent together on their campaigns.)
Public groups supporting the proposition could only raise one-tenth
as much, and spent $512,000.

By November,

the polls revealed a voter

switch to 56%-42% against the measure, which was eventually defeated
in the election.

?7

Establishing causality is obviously difficult in
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these situations, but undoubtedly some of this turn-around can
be

attributed to the massive political advertising campaign by the tobacco
interests, and the one-sided policy debate it produced. Thus if an

analyst is concerned with promoting more open and rational policy
debate, he or she must inevitably come face-to-face with a number of

current political issues

— namely

the ability of wealthy interest groups

to dominate public policy debates, and to exert an undue amount of

power in the policymaking process in general.

To ensure fair debate,

the policy analyst must logically get politically involved in elimi-

nating at least the inequalities that are present in our present policy

discourse system.

Since little can be done on an individual level,

fostering these changes would probably require the analyst to become
allied with the political groups that share these concerns

— for

example,

citizen groups who are promoting equal time provisions for political
ads, and other solutions to this problem.

There are other political issues which also naturally fall into
the analyst's area of concern.

For instance, an analyst committed to

more dialogical and participatory forms of policy planning and analysis
could quickly become involved in the current campaign for more citizen

participation in the public policy process

— especially

on the part of

those poor and powerless groups who have been traditionally disen-

franchised from the planning process.

In particular, an analyst advo-

cating more participatory policy analysis might also have to advocate

more participatory forms of making policy decisions.

Participatory
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analysis means little by itself if the participants have
no real

ability to effect policy decisions.

There would be little reason for

citizens to devote their time and energy to a dialogical
process if
they have no real power to ensure that their contributions
are taken

into account.

Indeed, it could be argued that without any access to

real power, many of the promising participatory approaches to analysis
and planning that have been discussed here are largely a waste of
time

— or

even worse, merely a way of co-opting those citizens who take

part in them.

An interactive hearing for example might only function

to give the illusion of participation, while policy decisions are

actually largely structured by the influence of powerful special interest
groups working behind the scenes in the policymaking process.
As Sherry Arnstein pointed out in her new classic study of public

participation in policy planning, most forms of participation are
routinely used to either propogandize, placate, or co-opt the public.

Hearings are often used purely as ways to further the plans of the
agencies which hold them, either by using them as a way to defuse public

discontent by allowing criticisms to be aired in a harmless way, or as
a kind of tokenism which gives the appearance that the agency has taken

into account public desires when in fact the policies had already largely

been decided.

A specific example of an attempt to use participatory

techniques to further agency ends can be found in an 1978 Department of

Energy Task Force report on the problem of nuclear waste disposal.

Waste disposal is one of the most difficult problems facing the nuclear
industry.

There have been technical difficulties with finding a suitable
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storage method, but also there have been serious political obstacles
as well.

'

In particular, there has been stiff public resistence in

various states against the idea of making their town or state the

nation's nuclear dumping ground.

Several members of Congress have

supported legislation that would require state referendums before disposal sights were approved but the DOE has been reluctant to support

such measures.

But curiously enough, the

task force report emphasized

the importance of holding public hearings in areas being considered as

disposal sites.

The reasoning became clear however when the director

of the task force said that he thought the government could convince

the people near those waste disposal sites that it would be safe by

discussing concerns with interested citizen groups in the area. 29

It

is difficult of course to assess the motives of policymakers in the

DOE, but it seems reasonable to conclude that some sought to use public

hearings to diffuse dissent on their waste disposal plans, and to create
an opportunity for government technical experts to come into a local

area and "educate" the citizens about how safe these disposal sights
really are.
In her study, Arnstein concludes that an interest in public partici-

pation in policy planning must also logically lead to a concern over how
political power is distributed.

As she explains, "without the redis-

tribution of power, participation is an empty and frustrating process for
the powerless.

It allows power holders to claim that all sides were

"3°
considered when only a few will benefit.

She argues that participation

citizen
can only be meaningful when it takes the form of direct
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participation in making policy decisions, as in the case of

coiranunity-

controlled schools and neighborhood-controlled city programs.

This

notion that the concerned policy analyst must become involved in
questioning the nature and structure of political power in our society
is also supported by the work of Roger Kasperson and Myrna Breitbart.

In their essay, "Participation, Decentralization, and Advocacy
Planning,"-^-'-

they conclude that analysts must become more concerned

with eradicating the large inequalities in economic and political power
that bias the making of public policy decisions in our country.

They

also suggest that we begin to cautiously explore the benefits of de-

centralized governmental structures

— structures

which are accessible

and allow citizens to be more directly involved in analyzing and deciding

upon the policies which affect their lives.

One move in this direction

might be the creation of more of the small publicly-owned utility
systems that were discussed in the prior chapter.

Instead of citizen

interests being represented by remote, politically appointed state
utility commissioners, or by citizen groups which can only testify at
rate hearings, a small co-operatively-owned or municipally-owned utility

where the directors were directly elected from the ranks of its customers
would offer a much more direct avenue of public control over these
important institutions.
As Kasperson and Breitbart point out, analysts who pursue these
is
kind of political changes are not in for an easy time; and this

especially true for analysts who work within government agencies.
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Analysts will find themselves going against the ingrained values and
procedures of the centralized, bureaucratic institutions in which
they find themselves.

Commenting on the uncomfortable position that

advocates of public participation sometimes find themselves in,

Kasperson and Breitbart observe that

Program development in government stresses efficiency, program
results, minimization of manpower and resource expenditures,
and rapid decision-making.
But any genuine participation
process is, at least in the short-run, inefficient, costly,
time-consuming, and uncertain. Effective participation calls
for a commitment of sufficient depth to override these other
values
Admittedly, this kind of commitment is difficult to maintain in a

hostile environment, and that is one reason why it is important to link
up with people and groups both within and outside of the government

which can provide aid and support for these kinds of changes.

And even

though efforts to change the nature of the policy planning and policy-

making process can be a laborious and frustrating endeavor, the experience of people like Bryan Tomlinson and the staff of the Virginia Board
of Health Planning shows how even small innovations can be quite

exciting and very rewarding.
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CHAPTER

XII

ENERGY GROWTH AND HUMANISTIC ANALYSIS

Up to this point, my discussion of humanistic policy analysis

has been largely theoretical,

concentrating primarily on develop-

ing the methodological, philosophical, and political justifications

for such an approach.

While this development was important, the

question remains of just how practical and useful this method of
analysis can be in illuminating the policy issues which face us
as a nation.

I

believe that the approach can be extremely useful,

and I will attempt to demonstrate this in this chapter.
I

will again turn to the issue of

To do this,

energy growth, an issue touched

upon repeatedly throughout this work.

This time, however, the focus

will be primarily upon the substance of that issue,

and on what new

insights into this subject a humanistic form of analysis has to offer.

The choice of this policy is a timely one, for the issue of energy
growth is again high on the national policy agenda.

The cornerstone

of the Reagan administration's energy plan in the assumption that vig-

orous energy growth is the basic solution to our energy problem.
In my consideration of this issues,

I

will first give a brief

account of the history of the debate over energy growth, and then

describe the current state of this debate.

The rest of the chapter

will explore how the various techniques of humanistic policy analysis
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— in particular

moral analysis and multiple-scenario analysis— can

shed light on this important issue.

It will be shown that a human-

istic approach can play a vital role in encouraging a more
serious
and democratic debate in this controversial policy area.

The Early Debate Over Energy Growth

Before the early 1970' s, there was no debate over the necessity
and desirability of energy growth.

As noted in Chapter VII, virtual-

ly all energy and economic analysts assumed that energy production

must continue to expand in order to meet the requirements of an evergrowing economy.

There was believed to be an "iron-link" between ener-

gy and economic growth.

Even as late as 1976, the Chase Manhattan

Bank's Energy Report confidently claimed that "there is no evidence
that indicates that the long-lasting, consistent relationship be-

tween energy use and GNP will change in the future.

There is no

sound, proven basis for believing a billion dollars of GNP can be

generated with less energy in the

Thus is seemed that one

future."'''

could not question energy growth without also questioning economic
growth, and there was little sense in that.

Throughout the 1970'

s

the energy industry seized upon this as-

sumed one-to-one relationship between energy and economic growth to

promote increased energy production and the weakening of environmental
constraints interfering with this development

.

The effectiveness of this

line of argument was heightened by the declining state of the economy

during that decade.

Particular emphasis was placed on the issue of

unemployment, and the prospect for there being loss of jobs if new,
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reliable energy supplies were not developed quickly.

A report from

the Westinghouse Energy Office illustrated this aspect of the indus2

try's argument.

The report consisted almost entirely of quotes noting

the unemployment caused by the energy shortages of 1973 and 1977.

The sudden curtailment of the energy supply in the fall of 1973
(OPEC oil embargo) resulted in unemployment of approximately
500,000 people.
U.S. News and World Report
February, 1977
...a 2% shortfall in energy production could mean the loss of
900,000 jobs.
Rep. Mike McCormack
^
U.S. House of Representatives

Based on this evidence, the report concluded that there is a
provable, one-to-one correlation between energy growth and

Again they quoted Representative McCormack:

.job

growth.

"The phenomenal correlation

between energy consumption and employment cannot be ignored with impunity."

4

And the report included the figure belox^ to prove its point.
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However, throughout the 1970'

s,

these arguments met with increasing

skepticism from independent energy analysts.

One of the first major stu-

the Ford Foundation
dies to cast doubt on the iron-link assumption was
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report, A Time to Choose , released in 1974.^

A good example of the

multiple-scenario approach described in Chapter VIII, this report
was able to construct a plausible Zero Energy Growth scenario.

The

scenario demonstrated that while conservation through curtailment

might cost jobs, conservation through increased efficiency of energy
use would not harm employment at all.

By using increased energy effi-

ciency and investment in less energy intensive sectors

of

the economy,

the United States could sustain economic and job growth and still main-

tain energy consumption at a constant level.

This report with its

scenario approach, was very instrumental in beginning to generate a
true debate over the necessity of continued energy growth.

This notion that the link between energy growth and economic

growth was more flexible that once assumed became increasingly popular
among non- industry analysts during the 1970'

s.

Analysts from as diverse

perspectives as environmentalist Amory Lovins and the Harvard Business
Chool became equally fond of comparing American energy consumption per

unity of GNP to that of other advanced industrial countries.^

As the

Harvard study pointed out, "West Germany consumed less than three quarters as much energy for each dollar of gross national product as the

United States, and France only half."

The study went on to conclude

that there was so much massive waste and inefficiency in the U.S. ener-

serious commitment to congy system, that "if the U.S. were to make a

servation, it might well consume 30-40% less energy than it now does,
and still enjoy the same or an even higher standard of living."

9

and slower
By the late seventies, the arguments for conservation

public policy
energy growth had begun to make serious inroads in to the
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debate over energy.

Even energy industry analysts began to admit that

the iron-link was probably more flexible than previously
thought.

"We

have found we can decouple the two," announced Shell U.S.A.
in a 1978
report.''"^

And indeed, there seemed to be empirical evidence which
de-

monstrated an unprecedented reduction in the growing demand for oil
and electricity.

During the 1970'

s

the

average GNP increased by 2.9%,

but energy consumption only grew by 1.9% each year; and between 1978
and 1979, U.S. energy production actually declined slightly from 78.15

quades (quadrillion BTU) to 78.02 quads, while GNP rose by 2.3%."

The

1977 Carter administration energy plan also formally acknowledged the

possibility of decoupling energy and economic growth, stating that
"there is no fixed relationship between energy and GNP."

Unfortunat-

ely, despite this encouraging rhetoric, there was no fundamental change

in policy away from the emphasis on energy growth.

In spite of the

Carter administration talk of conservation, the details of his energy

plan actually called for a 26% increased in energy consumption by 1985—
most of which was to be met with increased development of coal and

nuclear power.

The plan advocated only a 2-3% energy savings due to

conservation measures, far less than the potential cited in studies
like that of the Harvard Business School.

13

However, despite this

disappointing lack of action, it was clear that at the end of the decade of the seventies, conservation and slow-energy growth were at
least present on the public agenda.

305

The Current, Stalled Debate

In contrast to the lively debate that took place in the late
1970' s over the question of energy growth, the 1980 's began as a

decade in which this debate would be sacrificed in an attempt to recommit the U.S. to a policy of all-out energy growth.

The coming

of the Reagan administration heralded the revival of the notion of

a strong link between energy and economic growth.

To be sure, no one

is returning to the discredited iron-link hypothesis, but it is argued

by administration analysts that there is still a significant link between energy and economic growth.

It is acknowledged that some con-

servation can be helpful, but it is thought that conservation can only
loosen the

link

between energy and the economy, not decouple it.

In

fact, energy policy spokesmen for the administration, like Secretary
of Energy James Edwards, have argued that too much conservation will

only threaten the prospects for economic recovery.

As he stated at

his appointment hearing before the Senate, "I wish we could conserve

ourselves into full employment in this country, but

we can."^^

I

don't believe

This stance is a reflection of Reagan's contention during

the 1980 campaign that "arbitrary reductions in America's energy use

would slow economic growth.

"^^

The Reagan administration has done away with the Carter's mis-

leading rhetoric of conservation and has explicitly embraced increasing
supplies as the only basic answer to our energy problems.

Among his

policy proposals has been the abolition of the Solar and Conservation
Bank, and the cutting of the government media campaign encouraging
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conservation by $66 million in 1981 and
$210 million in 1982.

Reagan

has also encouraged increased use of coal
and nuclear power for elec-

tricity generation.

In order to increase exploration for
more oil

and natural gas resources, Reagan has decontroled
oil, opened up more

federal lands to development, and allowed increased
off-shore drilling.
By hooking up energy policy to the train of
economic recovery

and growth (if only loosely), the Reagan administration
has succeeded
in leaving conservationists sitting at the station.

This strategy

has been very effective in limiting the scope of the debate
over energy
policy.

Opponents to this massive push

for

energy growth find that

their reluctance to endorse energy growth can be perceived as being

only weakly committed to economic recovery
is currently the highest national priority.

—

and economic recovery
Any talk of serious con-

servation or environmental protection is likely to be quickly attacked
as undermining the possibility of creating more jobs and a healthy

economy.

Thus as long as energy remains coupled to the all important

goal of economic recovery, it seems that the debate can hardly be

more than minimal.
The Reagan administration has not only been successful in putting

ideological limits on the energy debate, it has also attempted to
create an institutional environment that will inhibit public dis-

cussion over energy growth policies.

It has taken several steps to

ensure that parts of the energy policy-making structure are redesigned
in order to discourage

true

democratic debate over policies.

For

example, in early 1981 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed

regulations that would have significantly reduced the ability of the
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general public to gather the information they need to
participate

effectively in nuclear plant liscensing hearings.

Before, individ-

uals or groups involved in liscensing proceedings could
require the

NRC staff to produce documents or answer questions relating
to these
cases.

This process, called "discovery," permitted the public
to

gather detailed information about a power plant before a formal
hearing opens.

But under the NRC's proposal, the formal discovery pro-

cess would have been abolished, and the NRC staff would have decided

whether to respond to inquiries for information or documents.

The NRC

would have furnished the information on a voluntary basis "wherever
practicable."

Richard Pollack, director of

the Critical Mass Energy

Project, noted at the time that without the discovery process, citizens

groups would be unable to get the technical information need to pre-

pare for a hearing.

"Basically, they will take away the tools citizens

have in a democratic proceeding.

"^^

Besides trying to eliminate this discovery process, the NRC
requested at

the same time the authority to issue interim operating

liscenses for nuclear plants before hearings on safety requirements
have been completed.

18

These kinds of policies represent attempts

by the Reagan administration to further limit the debate taking place

over the issue of energy growth by circumventing democratic procedures.
At best, such efforts can have a chilling effect on public discussion
of this important policy issues; at worst,

they constitute a disturb-

ing threat to the viability of democracy and free debate in the 1980' s.
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Applying Humanistic Analysis

How can one begin to question the pro-growth
vision that dominat es
energy policy?

How can one begin to promote a more vigorous
democrat:ic

debate of the full range of options open to the
United States?

Unfor-

tunately, traditional positivistic analysis offers
few ready answers
to these questions.

Indeed, there is little in positivistic analysis

that is incompatible with the current. non-debate in energy
policy.
I

As

pointed out in Chapter II, most policy analysis in energy has
tradi-

tionlly focused on examining the various means to encourage energygrowth.

Little attention is paid in value-free, positivistic analysis

to questioning the end of energy growth itself.

In addition,

the top-

down, technocratic perspective found in much of policy analysis is

very compatible with restricting public debate over issues like nuclear
energy.

It is often argued that such complex questions should best be

left up to qualified policy experts.

However, the current effort to limit debate over energy growth
is surely not compatible with a humanistic approach to policy analy-

sis.

As we have seen, this approach seeks to maximize rather than

minimize rational public debate over important policy issues like energy.

Moreover, the humanistic approach offers interested analysts the

analytic techniques to help open up the discussion over energy growth.
Two techniques in particular would seem helpful in encouraging a more

criticial and broad debate over energy growth.

First energy growth

should be seen more clearly as a moral issue -- not just a technical
one.

Increased debate over current policies would be logically required

309

if it could be

demonstrated that growth is not an unmitigated bless-

ing, but a path full of moral problems that are serious and
not

easily solved.

Secondly, multiple- scenario analysis could be use-

ful in constructing alternatives that would serve to further open
up debate over this issues.

If it could be shown that a no-growth

or slow-growth energy path is a plausible possibilitiy , this would

undermine the atmosphere of necessity that supports the dominance
of current growth policies.

Let us consider in more detail what

these two approaches to the energy growth issue would look like.

Energy Growth and Basic Societal Needs

If a true debate is to take place over energy growth, the auto-

matic desirability of energy growth would have to be directly questioned.
One would have to penetrate the normative mystique that surrounds the

notion of energy growth; for most Americans seem to believe that increased energy growth would be an unmitigated boon to society.

There

are however many moral issues contained in energy growth which can be
used to cast doubt on this assumption.

Indeed, there are too many

such issues to deal with all of them in this limited space, but we
can at least sketch out what several of the most productive lines of

moral argument would be.

There are several morally problemmatic areas

that, if sufficiently emphasized, could serve a levers to open up the

debate over the desirability of energy growth.
For example, it was shown in Chapter IX that the basis of many

moral judgements is the notion of basic human needs, and that policies
fail in
can legitimately be evaluated in terms of how they succeed or

meeting these needs.

It is useful to ask,

therefore, how effective

current policies of energy growth are in meeting the basic
needs of
Americans.

The basic needs that would be most useful to focus on

for our purposes would be (1) the physical need for a healthy
envir-

onment;

the social/political need to reduce inequities in Amer-

(2)

ican society; and (3) the pressing economic need of increased employ-

ment.

It is safe to say that this set of needs does embody many of

the most basic and important needs of our society today.

And yet

energy growth turns out to be a very ineffective way of meeting
those needs.

Clearly energy growth is an extremely poor way to encourage a

healthy environment.

Indeed, energy growth has been consistently

singled out by environmentalists as one of the most fundamental
threats to the health of the human and natural environments.

In-

creasing energy growth, as advocated by the current administration,

would necessarily require increasing use of coal and nuclear power
both of which exhibit serious environmental problems.
but a few:

(1)

To mention

increased coal development would encourage more mine

deaths from accidents and occupational diseases like black lung;

(2)

increased coal burning means increases in gaseous and particulate

pollution which are known to be harmful to human health;

(3)

coal

combustion also contributes heavily to acid rain and acid dust which
are detrimental to natural ecological systems; (4) the C02 created
by coal combustion threatens to raise the mean temperature of the
earth, which could cause destructive climatic changes;

(5)

mining

of uranium has been shown to cause low-level radiation threats to
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human health;

(6)

nuclear plant accidents could cause potentially

devastating and long-range destruction to human and natural
populations;

(7)

nuclear waste disposal presents health hazards which have

not yet been solved; and (8) the export of nuclear technology encour-

ages the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increases the probability of nuclear war.

One could go on

a healthy environment is a good,

— but

the obvious point is that if

then increased energy growth is mor-

ally questionable on those grounds.
It can also be argued that increased energy production and its

environmental costs also undermine the basic moral principle of equity.
All of the health risks generated by increased energy production and

consumption are not shared by the population equally.

Instead what

we usually find is that a small portion of the population is expected
to bear the risks and the costs, while another portion of the popula-

tion reaps most of the benefits.

As David Orr discovered, decisions

about the development and use of energy sources produce specific

groups of winners and losers: "The winners are cooled, coiffured,

and entertained electrically, while the losers are strip-mined, irradiated and polluted."

19

And as Orr points out, it is these inevitable

inequities of current energy growth policies that have fueled many of
the attempts by public groups to slow-down or block the expansion of

energy production.

The emergence of anti-nuclear groups, farmers

protesting high-voltage lines, and Indians protesting desecration of
holy land by coal developers are all due in part to the failure of

current growth policies to fulfill the moral criterion of equity.
ability
Current attempts by the Reagan administration to limit the
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of such groups to take part in the policy-making process may
be some-

what effective in obscuring these moral problems

— but

such problems

will continue to exist and grow worse as energy development procedes.

Energy Growth and Jobs

Even if energy growth undermines the values of equity and envir-

onmental health, it might be argued that growth is still necessary to
ensure increased employment

nomic needs.

— currently

one of our most pressing eco-

And if there were indeed a trade-off between employment

and the values of equity and the environment, then it is clear that a

moral case could be made for increased growth.

One would simply ar-

gue that the need for a healthy economy with increased jobs must cur-

rently take precedence over the other values.

However, it is ques-

tionable whether such a trade-off actually exists, for many analysts
have argued that there may not be a direct link between energy growth
and increased jobs.

Let us consider two versions of this argument.

The first version posits that it is misleading to suggest that

increased energy production and utility expansion will m.aximize job
production.

20

The energy industry is not very labor intensive, and

it can be shown that capital invested in the energy industry will in

facte create substantially fewer jobs than the same capital invested
in other kinds of business.

As the table below indicates, a job in

the petroleum industry requires about 21 times the capital investment
as a job in textiles.

In other words, investing in textiles produces

20 times more jobs than investing in the petroleum industry.

for the utility industry are almost equally discouraging.

Figures

It would

seem then that the expansion of the energy industry
would b e a poor

way to promote increased employment.

Table

4

21

CAPITAL INVESTMENT PER JOB'

Industry

Capital Investment
per employee

petroleum
public utilities
chemicals
primary metals
stone, clay, glass
all manufacturing (average)
food and kindred products
wholesale and retail trade
services
apparel and other fabricated textiles

$108,000
105,000
41,000
31,000
24,000
19,500
18,000
11,000
9,500
5,000

It is sometimes argued that while investing in increased ener-

gy production produces relatively few new jobs directly, it does cre-

ate indirect increases in employment.

And indeed, invested money

respent in the economy (the multiplier effect) and stimulates increased output and employment.

But this phenomenon in itself is little

reason to invest in energy specifically

multiplier effect.

— for

any investment has this

Even unemployment benefits have a multiplier ef-

Thus this indirect employment argument gives us no strong rea-

fect.

son to invest in the energy industry over any other.

The second version of the attack on increased energy as neces-

sary for increased employment is illustrated in the work of Herman

Daly.^^

Daly questions the assertion that there is a direct, positive

correlation in the economy between more energy and more jobs
gued by the Westinghouse report cited earlier.

as ar-

He points out that
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energy often serves as a substitute for labor, not
merely as a complement.

As the push for increased automation substitutes energy
for labor

in industrial processes,

the total number of workers would naturally

tend to decrease rather than increase.

Daly argues that the only rea-

son that the total numbers of workers have increased in some
industries is because of increases in demand that have accompanied a growing population.

Thus while it has appeared historically that energy

expansion has been causing increases in jobs, it was actually constantly expanding demand which led to constantly expanding employment.
Daly's arguments are supported by the fact that very few new

jobs are produced by the energy intensive sectors of the economy.
is the service sector

—

It

including such things as banks, hospitals, re-

tail stores, schools, insurance companies, etc.

— which

have accounted

for nearly all new employment in the U.S. and this service sector is
the least energy intensive sector of the economy.

As Daly points

out, of the total net increment of fourteen million jobs between
947 and 1965, the service sectors accounted for thirteen million,

while industry accoundted for only four million, and agriculture accounted for a decrease of three million.

He concluded that "to al-

lege that large increases of in energy input are needed to provide

new jobs seems to presuppose that the average new worker will work
in a steel or aluminum plant, a counter-factual presupposition,

asmuch as it is likely he will work in a service institution."

in-

23

This line of argument would seem particularly relevant to the

attempt to question the Reagan administration's effort to link enerand greater employment. The
gy growth to the goals of reindustrialization
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link between reindustrialization and energy growth is
clear— reindus-

trialization focuses on revitalizing the basic industries
(automobiles,
steel, etc.)

— which

already constitute the most energy intensive

sectors of the economy.

Reindustrialization would make these indus-

tries even more energy intensive because the plan calls for increasing

amounts of technology and automation.

Greater automation is seen as

necessary in order to increase the labor productivity of these firms,
and greater labor productivity is seen as the key to stemming inflation.

Increased industrial production can only be anti- inflationary

if greater labor productivity makes those goods relatively cheaper.

But while it is clear that such a plan could require greater energy

production and comsumption, it is less clear that it would produce
substantial increases in employment.

If Daly is correct,

such an

economic approach might not be effective in producing the large
amount of jobs the society requires.

In that case, increases energy

production will not only produce greater environmental degradation,
it may also fail to produce the jobs which are supposed to make the

degradation worth it
Of course,

—

the worst of both worlds.

the potential failure of this energy- intensive re-

industrialization program to produce a substantial increase in employment might not be perceived as a failure at all

whether this was in fact its original intention.

— it

depends on

It could easily be

that the primary aim of this program is not to increase employment
at all, but to increase the productivity and the profits of our basic

industries.

Despite the Reagan administration's rhetorical bow to

the goal of greater employment, the nature of its reindustrialization
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program could suggest that this important goal is not
their highest
priority.

A Conservation Scenario

While a normative critique of the assumed good of energy growth
can be useful for casting doubt on our current energy path, little

real debate over energy policy can be expected without a plausible

alternative path.

A clean environment and higher employment are ob-

viously desirable goals, but it must be shown that slowed energy
growth makes both possible.

The task of laying out the complete

details of such an alternative energy path is a complex one; but
enough work has been done in this area that it is relatively easy to
identify the important elements of such a scenario.
First, increased energy conservation would have to have high

priority.

By energy conservation

I

do not mean curtailment of ration-

ing of energy, but increased efficiency of energy use

cars,

— higher-mileage

insulated houses and other buildings, more efficent lighting

and appliances, etc.

If the Harvard study is correct, we can easily

run our economy on 30-40% less energy that we use today.

This kind

of conservation would be a much more effective way to meet the basic

needs discussed earlier. The potential threats

to

the human and na-

tural environments posed by a strong conservation program are very

minimal compared with a policy of increased growth.

Serious conser-

vation would also mean less need for more off-shore drilling, nuclear
plants, and coal plants, and thus would avoid all of the potential

health risks that these projects would inevitably entail.

It

is also
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clear that a conservation program would
eliminate many of the equity

problems discussed earlier.

As environmental costs and risks are

minimized, so too is the potential for inequitable
distribution of
those costs and risks.
Further, conservation as increased efficiency would
not cause

increased unemployment.

with less energy.

It would simply mean doing the same jobs

In fact, some analysts have argued that a con-

servation scenario would actually create a substantial increase in
jobs due to the expansion of a labor intensive conservation industry.

For example, Richard Grossman's analysis concludes that "con-

servation policies yield more jobs and a more stable economy than
does our

present energy policy."

25

To support his point, he cites

a study by the Bonneville Power administration that found that "high
impact conservation programs create more jobs than would be created

by building new power plants to generate an equivalent amount of

energy."

26

Grossman also notes the optimistic findings of a study

done for the state of Colorado:
The State of Colorado has estimated that 17 million private
homes in the nation need ceiling insulation; 20 million need
clock thermostats; 20 million need caulking and weatherizing;
10 million need storm windows.
In addition, millions of multiple-unit dwellings, apartment houses, commercial and industrial buildings are inadequately insulated and weatherized.
If 487,000 jobs are generated by only three simply conservation procedures in a small fraction of the buildings which
need work, the potential obviously exists for millions of
Employment for energy specialists, construction of
jobs.
more energy efficient equipment, jobs for architects and engineers will be increased, along with jobs in the field of
insulation, heat pumps, electronic controls and systems analyses, communications and transportation. 27

Given this potential for employment, there is clearly no real
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trade-off between conservation and jobs; and it is
equally clear that
if increased employment is a valued goal in our
society,

that con-

servation policies should be highly valued on those grounds.

Thus

an energy policy scenario which emphasized strong, across-the-board

conservation measures would seem to be both desirable and plausible.
The Next Step: Questioning Economic Growth

An effort to focus more attention on the moral problems of

continued energy growth, and on the plausibility of the intensive

conservation scenario could be useful in opening up the currently
stalled debate over energy growth.

Indeed, just such an approach

(as exemplified by the Ford Foundation Study and the work of Amory

Lovins) already proved useful in the first effort to widen the de-

bate in energy policy during the seventies.

It is possible that

such an approach could be effective again, and such a path is certainly worth pursuing.

However, new analytic and political devel-

opments suggest that a new kind of challenge to current energy policies might also be called for.

In particular, it might now be nec-

essary to question more directly the notion of economic growth un-

derlying the push for stronger energy growth.
for this.

There are two reasons

First, the current administration has been relatively suc-

cessful in tying together energy and economic growth

evidence that the link is questionable.

— in

spite of

Second, and perhaps more

importantly, it may be that conservation can only decouple energy
and economic growth

temporarily and that in the long-run increasing

economic growth will necessarily require increased energy growth.
Let us consider these two arguments.

One reason it may be necessary to focus more explicitly
on the
issue of economic growth is that the Reagan administration
has made
it an issue in current energy policy decisions.

And despite that

fact that this attempt to recouple energy and economic growth
may
be questionable on empirical grounds, Reagan has nevertheless been

successful in linking the two issues in the public's mind.

Thus in

order to gain leverage in the debate over energy policy, it may be

necessary to criticize Reagan's current economic growth policies.
If the logic and the desirability of these policies can be undermined

then it would be much easier to question the necessity of energy

growth as well.
The other reason a challenge to economic growth policies might
be necessary is related the analyses that indicate there actually is
a very close link between energy and economic growth

the long run.

— at

least in

For example, the work of William Ophuls in his much

praised book. Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity

,

suggests that de28

coupling energy and economic growth can only by done temporarily.

He argues that when most energy waste is eliminated and energy ef-

ficiency is maximized, then once again there will be a very tight
link between energy and economic growth.

Insulating houses now may

lessen demand in the short run; but if one continues to build houses,
even insulated ones, eventually energy demand must again begin to
rise.

While a possible 40% gain in efficiency may at first seem a
very large amount, Ophuls demonstrates that if economic growth continues at current rates, such a "conservation program can buy no
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mare than a decade or two of time" before we again face
serious demands to increase energy production. 9 Q

servation can be "extremely

He concludes that while con-

useful over the next few decades in help-

ing to alleviate the impact of fuel shortages and reducing
dependence
of foreign oil,

...energy conservation can never be more than a short-

term palliative. ""^^
For several reasons then, any plausible, long-range alternative
to the problems created by endless energy growth may have to eventual-

ly question the viability of the continually growing economy.

Needless

to say,

Econo-

this is a very difficult line of argument to develop.

mic growth is one of the most deeply entrenched values in American

society

— but

nevertheless, the challenge to current economic growth

policies is probably a necessary one if there is to be any hope for
an alternative approach to energy policy.
Again, humanistic analysis can point the way and indicate what
the general outline of an effective challenge to economic growth would

look like.

The attempt to generate a serious debate over the viability

of continuous

economic growth would take the same basic form as the

attempt to widen the energy debate.

First, one would need to focus

on the cost and moral problems generated by current economic growth

policies, and second, one would have to construct a plausible alter-

native vision of a healthy economy.
The moral challenge to economic growth is obviously a necessary
one; for if one cannot demonstrate that current growth policies create

more problems than they solve, then no alternatives will ever be taken
seriously.

Several lines of moral argument suggest themselves here:

1.

As with energy growth, one should emphasize the destruction
of human health and the natural environment caused by the

resource exploitation and inevitable pollution that must
result from an economy dedicated to increasing levels of

production and consumption.
2.

It should also be pointed out, as William Ophuls does, that

there are basic ecological limits to economic growth

— lim-

ited amounts of land, water, energy etc., which make con-

tinued growth not only undesirable but impractical.
3.

In terms of social values, one should emphasize the current

suffering created by policies (like the cutting of food
stamps, school lunch programs, unemployment benefits, etc.)

which are intended to encourage growth, but impact most severely on those least able to afford it.
4.

Also, it would be relevant to demonstrate that despite all
of its promises, economic growth has been unable to elimin-

ate poverty in the U.S. or to mitigate the vast inequalities in wealth and income that exist in the U.S.
5.

Special attention should also be paid to the arguments of
those like Fred Hirsch (cited earlier in Chapter VII) who

demonstrate that economic growth will never be able to pro-

vide universally the kinds of scarce social values that all
citizens increasingly seek.

32

In short, a moral challenge to economic growth policies would

develop two fundamental lines of argument.

First it would be argued
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that growth as currently pursued, has failed to meet a whole range of

basic human needs

— environmental,

economic, and social.

Second,

and equally important, it must be argued that economic growth cannot
in principle

ever meet some of these needs.

As analysts like Ophuls

and Hirsh have pointed out, some of the goals of growth are simply

physically impossible to meet -- and thus continuous economic growth
is morally irrational.

Recall that in the discussion of moral ra-

tionality in Chapter IX, it was seen that one of the essential features of an effective and rational moral argument is that the desir-

able act be "practical, " that it be possible to accomplish the act.

Demonstrating that economic growth fails this practicality criterion
can be an effective way of dampening the natural moral appeal of
growth.

This is an extremely important kind of argument to make,

for as long as economic growth continues to be seen as the most

practical way to solve many of our country's problems, no alternative will be taken truly seriously.

No-Growth or Different Growth

As in the case of energy, the second thrust of any challenge to

economic growth would necessarily be the development of an alternative

vision of a healthy economy
growth.

— one

which did not require continuous

This is a large and extremely problematic task.

One of the

few economists who have attempted to take on this task is Herman Daly.

no-growth or
Daly has spent considerable time working on a model of a

"steady-state" economy.

According to Daly, a steady-state economy is
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one in which "the total population and total stock of physical
wealth
are maintained through-put." 33

Translated into more easily understood

terms, a steady-state economy would require that:

(1)

we have a constant

population in order to ease that most basic source of pressure for
growth;

(2)

we have a constant rather than increasing level of physical

stock (houses, cars, consumer goods, etc.) on which that population depends; and (3) we maintain those stocks with the minimum amount of re-

sources being put through the economy.

This last concept of minimum re-

sources through-put is in many ways the key one in a steady-state economy, and the most relevant to the consideration of energy policy.

If one

of the basic problems with constant economic growth is acknowledged to be

the ever increasing amount of non-renewable natural resources (including

energy)

that such a production system requires (and the inevitably in-

creasing pollution this process creates), then the only viable long range

solution is a production system which uses a constant minimum amount of
those resources to maintain the standard of living of the constant population.

Minimum through-put would imply several basic changes in our
energy and production systems.

In terms of energy, it implies a move

away from non-renewable energy resources and an emphasis on renewable
sources such as solar.

In the production system, there would be a

shift in emphasis from goods that require frequent replacement to
goods which are durable or easily repairable.

As Daly explains, this

simple shift would have fundamental impacts of the quality of American life:
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For the stock of wealth, a low rate of through-put
(low production
and equally low consumption) means greater life
expectancy or durability of goods and less time sacrified to production.
This
means more "leisure" or non-job time to be divided into
consumption time, personal and house-hold maintenance time,
cultural
time, and idleness. 34

Such a low-production/ low consumption society might first

appear to not offer the necessary number of jobs for the population.
But Daly points out that low resource through-put also implies minim-

izing energy use, and this would encourage the substitution of labor
for energy in many production processes.

And there is a neat com-

patibility between the emphasis on industries which are labor and
skill intensive and the need in a steady-state econom.y for high

quality goods which will be durable.
Obviously, such a short description of the steady-state economy
cannot do justice to the rich vision that is present in Daly's books.
However, it is possible to see that his is a provocative vision that

deserves attention from those concerned about the problems of economic and energy growth.

In practical political terms, however, Daly's

vision may simply be too radical to appear plausible to most Americans.

And indeed, one finds that Daly's work has recieved little

serious attention.

short-run

— while

interested

in

This is a serious political deficiency.

In the

the growth ideal is still alive in America

— those

pursuing alternative energy policies might find it

more advantageous to advocate different visions for growth, rather
.than the no-growth ideal itself.

Until the normative attack on

growth is felt more strongly by the public and policymakers, it might
make more sense to simply emphasize the need for different kinds of

economic growth.

One could promote policies

— such

as a policy of

growth in the development of non-renewable resources, or
a policy
of growth in the labor intensive sectors of the economy

— which

not

only have current relevance, but also lead in the direction
of a

steady-state economy.

Support for these kinds of transition policies

may be the only viable tactics, given the present political realities.
Any attempt to put the no-growth alternative on the national policy

agenda now would most likely be premature and ineffective.

Conclusions

The foregoing discussion has clearly not been detailed enough
to provide any concrete answers to our current energy and economic

problems

— but

it was not intended to do so.

My intention was more

humble: to demonstrate that the humanistic approach to policy analysis
can indeed be relevant and yield some insights into these crucial

policy issues.

And

I

believe that it has been shown that these anal-

ytic techniques can be useful, especially in the attempt to provoke
a more serious democratic debate over energy and economic policy.

Such a debate would necessarily involve developing and promoting
lines of argument similar to those just described.

And to this

extent, the effort to promote a more humanistic approach to policy

analysis can be seen as a desirable one.
However, the humanistic approach demands that one last point
be made: it is naive to assume that any new analytic approach would
be sufficient in itself to open up currently narrow policy discussions.

As I have continually stressed throughout this work, policy
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decisions are political decisions.

Policy paths are set for political

as well as moral and rational reason.

The dominance of the all-out

energy growth scenario in the Reagan
administration must finally be

understood not simply as a function of an overly
narrow and conservative analytic perspective, but also as a function
of whose interests

are represented most strongly in this administration.

Whose inter-

ests dominate energy policy decisions was made clear
even before the

1980 election when Reagan chose his Energy Task Force

—

the group

who designed the approach which serves as a blue-print for
current

Reagan policies.

Of the 17 signers of the task force report, seven

were chairman, vice-chairman, or presidents of oil, chemical, utility
or nuclear companies.

No women, no environmentalists, no experts in

arms control, nor experts in energy efficiency or conservation were

represented on the panel.

It is hardly surprising,

then, that the

panel recommended the growth policies long advocated by the energy
industry.
Thus, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, any attempt
to ensure rational debate and policy choices in areas like energy

policy must be a political as well as an intellectual task.

At-

tempts must necessarily be made to broaden democratic participation
in our policy-making institutions.

Without a more representative

cross-section of people, interests, and views in the policy-making
process, there is little hope that a serious debate over current en-

ergy policies will take place.
This realization of the central importance of political change

should not be taken to mean that encouraging a more humanistic

approach to policy analysis is irrelevant or secondary.

Indeed,

this approach remains a necessary and useful element in any attempt
to encourage more wide-ranging and rational policy debates.

It can

serve as an invaluable tool for undermining the conceptual con-

straints and biases which help to unduly limit our present policy
choices

— and

this in itself is an important contribution to the

cause of democracy and good policy.
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